^\.s^ 

Ms  s 


STATE  OP  MICHIGAN 


BULLETIN  NO.  3 

ISSUED  BY  THE 


INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 

LANSING 


EARLY  RULINGS  OF  BOARD 

OPINIONS  IN  LEADING  CASES 

ADMINISTRATION  AND  PRACTICE 
RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 

FORMS  AND  BLANKS 


DECEMBER,  1913 


Members  of  Board: 

John  E.  Kinnane,  Chairman;  Ora  E.  Reaves,  James  A.  Kennedy, 


Richard  L.  Drake,  Secretary. 


/ 


STATE  OF  MICHIGAN 


BULLETIN  NO  3 

issued  by  the 

INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 

LANSING 


EARLY  RULINGS  OF  BOARD 

OPINIONS  IN  LEADING  CASES 

ADMINISTRATION  AND  PRACTICE 
RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 

FORMS  AND  BLANKS 


DECEMBER,  1913 


Members  of  Board: 

* 

John  E.  Kinnane,  Chairman;  Ora  E.  Reaves,  James  A.  Kennedy, 


Richard  L.  Drake,  Secretary. 


f  T  kW  ,  ^ 


hAss 

l?S) .  $ 


PROVISIONS  AND  PROGRESS  OF  THE  LAW. 

This  bulletin  has  been  prepared  by  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  in 
the  hope  that  its  contents  will  be  of  material  assistance  to  those  in¬ 
terested  in  the  operation  and  administration  of  the  Compensation  Law. 
It  embodies  the  system  of  administration  and  procedure  adopted  by  the 
Board,  and  substantially  presents  the  experience  of  the  Board  in  ad¬ 
ministering  the  law  from  the  time  it  went  into  effect,  September  1, 
1912,  to  the  date  of  this  bulletin,  December  1,  1913.  It  presents  under 
the  head  of  “Early  Rulings  of  the  Board,”  the  important  decisions  on 
administrative  and  substantive  features  of  the  compensation  act  made 
during  the  early  period  of  its  administration,  and  which  developed  to 
a  large  extent  the  system  of  administration  and  construction  finally 
adopted  by  the  Board.  This  is  followed  by  the  more  formal  opinions 
of  the  Board  filed  in  leading  cases  which  were  heard  and  disposed  of 
on  Review.  It  also  presents  the  system  of  “Administration  and  Prac¬ 
tice”  adopted  by  the  Board,  which  is  intended  to  cover  at  least  in  a 
general  way  the  methods  and  means  of  conducting  and  transacting 
business  before  the  Board  in  connection  with  cases  or  matters  that  are 
contested,  or  that  require  judicial  action.  It  covers  under  the  head  of 
“Rules  of  Procedure”  the  reporting  and  handling  of  accidents  and  all 
procedure  in  the  adjustment  of  claims  and  payment  of  compensation  in 
cases  that  do  not  reach  arbitration.  It  also  presents  copies  of  the 
forms  and  blanks  adopted  and  used  by  the  Board  with  appropriate  ex¬ 
planations  by  notes  and  otherwise  as  to  their  use.  It  will  be  seen  that 
the  leading  purpose  of  this  bulletin  is  to  furnish  to  those  interested  in 
the  administration  of  the  law,  the  means  of  information  as  to  the 
rulings  of  the  Board,  and  all  matters  of  administration,  procedure  and 
practice  before  the  Board,  as  well  as  in  reporting  and  handling  acci¬ 
dents  and  the  payment  of  compensation.  The  Board  here  wishes  to  ex¬ 
press  the  hope  that  this  bulletin  will  furnish  to  those  interested  in  and 
handling  matters  under  the  compensation  law  the  information  which 
heretofore  was  conveyed  by  the  expensive  and  laborious  method  of 
5  answering  thousands  of  letters  of  inquiry. 

The  Compensation  Law  has  become  a  most  potent  factor  in  the  in¬ 
dustrial  and  social  life  of  Michigan.  More  than  ten  thousand  em¬ 
ployers  of  labor  have  accepted  the  provisions  of  the  law,  thus  bringing 
under  its  operation  practically  half  a  million  industrial  workers  in  the 
factories,  mines,  railways,  shops,  stores,  and  other  industries  through¬ 
out  the  state.  In  addition  to  these,  it  also  covers  the  employes  of  the 
state  itself,  of  the  84  counties,  the  108  cities,  335  villages,  1,245  town¬ 
ships,  and  7,362  school  districts  of  the  state. 

The  operation  of  the  law  with  particular  reference  to  the  workers 
under  its  provisions  is  further  shown  by  the  following  facts  and  figures 


4 


taken  from  the  records  of  the  Board,  viz.:  Total  number  of  accidents 
reported  to  date,  21,172;  of  which  number  there  were  495  fatal,  2,112 
amputations,  7,150  major  (causing  disability  of  eight  weeks  or  more), 
and  11,415  minor  (causing  disability  of  less  than  eight  weeks).  It  will 
be  noted  that  under  the  “Rules  of  Procedure”  adopted  by  the  Board, 
only  “accidents  which  result  in  disability  continuing  for  more  than  one 
full  working  day,”  and  also  accidents  involving  the  loss  of  a  member 
or  resulting  in  death,  are  reported  to  the  Board;  and  that  the  above 
number  of  accidents  does  not  include  any  injury  unless  its  severity  was 
such  as  to  cause  at  least  one  full  day’s  disability. 

During  the  period  that  the  law  has  been  in  operation,  there  have 
been  14,413  agreements  for  compensation  filed  with  and  approved  by 
the  Board;  266  cases  of  arbitration;  61  cases  heard  on  Review  before 
the  full  Board,  and  10  appeals  to  the  Supreme  Court. 

While  the  immediate  purpose  of  the  law  is  to  provide  compensation 
for  industrial  accidents,  its  influence  and  effect  is  not  limited  to  that 
sphere.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  exerted  a  m«st  potent  influence  in  the 
prevention  of  industrial  accidents.  One  of  the  most  gratifying  results 
from  the  operation  of  the  law  is  the  steady  decrease  in  the  number  of 
accidents  daily  occurring  throughout  the  state.  One  year  ago  the 
average  was  two  fatal  accidents  each  day  and  100  accidents  that  were 
non-fatal.  At  the  present  time  the  average  of  fatal  accidents  is  less 
than  one  per  day,  and  of  non-fatal  accidents  65.  Never  before  in  the 
history  of  Michigan  has  the  movement  for  accident  prevention  and 
providing  safety  devices  of  every  description  in  the  factory,  on  the  rail¬ 
road,  and  in  the  mine,  been  carried  forward  with  such  zeal.  Every  in¬ 
dustrial  accident  in  Michigan  now  costs  money,  and  the  provision  of  the 
law  requiring  the  employer  to  furnish  medical  and  hospital  services 
makes  costly  even  the  minor  accidents  where  the  disability  is  of  such 
short  duration  as  not  to  extend  into  the  compensation  period.  No 
system  for  compelling  the  installation  of  safety  devices  and  methods, 
enforcible  by  penal  statutes  or  executive  orders,  could  bring  about  the 
degree  of  perfection  and  efficiency  along  that  line  which  is  attained 
today  by  many  Michigan  employers  operating  under  the  Compensa¬ 
tion  Law.  The  fundamental  problem  in  the  management  of  any  busi¬ 
ness  enterprise  in  the  industrial  world,  is  to  make  it  pay.  Every  acci¬ 
dent  now  costs  the  business  a  fixed  or  readily  ascertainable  sum  of 
money,  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  persuade  the  business  man  or  manager 
to  take  active  measures  to  prevent  such  drain  when  captains  of  in¬ 
dustry  can  see  that  the  large  sums  of  money  which  go  to  pay  for  acci¬ 
dents  can  be  saved  and  turned  into  the  profits  of  the  business  if  such 
accidents  can  be  prevented,  or  their  number  materially  lessened,  the 
business  instinct  is  aroused  and  the  energy  formerly  directed  in  other 
lines  is  turned  to  the  subject  of  accident  prevention. 

Even  this  tells  but  part  of  the  story.  Employers  everywhere  are 
studying  the  subject  of  industrial  accidents,  and  are  coming  to  regard 
them  as  being  largely  preventable.  It  would  be  unjust  to  say  that  the 
great  change  in  sentiment  on  this  subject  and  the  state  wide  movement 
for  accident  prevention  is  due  solely  to  the  desire  of  employers  to 
save  money.  In  many  cases  they  have  caught  the  sentiment  that  is 
being  developed  on  this  subject,  and  realizing  that  at  best  compensa¬ 
tion  is  but  a  poor  substitute  for  life  or  limb  or  health  lost  through  the 


5 


hazards  of  industry,  they  are  doing  splendid  work  for  the  prevention 
of  accidents  from  unselfish  and  humane  motives.  In  fact  some  have 
become  real  enthusiasts  in  the  work.  The  workmen  individually  and 
through  their  organizations  are  studying  the  subject  of  accident  pre¬ 
vention  and  seeking  to  do  their  full  share  to  reduce  the  number  of 
industrial  accidents  to  the  minimum.  The  schools  and  civic  organiza¬ 
tions  throughout  the  state  are  commencing  to  join  the  movement,  so 
that  on  the  whole  it  may  be  said  that  the  most  substantial  good  re¬ 
sulting  from  the  law  is  the  great  reduction  in  the  number  of  industrial 
accidents  and  the  humane  spirit  aroused. 

For  the  large  degree  of  success  attained  by  the  Compensation  Law 
in  this  state,  much  credit  is  due  to  the  fine  spirit  shown  by  the  em¬ 
ployers  and  their  hearty  co-operation  with  the  Board  in  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  the  Law;  and  to  a  like  spirit  and  co-operation  on  the  part 
of  the  workingmen  of  the  state.  Much  credit  is  also  due  to  the  Press 
of  the  state  for  the  wide  publicity  given  and  the  hearty  co-operation 
and  interest  shown  in  the  work  of  the  Board  since  the  inauguration  of 
the  law. 

JOHN  E.  KINNANE,  Chairman , 
ORA  E.  REAVES, 

JAMES  A.  KENNEDY. 

RICHARD  L.  DRAKE,  Secretary. 


EARLY  RULINGS  OF  THE  BOARD. 


COMMISSION  SALESMEN. 

It  is  the  present  opinion  of  the  Board  that  a  salesman  receiving  com¬ 
mission  only  is  an  employe  in  the  meaning  of  the  Act.  The  fact  that 
his  compensation  is  computed  on  the  basis  of  sales  made  instead  of  on 
days  or  weeks  spent  in  the  work  would  be  unimportant,  as  merely  being 
a  different  method  of  computing  compensation  for  his  work. 


PRESUMING  DURATION  OF  DISABILITY. 

The  ruling  of  the  Board  as  to  estimating  the  duration  of  disability, 
is  that  such  estimates  cannot  be  made  a  basis  of  settlement,  and  that 
the  agreement  shall  include  and  embrace  the  sum  of  the  amount  to  be 
paid  weekly,  together  with  the  data  by  which  the  sum  is  arrived  at,  and 
that  such  payments  shall  continue  until  the  disability  ceases.  When 
the  disability  ceases  a  final  receipt  and  report  is  to  be  filed  with  the 
Board  closing  the  matter. 

VIOLATION  OF  SHOP  RULES. 

It  is  the  present  opinion  of  the  Board  that  a  mere  violation  of  rules 
or  instructions  of  the  employer  would  not  constitute  wilful  and  in¬ 
tentional  misconduct  within  the  meaning  of  the  act.  It  would  have  to 
be  shown  at  least  that  the  violation  was  intentional  and  wilful,  and  not 
through  inadvertance  or  inattention.  The  question  as  to  what  consti¬ 
tutes  wilful  and  intentional  misconduct,  will  in  most  cases  be  a  ques¬ 
tion  of  fact,  depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  act  complained  of  and 
the  circumstances  surrounding  the  particular  accident. 


POSTING  OF  NOTICES  BY  EMPLOYERS. 

On  the  question  of  posting  notices,  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down 
that  will  be  applicable  to  the  infinite  variety  of  circumstances  and  con¬ 
ditions  found  in  the  various  industries  of  the  state.  The  employer 
should  in  good  faith  endeavor  to  so  post  these  notices  as  -to  effectually 
bring  to  the  knowledge  of  his  employes  the  fact  that  he  is  operating 
under  the  workmen’s  compensation  law.  The  provisions  directing  the 
manner  and  place  of  posting  notices  found  in  Sec.  6,  Part  1  of  the  law 
shall  be  closely  followed,  and  will  be  found  applicable  to  the  situation 
in  most  industries. 


INSURANCE  COMPANY  REPORTING  FOR  EMPLOYER. 


With  reference  to  the  matter  of  making  reports  of  accidents  to  the 
Industrial  Accident  Board,  the  law  imposes  the  duty  upon  the  employer 
.and  if  the  insurance  company  does  the  reporting  for  him  it  does  it  sub¬ 
stantially  as  his  agent  or  representative.  The  burden  of  making  the 
report  is  placed  on  the  employer  and  the  liability  for  failing  to  report 
falls  also  upon  the  employer,  and  in  case  of  failure  to  report  prosecution 
for  the  penalty  would  have  to  be  had  directly  against  the  employer.  If 
the  insurance  companies  do  this  work  of  making  reports  for  the  em¬ 
ployers  with  the  usual  efficiency  and  regularity  with  which  they  handle 
business,  we  think  the  work  so  done  would  be  acceptable  to  the  Board. 


POSTING  OF  NOTICES  BY  MUNICIPALITIES. 

It  is  the  present  opinion  of  the  Board  that  the  posting  of  notices  in 
case  of  a  building  erected  for  a  municipality,  as  stated  in  your  letter, 
is  not  necessary  or  contemplated  by  the  law.  The  municipality  comes 
under  the  provisions  of  the  law  not  bv  election  but  by  force  of  the  statute 
itself.  All  persons  dealing  with  a  municipality  are  bound  to  take  notice 
of  this  fact,  just  the  same  as  they  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  any  other 
law  which  by  its  own  force  becomes  binding  and  operative.  The  office 
and  purpose  of  the  notices  to  be  posted  under  certain  provisions  of  the 
law  is  to  bring  to  the  employe  knowledge  and  notice  not  of  the  law 
itself,  but  of  the  action  taken  by  the  employer,  to-wit,  his  election  to  be 
subject  to  its  provisions. 


INJURY  AGGRAVATED  BY  DISEASE. 

Claimed  by  employer  that  injured  employe  was  afflicted  with  disease  which 
aggravated  wound  to  eve  caused  by  flying  piece  of  rock.  Claimed  that  disease 
and  not  injury  caused  loss  of  eye.  Held,  ;hat  existence  of  disease  generally  does 
not  relieve  employer  of  obligation  to  pay. 

It  is  held  that  where  a  man  receives  an  injury  which  results  seri¬ 
ously  on  account  of  some  latent  disease  in  the  system,  that  the  fact  of  the 
existence  of. such  disease  does  not  relieve  the  employer  from  the  obliga¬ 
tion  to  pay  for  the  injury  that  results.  This  rule  is  based  upon  the 
principle  that  we  are  dealing  in  actual  business  life  with  the  average 
man,  and  not  with  the  perfect  man.  It  is  the  present  opinion  of  the 
Board  that  the  English  and  German  rule  should  be  applied  in  this  case. 


PARTIAL  INCAPACITY  AFTER  FOURTEEN  DAYS. 

The  employe  was  totally  incapacitated  for  fourteen  days  and  returned  to  work 
on  the  fifteenth  day  at  a  reduction  of  wages.  He  has  received  50%  of  his  loss 
in  salary  for  six  weeks  and  the  question  that  arises  is,  should  he  receive  com¬ 
pensation  for  the  first  two  weeks,  and  if  so,  how  much? 

It  is  the  opinion  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  that  inasmuch  as 


8 


the  incapacity  resulting  from  the  accident  (part  being  total  and  rest 
partial  disability)  continued  for  more  than  eight  weeks,  as  it  did  under 
your  statement,  the  employe  would  be  entitled  to  compensation  for  the 
first  two  weeks  under  Section  3  of  Part  II  of  the  Act.  Inasmuch  as 
the  disability  for  the  first  two  weeks  was  total,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the 
Board  that  for  said  first  two  weeks  he  should  receive  compensation 
for  total  disability. 


COMPENSATION  NOT  PAYABLE  TO  ADMINISTRATOR. 

There  is  no  provision  of  the  compensation  law  authorizing  the  pay¬ 
ment  of  compensation  in  death  cases  to  an  administrator  of  the  estate 
of  a  deceased  employe.  The  statutes  of  this  state  commonly  known  as 
the  “death  act”  and  the  “survival  act”  expressly  provide  for  suit  and 
recovery  by  an  administrator  in  cases  brought  for  causing  wrongful 
death,  under  the  above  acts  respectively,  but  this  right  of  the  admin¬ 
istrator  is  created  by  such  statutes.  Such  administrator  has  no  right 
to  claim  or  receive  any  compensation  payable  under  Act  No.  10  Public 
Acts  of  1912.  The  act  expressly  provides  that  in  death  cases  the  com¬ 
pensation  shall  be  paid  to  the  dependents  of  the  employe,  and  such  pay¬ 
ments  shall  be  made  direct  to  them  without  the  intervention  of  an  ad¬ 
ministrator  or  trustee.  In  case  any  of  such  dependents  are,  minors  or 
mentally  incompetent,  a  guardian  may  be  appointed  by  the  proper 
Probate  Court. 


LIABILITY  OF  BOAT  OWNERS. 

With  reference  to  an  election  under  the  Compensation  Law,  the  owner¬ 
ship  of  the  boat  set  forth  in  your  letter  raises  a  novel  question.  Under 
the  Admiralty  Law  the  boat  is  treated  as  the  unit  and  it  is  held  liable 
for  contracts,  debts  and  obligations  and  all  suits  and  actions  to  enforce 
same  are  brought  against  the  boat,  irrespective  of  its  ownership.  It 
would  seem  that  to  bring  the  boat  under  the  Compensation  Law,  the  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  one  or  more  of  the  part  owners  of  the  boat  would  not  suffice. 
The  acceptance  of  the  individual  owners  of  undivided  shares  of  the 
boat  apparently  would  have  the  effect  of  bringing  such  owners  under 
the  Compensation  Law,  but  there  is  much  doubt  as  to  whether  such  ac¬ 
tions  would  bring  the  boat  under  the  provisions  of  the  Compensation 
Law.  If  all  of  the  owners  of  the  boat  would  unite  in  signing  an  ac¬ 
ceptance  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  boat,  of  the  Compensation  Law,  it  un¬ 
doubtedly  would  be  valid  to  bring  the  boat  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Law. 


NEGLECT  TO  PROPERLY  CARE  FOR  INJURY. 

In  this  case  it  was  claimed  that  the  employe  received  a  slight  cut  on 
the  finger  and  neglected  to  have  the  same  treated.  Infection  set  in 
and  the  employer  applied  to  the  Board  to  be  relieved  from  liability  for 
loss  of  the  finger  or  hand,  as  the  case  might  be,  alleging  that  no  further 


9 


trouble  would  have  been  experienced  had  the  employe  accepted  proper 
medical  treatment.  Held  by  the  Board,  that  the  case  stated  was  one 
of  fact  rather  than  law  and  the  Board  would  not  assume  to  pass  upon 
it  until  claim  was  made  for  the  injury  and  a  full  hearing  had.  In  most 
cases  where  it  is  claimed  that  the  disability  or  loss  of  a  member  by  the 
employe  was  caused  by  his  refusal  to  accept  proper  medical  treatment, 
or  to  properly  care  for  the  injury,  the  facts  are  more  or  less  in  dispute, 
and  the  final  determination  of  the  question  will  depend  largely  upon 
the  facts  established  at  the  hearing.  No  rule  can  be  laid  down  in  ad¬ 
vance  that  will  govern  or  dispose  of  such  cases,  as  each  of  them  would 
have  to  stand  on  its  own  merits. 


PAYMENTS  TO  BE  MADE  WEEKLY. 

The  Board  has  carefully  considered  the  question  raised  by  a  consider¬ 
able  number  of  employers  of  labor  in  the  State,  as  to  whether  payments 
of  compensation  under  the  law  may  not  be  made  monthly  or  bi-weekly 
instead  of  being  made  in  weekly  payments.  The  provision  of  the  law 
is  plain  requiring  such  payments  to  be  made  weekly.  There  is  no  power 
vested  in  the  Board  to  suspend  or  modify  this  provision  of  the  law  or 
to  substitute  for  it  bi-weekly,  monthly  or  quarterly  payments.  From  the 
language  used  throughout  the  Act,  it  seems  apparent  that  the  clear  pur¬ 
pose  of  the  legislature  was  to  provide  that  compensation  receivable  under 
this  law  should  go  to  the  persons  or  families  entitled  to  the  same  in 
weekly  payments,  and  that  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  legislature  that  com¬ 
pensation  paid  weekly  would  more  effectually  meet  the  wants  and  relieve 
the  distress  of  injured  employes  and  their  families  than  of  a  greater  in¬ 
terval  of  time  elapsed  between  such  payments.  The  question  of  changing 
the  time  of  making  payments  is  one  for  the  legislature,  if  there  is  real 
ground  for  complaint  on  account  of  the  present  provisions. 


METHOD  OF  PAYING  COMPENSATION  FOR  LOSS  OF  MORE 

THAN  ONE  FINGER. 

Injured  employe  lost  index  (35  weeks),  second  (30  weeks)  and  third  (20  weeks) 
fingers.  Question  raised  as  to  whether  payment  should  be  made  at  the  rate  of 
50%  of  wages  for  each  finger  each  week  or  50%  of  salary  for  85  weeks.  Held, 
that  latter  is  correct  method. 

The  Industrial  Accident  Board  has  considered  the  question  as  to  the 
manner  of  payment  in  a  case  where  three  fingers  are  lost  by  an  accident 
to  an  employe.  The  conclusion  reached  by  the  Board  is  that  the  rate 
of  payment  in  such  a  case  is  one-lialf  of  the  weekly  wages  of  such  em¬ 
ploye,  and  that  the  number  of  weeks  for  which  such  weekly  payments 
shall  continue  is  to  be  determined  by  the  number  of  fingers  and  the 
schedule  of  compensation  for  the  particular  fingers  lost.  There  is  no 
provision  of  law  by  which  more  than  Ten  ($10.00)  Dollars  per  week 
could  be  paid,  and  this  fact  would  make  improbable  and  unworkable 
the  theory  that  weekly  payments  for  each  finger  lost  should  be  made 
each  week,  continuing  until  the  claim  of  the  less  valuable  fingers  drop 
2 


10 


out  of  the  account,  and  until  the  one  most  valuable  is  fully  paid  for. 
The  same  rule  would  apply  in  case  of  toes  or  other  members. 


PARTIAL  DISABILITY;  DUTY  TO  SEEK  EMPLOYMENT. 

An  employe  who  is  recovering  from  an  injury,  and  who  has  recovered 
so  far  that  the  disability  is  only  partial,  cannot  reasonably  be  required 
in  his  partially  disabled  condition  to  go  among  strangers  looking  for 
work.  Such  requirement  would  not  be  reasonable,  and  the  probabilities 
of  his  obtaining  work  if  required  to  so  seek  it  would  be  very  remote. 
On  the  other  hand  if  his  employer  has  work  suitable  for  him  to  per¬ 
form  in  his  partially  disabled  condition,  and  which  he  can  do  without 
causing  suffering  or  inconvenience,  and  offers  to  give  him  such  work, 
then  it  is  the  duty  of  such  employe  to  accept  the  work  tendered  and 
thereby  reduce  the  liability  for  compensation.  That  if  the  employer 
has  no  such  suitable  work,  or  having  such  work  fails  to  tender  it  to 
the  injured  employe,  the  compensation  cannot  be  reduced  upon  the 
theory  that  there  are  classes  of  work  which  he  is  able  to  do  and  which 
he  might  obtain  perhaps  if  he  diligently  sought  for  it,  and  which  on 
the  other  hand  he  might  not  be  able  to  obtain  at  all. 


LUMP  SETTLEMENT  DURING  DISABILITY. 

The  employe’s  hand  was  severely  injured  and  the  ultimate  result  of 
the  injury  uncertain.  The  employe  and  employer  desire  to  enter  into 
an  agreement  as  to  the  probable  period  of  disability  and  make  settle¬ 
ment  therefor  by  a  lump  sum  payment.  Held  that  the  Board  will  not 
approve  settlement  where  period  of  disability  is  presumed  or  estimated. 

As  a  result  of  the  injury,  the  employe’s  right  hand  has  been  rendered 
practically  useless,  but  there  is  a  prospect  of  making  the  hand  useful, 
and  perhaps  as  good  as  ever,  by  a  surgical  operation.  However,  the 
Board  cannot  act  upon  probable  results  of  such  operation,  and  cannot 
make  an  order  that  will  discharge  entirely  the  employer  from  liability 
upon  any  showing  as  to  the  prospects  of  removing  the  disability  that 
now  exists.  Time  alone  will  determine  whether  such  disability  can  be 
removed.  The  Board  advises  that  the  employer  advance  enough  money 
to  defray  the  expense  of  the  proposed  operation.  If  such  operation  is 
successful  and  removes  the  disability  both  the  employer  and  employe 
will  be  benefited. 


RE-EMPLOYMENT  NO  PART  OF  SETTLEMENT. 

After  the  employe  in  question  recovered  from  a  serious  injury  a  settlement  was 
proposed  for  less  than  the  full  amount  of  compensation  provided  for  in  the 
law,  the  further  consideration  for  such  settlement  being  that  the  employe  was 
to  be  reinstated  by  the  employer  to  the  position  which  he  occupied  before  the 
injury.  When  this  proposed  settlement  was  submitted  by  the  employer,  approval 
was  refused  for  the  following  reasons: 

By  the  Board:  The  matter  of  reinstating  an  employe  to  the  position 


11 


he  occupied  before  the  injury  should  not  enter  into  the  matter  of  settle¬ 
ment  and  cannot,  under  the  law,  be  in  any  way  considered  by  the  Board. 
When  an  accident  occurs  to  an  employe  as  in  this  case,  causing  the  loss 
of  certain  fingers,  you  immediately  become  indebted  to  such  injured 
employe  for  an  amount  fixed  by  the  law,  which  indebtedness  it  becomes 
your  duty  to  honorably  discharge  by  payment.  In  such  case,  if  you 
discriminate  against  the  injured  employe  by  refusing  to  reinstate  him 
with  your  company  because  he  insisted  on  the  payment  of  the  amount 
so  due  him  for  the  injury,  such  action  on  your  part  would  be  morally 
and  legally  wrong. 


MINERS  RECEIVING  PART  PAY  IN  SUPPLIES. 

Miners  in  the  coal  region  are  accustomed  to  buy  supplies  from  the  company. 
A  form  of  ticket  is  issued  and  the  amount  of  purchases  is  deducted  from  the 
miner’s  earnings.  When  supplies  are  purchased  from  time  to  time  the  amount 
is  punched  in  the  ticket.  Question:  Is  the  rate  of  compensation  in  case  of  an 
injury  to  a  coal  miner  to  be  based  on  his  earnings  less  the  cost  of  supplies  so 
purchased? 

By  the  Board:  “As  a  general  proposition,  the  amount  of  money  the 
miner  is  entitled  to  receive  for  the  work  he  does  constitutes  his  wages 
or  earnings.  If  he  gets  from  the  company  during  the  week  articles  of 
clothing,  tobacco,  etc.,  and  the  same  are  charged  against  and  deducted 
from  his  wages  for  that  week,  this  would  not  constitute  a  reduction  of 
the  amount  of  money  earned  by  the  miner  during  the  week,  but  would 
merely  be  the  spending  of  a  portion  of  the  amount  earned.  In  general, 
it  seems  that  this  same  rule  would  apply  to  other  and  different  articles 
furnished  a  miner  from  the  company’s  store  and  charged  and  deducted 
from  his  wages.  This  might  perhaps  be  modified  by  the  contract  or 
scale  in  force  between  the  miners  and  the  company,  if  there  are  any 
agreements  in  such  scale  that  would  have  the  effect  of  causing  such 
modification,  which  we  do  not  assume  to  decide.  There  may  be  special 
circumstances  also  in  some  cases,  and  in  all  disputed  cases  the  parties 
on  both  sides  will  be  given  a  full  hearing  both  on  the  facts  and  the 
law,  before  the  Board  will  render  a  final  decision.” 


MEDICAL  AND  HOSPITAL  TICKETS. 

Under  the  law  the  employer  is  liable  for  the  first  three  weeks  medical 
and  hospital  service  and  medicine,  when  the  same  are  needed.  The 
employer  cannot  avoid  his  duty  in  this  respect  by  deducting  from  the 
wages  of  his  employe  small  sums  of  money  at  intervals  to  pay  for  a 
hospital  ticket  or  membership  in  a  hospital  or  medical  association 
which  is  to  furnish  the  above  service  in  case  of  accident.  The  effect  of 
such  procedure  would  be  to  shift  the  burden  of  paying  for  such  service 
from  the  employer  to  the  employe.  In  this  case  the  hospital  ticket 
was  paid  for  by  money  deducted  from  the  wages  of  the  employe,  and 
when  injured,  the  medical  and  hospital  service  was  furnished  through 
said  ticket  and  membership.  The  physicians  and  hospital  have  already 
been  paid  through  the  ticket,  and  therefore  they  have  no  further  claim. 


12 


The  employe  in  fact  paid  for  the  hospital  and  medical  service,  and  the 
fact  that  he  paid  for  the  same  through  a  hospital  ticket  or  some  hospi¬ 
tal  organization,  is  no  concern  to  the  employer.  The  employe  bought 
and  paid  for  it,  and  owned  it  as  much  as  his  coat  or  hat.  It  therefore 
seems  to  leave  the  plain  question  of  the  employer  paying  to  the  injured 
employe  the  reasonable  value  of  the  medical  and  hospital  treatment 
which  he  received  during  the  first  three  weeks  following  the  injury. 
The  employer  is  liable  for  the  payment  of  the  same,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  Board,  and  the  case  is  not  essentially  different  from  what  it  would 
be  if  the  injured  employe  had  in  fact  paid  the  regular  rates  for  such 
hospital  and  medical  service  at  the  time  the  same  were  furnished. 


PAYMENT  OF  HOSPITAL  EXPENSE  AFTER  FIRST  THREE 

WEEKS. 

In  this  case  the  injured  employe  was  being  treated  at  the  hospital  and  could 
not  be  discharged  at  the  end  of  the  first  three  weeks.  The  hospital  authorities 
wish  to  know  the  source  from  which  they  are  to  be  paid  for  further  service  ren¬ 
dered.  The  employer  writes  a,s  follows:  “It  was  agreed  that  we  withhold  pay¬ 
ment  of  the  weekly  compensation  until  such  a  time  as  the  injured  could  be  dis¬ 
charged.  We  would  then  pay  the  first  three  weeks  ourselves,  and  for  the  re¬ 
maining  time  we  would  pay  the  hospital  from  the  amount  of  the  employe’s  week¬ 
ly  compensation,  and  then  turn  over  to  him  the  balance,  if  any.” 

By  the  Board:  “The  Industrial  Accident  Board  feels  that  your  sug¬ 
gestion  to  withhold  payment  of  weekly  compensation  and  to  pay  hospi¬ 
tal  and  medical  charges  after  the' first  three  weeks  therefrom,  and  then 
turn  over  the  balance,  if  any,  to  the  injured  employe,  cannot  be  ap¬ 
proved  by  the  Board.  If  you  will  consider  for  a  moment  the  rights 
of  the  injured  man  granted  to  him  by  the  statute,  we  think  that  it  will 
be  apparent  that  neither  your  company  nor  the  Industrial  Accident 
Board  have  any  power  to  expend  or  appropriate  the  money  to  which 
he  is  entitled  for  compensation.  The  law  provides  that  this  compensa¬ 
tion  shall  be  paid  direct  to  the  injured  man  and  this  Board  has  abso¬ 
lutely  no  power  to  divert  such  payment  from  him  or  authorize  it  to  be 
done.  We  think  that  the  payment  by  you  of  any  part  of  this  compensa¬ 
tion  to  the  hospital,  or  to  the  doctors  or  others,  would  be  no  defense  to 
a  claim  for  such  compensation  that  the  injured  man  might  afterwards 
assert  against  you.  The  injured  man  is  entitled  to  payment  of  com¬ 
pensation  without  waiting  for  his  recovery  or  for  an  adjudication  of 
the  amount,  and  if  it  is  paid  he  will  in  most  cases  be  able  to  make 
provision  for  his  treatment  and  care.” 


WILFUL  NEGLIGENCE,  WHAT  CONSTITUTES. 

Employers  Statement:  “Krause  and  his  partner  brought  their  car  to  the 
shaft  and  dumped  it  into  the  skip.  His  partner  then  rang  the  bell  and  started 
back  with  the  empty  car,  supposing  that  Krause  was  following  him,  but  instead 
of  doing  so  he  deliberately  stepped  between  the  rails,  probably  not  over  five 
or  six  feet  in  front  of  the  skip,  to  get  some  water  which  is  running  down  the 
shaft,  in  order  to  fill  his  lamp,  with  the  result  that  the  skip  ran  over  him  and 
cut  off  one  foot.  In  this  connection  will  say  that  it  is  absolutely  unnecessary 
for  a  man  to  get  water  where  he  attempted  to  do  so  as  a  place  is  provided  with 


13 


a  tin  can,  at  one  side  of  the  shaft,  for  the  purpose  of  providing  water  for  the 
lamps  the  men  use.  In  this  case  Krause  was  solely  to  blame  for  being  hurt,  as 
it  was  in  no  way  due  to  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  company,  a  fellow  employe 
or  the  natural  dangers  incident  to  the  business  of  mining,  and  we  would  like 
to  know  if  this  accident  would  be  considered  wilful  and  intentional  misconduct." 

By  the  Board:  The  question  as  to  what  constitutes  intentional  or 
wilful  misconduct  within  the  meaning  of  the  compensation  law  is  gen¬ 
erally  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  and  no  final  decision  upon  any 
such  question  could  be  reached  by  the  Board  until  both  parties  are 
given  full  hearing.  However,  the  Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  state¬ 
ment  of  facts  contained  in  your  letter  does  not  necessarily  show  inten¬ 
tional  or  wilful  misconduct.  The  injured  may  have  stepped  in  front  of 
the  skip  through  thoughtlessness  or  inattention,  and  may  have  been 
imprudent  in  doing  so  or  even  negligent,  but  none  of  these  constitute  in¬ 
tentional  or  wilful  misconduct  within  the  meaning  of  the  compensation 
law.  Under  a  like  provision  in  the  Wisconsin  statute  the  following 
rule  has  been  laid  down,  viz. :  “To  be  guilty  of  wilful  misconduct 
which  will  defeat  compensation,  the  person  so  guilty  must  have  know¬ 
ingly  and  intentionally  done  wrong.  The  mere  doing  of  the  wrong 
thing,  or  the  right  thing  in  the  wrong  way  will  not  defeat  compensation. 
It  is  the  conscious  and  intentional  wrong  doing  which  constitutes  mis¬ 
conduct.^ 


LOSS  OF  USEFULNESS  OF  MEMBER. 

The  question  in  this  case  relates  to  the  payment  of  a  specific  amount  for  the 
loss  of  a  portion  of  a  finger,  claimed  to  be  less  than  one  phalange.  The  em¬ 
ployer  contended  that  the  point  of  amputation  was  controlling. 

By  the  Board :  The  action  of'  the  surgeon  in  amputating  a  finger, 
or  in  failing  to  amputate  it,  or  in  choosing  the  point  of  amputation 
is  not  controlling  in  all  cases  of  this  kind.  Each  case  depends  for 
its  decision  upon  the  particular  facts  relating  to  the  finger,  and  these 
might  relate  to  the  point  of  amputation,  or  the  fact  that  the  finger  or 
a  portion  thereof  had  been  rendered  useless  without  being  amputated. 
The  statute  relative  to  the  loss  of  the  first  phalange  cannot  reasonably 
be  construed  to  apply  only  in  cases  where  the  finger  is  unjointed  and 
the  amputation  is  precisely  on  the  joint.  The  place  of  amputation 
should  be  determined  on  the  principles  of  what  constitutes  good  sur¬ 
gery,  the  controlling  thought  being  to  obtain  the  best  result  for  the  in¬ 
jured  person.  This  might  result  in  the  point  of  amputation  being  a 
little  below  or  a  little  above  the  first  joint.  If  the  loss,  in  case  of  such 
amputation,  is  substantially  the  first  phalange,  it  should  be  treated  as 
such  even  though  in  some  cases  it  was  a  trifle  more  and  in  others  a 
trifle  less.  The  real  test  in  such  cases  is,  as  to  whether,  by  reason  of 
the  amputation,  the  injured  person  has  lost  all  that  is  useful  of  the 
first  phalange.  The  Board  is  further  of  the  opinion  that  in  case  no 
part  of  the  finger  is  amputated  and  the  injury  is  such  as  to  entirely  de¬ 
stroy  the  usefulness  of  the  first  phalange  or  the  entire  finger,  in  that 
event  the  injured  person  has  lost  the  first  phalange  or  the  finger,  as 
the  case  may  be,  as  completely  as  if  the  same  had  been  amputated. 


14 


COMPENSATION  FOR  LOSS  OF  MEMBERS  DOES  NOT  DEPEND 

ON  LOSS  OF  TIME. 

The  injured  employe  lost  two  fingers,  which  under  the  provisions  of  the  Michi¬ 
gan  statute  is  deemed  equivalent  to  disability  for  65  weeks.  He  in  fact  returned 
to  work  some  three  weeks  after  the  accident,  resuming  his  accustomed  occupa¬ 
tion  at  the  same  wages  as  before  the  injury.  The  employer  objects  to  paying  the 
65  weeks’  compensation,  and  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  specific  amount  pro¬ 
vided  for  the  loss  of  said  fingers  should  not  be  paid  in  this  case  because  the  em¬ 
ploye  is  earning  the  same  wages  as  before  the  accident. 

By  the  Board:  “Under  the  statement  of  facts  in  your  letter  the  in¬ 
jured  employe  is  entitled  to  receive  $10.00  per  week  for  a  period  of  65 
weeks,  such  payments  to  be  made  weekly.  The  moment  that  the  acci¬ 
dent  occurred,  causing  the  loss  of  fingers  as  stated  the  company  became 
indebted  to  him  in  the  sum  of  $650.00,  payable  weekly  as  above,  and  his 
right  to  receive  said  sum  in  compensation  for  the  loss  of  his  fingers 
does  not  depend  on  his  loss  of  time  and  whether  he  returns  to  work  or 
the  wages  he  receives  thereafter.  The  law  is  so  framed  because  of  the 
fact  that  throughout  the  remainder  of  his  life  he  will  be  deprived  of  the 
fingers  so  lost.  The  Industrial  Accident  Board  has  no  authority  to 
either  vary  or  waive  the  expressed  provision  of  this  law.  The  law  im¬ 
poses  upon  the  Board  the  duty  to  see  that  the  law  is  carried  out  in 
every  respect,  and  does  not  permit  any  compromises  to  be  made.  While 
the  injury  may  not  keep  the  employe  from  his  work  for  any  consider¬ 
able  length  of  time,  still  the  injury  will  result  in  his  being  handicapped 
by  being  deprived  of  the  fingers  so  lost  for  the  remainder  of  his  life, 
and  the  law  expressly  fixes  the  sum  that  he  is  entitled  to  receive  as 
compensation  for  such  loss  without  reference  to  his  employment  or  sub¬ 
sequent  relations  to  his  employer.” 


PLACE  OF  MAKING  PAYMENT. 

Questions  as  to  the  manner  and  place  of  making  weekly  payments 
under  the  compensation  law  to  injured  employes  have  arisen  in  so  many 
cases,  a  general  ruling  by  the  Board  on  the  point  seems  desirable.  In 
some  instances  complaint  is  made  by  persons  receiving  compensation 
that  they  are  required  to  go  an  unreasonable  distance  to  the  place  of 
payment  designated  by  the  employer,  and  that  much  time  and  effort 
each  week  is  thus  expended  in  going  to  and  from  such  place  of  pay¬ 
ment.  The  compensation  law  is  silent  as  to  the  place  of  payment,  the 
language  of  the  statute  being,  “The  employer  shall  pay  or  cause  to  be 
paid  to  the  injured  employe,  etc.”  The  obligation  to  make  payment 
being  imposed  by  law  on  the  employer  without  specifying  the  manner 
and  place  of  payment,  the  common  law  rule  established  in  Michigan 
and  elsewhere  would  apply,  and  this  rule  requires  that  payments  be 
made  at  the  place  where  the  person  entitled  to  receive  such  payment 
resides.  30  Cyc,  page  1185;  McIntyre  vs.  Michigan  State  Ins.  Co.  52 
Mich.  194. 

It  is  the  opinion  of  the  Board  that  all  friction  on  this  point  should  be 
avoided  as  far  as  possible  by  mutual  arrangement  between  employer  and 


15 


employe  as  to  the  place  of  payment,  and  that  neither  should  be  arbitrary 
or  unreasonable  in  the  matter.  Pointing  out  in  this  manner  the  legal 
rights  of  the  employe  entitled  to  receive  weekly  payments  of  compensa¬ 
tion  will  no  doubt  cause  the  removal  of  any  arbitrary  requirements  by 
employers  as  to  the  place  of  payment,  and  thereby  remove  the  apparently 
needless  friction  that  has  arisen  in  that  regard. 

Some  employers  and  some  of  the  liability  companies  have  already 
adopted  a  payment  voucher,  similar  in  kind  to  those  which  have  long 
been  used  by  fire  insurance  companies  for  payment  of  losses,  having 
attached  duplicate  receipts.  The  payee  must  indorse  the  voucher  and 
sign  the  receipts  before  the  same  can  be  cashed,  and  in  practice  the 
genuineness  of  such  signature  is  in  most  cases  guaranteed  by  local  banks 
and  business  men  through  whose  hands  the  voucher  passes.  When  the 
voucher  is  returned  paid,  one  of  the  receipts  can  be  filed  by  the  em¬ 
ployer  and  the  other  sent  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board.  This  plan 
seems  to  furnish  a  system  for  making  payments  of  compensation  through 
the  mails  which  is  apparently  safe  and  satisfactory  to  all  parties. 


PAYMENT  OF  COMPENSATION  TO  MINORS. 

The  question  has  been  frequently  raised  before  the  Industrial  Acci¬ 
dent  Board  as  to  whether  a  guardian  should  be  appointed  before  pay¬ 
ment  of  compensation  can  be  made  to  an  injured  employe  who  is  under 
21  years  of  age.  A  large  number  of  cases  have  arisen  where  the  injured 
employes  are  minors  and  in  some  of  these  cases  the  injuries  were  com¬ 
paratively  slight  and  the  compensation  would  scarcely  more  than  pay 
the  expense  of  a  guardianship.  The  Board  has  carefully  examined  the 
provisions  of  the  statute  upon  this  point,  and  has  reached  the  conclu¬ 
sion  that  in  the  majority  of  cases  at  least  the  compensation  should  be 
paid  direct  to  the  injured  minor.  The  provision  of  the  law  upon  which 
this  conclusion  is  based 'is  found  in  subdivision  2,  section  7  of  part  1  of 
the  act,  and  is  as  follows: 

“Including  minors  who  are  legally  permitted  to  work  under  the 
laws  of  the  State,  who,  for  the  purposes  of  this  act,  shall  he  con¬ 
sidered  the  same  and  hare  the  same  power  to  contract  as  adult 
employes” 

The  evident  purpose  of  this  provision  of  the  statute  was  to  avoid  all 
unnecessary  delay  and  expense  to  minors  in  the  collection  of  and  re¬ 
ceipting  for  compensation  to  which  they  might  become  entitled.  This, 
of  course,  contemplates  that  the  payments  of  compensation  will  be  made 
strictly  in  accordance  with  the  statute,  in  weekly  installments,  and  will 
go  to  the  injured  minor  in  substantially  the  same  manner  in  which  his 
wages  were  paid  before  his  injury,  without  the  intervention  of  a  guard¬ 
ian  or  trustee.  In  cases  where  any  question  arises  between  the  injured 
minor  and  his  parents,  we  think  the  matter  can  be  readily  arranged 
so  as  to  have  the  receipts  for  compensation  signed  by  the  parents  as 
well  as  by  the  injured  minor.  It  seems  to  be  the  plain  intention  of 
the  act  to  make  the  payments  of  compensation  to  injured  minors  a 


16 


matter  as  simple  and  expeditious  as  was  the  payment  of  their  wages 
before  the  injury. 

The  provisions  of  section  14,  part  3,  of  the  Compensation  Law  are 
not  necessarily  in  conflict  with  the  above  construction.  The  latter  sec¬ 
tion  was  intended  to  apply  in  cases  where  the  injury  resulted  in  the 
mental  incompetency  of  the  employe,  and  in  death  cases  where  the  de¬ 
pendents  are  minors,  as  in  these  cases  a  guardian  or  next  friend  would 
be  clearly  necessary.  The  legislature  has  power  to  fix  the  age  at  which 
a  person  becomes  competent  to  enter  into  contracts  and  transact  busi¬ 
ness,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  legal  reason  why  that  age  should  not  be 
fixed  below  21  years  with  reference  to  the  operation  of  this  particular 
act  and  collection  and  receipting  for  compensation  thereunder. 


•  ELECTION,  WHEN  EMPLOYE  SUBJECT. 

We  have  examined  the  provisions  of  section  8  as  to  the  employe  being 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  Act  No.  10  of  Public  Acts  of  1912,  with 
special  reference  to  the  thirty-day  provision  in  subdivision  2  thereof. 

Our  conclusions  are  as  follows: 

That  the  acceptance  of  the  employer  is  a  first  requisite  to  the  em¬ 
ploye  coming  under  the  act.  In  addition  to  the  acceptance  by  the  em¬ 
ployer  the  following  is  required  in  order  to  bring  the  employe  under 
the  provisions  of  the  act: 

(1)  That  employe  did  not  at  hiring  give  notice  in  writing  of 
election  not  to  be  subject  to  act;  or 

(2)  In  case  of  an  old  employe,  whose  contract  of  hiring  ante¬ 
dates  the  employer’s  acceptance,  such  employe  gives  notice  in  writ¬ 
ing  of  election  to  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  act;  or 

(3)  In  case  of  an  old  employe  as  above,  after  employer  has 
accepted  and  posted  notices,  continuing  to  work  without  express¬ 
ing  his  election  either  way  for  a  period  of  thirty  days  or  more. 

The  evident  intent  of  the  law  is  as  follows: 

(a)  Where  a  man  comes  to  a  factory  working  under  the  act  with 
notices  posted,  etc.,  seeks  and  secures  employment,  walks  into  the  shop 
and  sees  the  posters,  and  does  not  go  back  to  the  office  and  sign  and 
serve  a  notice  that  he  elects  not  to  come  under  the  act,  is  deemed  to  have 
accepted  it  and  acquiesced  to  the  conditions  of  employment  in  the  in¬ 
institution  where  he  goes  to  work. 

(b)  In  case  of  an  old  employe  working  in  a  shop,  and  while  so  em¬ 
ployed  notices  are  posted  announcing  that  the  employer  has  accepted  the 
law,  etc.,  if  the  foreman  comes  round  and  passes  out  his  blank  accept¬ 
ances  to  be  signed  by  the  men  who  desire  to  come  under  it,  and  the  em¬ 
ploye  signs  it  and  files  with  the  employer  his  written  acceptance  of  the 
law,  then  such  employe  is  subject  to  the  law,  and  becomes  subject  to 
it  from  the  time  he  signs  and  delivers  to  his  employer  such  acceptance. 

(c)  That  in  case  of  an  old  employe,  who  when  notices  are  posted  in’ 
the  shop  as  above,  continues  to  work  without  giving  notice  that  he 


17 


iinll  be  subject  or  that  he  will  not  be  subject  to  the  law,  and  so  con¬ 
tinues  to  work  for  a  period  of  thirty  days,  then  his  action  in  continuing 
to  work  for  such  period  of  time  is  equivalent  to  an  actual  acceptance, 
and  he  is  deemed  subject  to  the  law.  But  if  he  is  injured  after  having 
continued  to  work  twenty  days  as  above,  then  we  think  he  would  retain 
the  right  to  decide  whether  to  make  claim  under  the  Common  Law  or 
under  the  Compensation  Law.  If  he  made  claim  under  the  Common 
Law  and  brought  suit,  the  employer  would  retain  his  former  defenses, 
the  same  as  if  the  employe  had  made  his  election  not  to  come  under 
the  act  before  the  time  of  his  injury. 


18 


OPINIONS  OF  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD  IN 
LEADING  CASES  HEARD  ON  REVIEW. 


MEDICAL  SERVICES  RENDERED  MORE  THAN  THREE  WEEKS 

AFTER  ACCIDENT. 

In  re  HARRY  HART. 

Claimant  was  injured  while  in  the  exercise  of  his  ordinary  duties,  but  serious 
effects  did  not  develop  until  more  than  eight  weeks  after  the  accident  occurred. 
Payment  for  medical  and  hospital  services  was  disputed  on  the  ground  that 
such  services  were  rendered  more  than  three  weeks  after  the  accident. 

Held:  1.  Sec.  4,  Part  2,  of  the  Compensation  Act,  an  employer  shall  furnish 
the  injured  employe  medical  and  hospital  service  not  exceeding  three  weeks  in 
point  of  time,  and  the  commencement  of  such  service  should  be  at  the  time  the 
injury  requires  it. 

2.  The  words,  “injury”  and  “accident”  as  used  in  the  act  are  distinguished 
thus:  the  “accident”  is  the  CAUSE  of  the  “injury”  and  the  time  is  computed 
from  the  date  of  the  injury  resulting  from  an  accident. 

The  question  as  to  the  liability  of  an  employer  to  pay  for  the  hospital 
and  medical  services  furnished  the  injured  employe  is  involved  in  this 
case.  The  employe,  Harry  Hart,  on  November  16,  1912,  while  acting  in 
the  course  of  his  employment,  caught  hold  of  and  attempted  to  stop  a 
barrel  of  sugar  which  was  rolling  down  a  slight  incline.  His  effort  in 
stopping  it  caused  a  strain  or  rupture  in  the  groin.  He  experienced  some 
pain  at  the  time,  but  it  did  not  appear  to  be  serious,  and  he  kept  on 
at  work  until  January  6,  when  the  hernia  became  more  clearly  devel¬ 
oped  and  its  condition  so  serious  that  it  necessitated  an  operation.  The 
operation  was  successful  and  he  returned  to  work  three  weeks  after  the 
sixth  of  January  fully  recovered.  The  doctor’s  bill  for  the  operation  is 
disputed  by  the  employer  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  incurred  more 
than  three  weeks  after  the  injury. 

The  determination  of  this  question  involves  the  construction  of  Sec¬ 
tion  4,  Part  2  of  the  Compensation  Act,  which  is  as  follows: 

“During  the  first  three  weeks  after  the  injury  the  employer  shall 
furnish,  or  cause  to  be  furnished,  reasonable  medical  and  hospital  ser¬ 
vices  and  medicines  when  they  are  needed.” 

The  claim  is  made  on  the  part  of  the  employer  that  the  injury  having 
occurred  on  November  16,  the  three  weeks  during  which  medical  and 
hospital  service  is  required  to  be  furnished  commenced  on  that  date,  and 
such  three  weeks’  period  had  expired  before  any  part  of  the  medical 
and  hospital  service  claimed  for  in  this  case  was  rendered.  In  the 
opinion  of  the  Board  it  is  the  clear  intent  of  the  law  that  in  all  cases 
the  employer  shall  furnish  the  injured  employe  hospital  and  medical 
service  if  the  injury  requires  such,  but  not  exceeding  three  weeks  in 
point  of  time.  That  the  commencement  of  such  service  to  be  furnished 


19 


should  be  at  the  time  when  the  injury  requires  it,  which.  in  a  vast  ma¬ 
jority  of  cases  is  immediately  following  the  accident.  There  are,  how¬ 
ever,  certain  kinds  of  accidents  where  the  injury  or  disability  does  not 
develop  or  become  serious  until  some  time  after  the  accident  occurs  and 
the  medical  and  hospital  service  in  this  class  of  cases  is  not  required  im¬ 
mediately  after  the  accident,  but  becomes  necessary  at  a  later  time.  It 
seems  apparent  that  it  was  not  the  legislative  intent  to  deprive  persons 
sustaining  injuries  of  the  kind  last  above  mentioned  of  such  medical 
and  hospital  service  for  the  mere  reason  that  the  disability  did  not  im¬ 
mediately  follow  the  accident;  and  from  a  careful  examination  of  the 
language  of  the  statute  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  such  construction  is 
not  required.  The  language  used  in  the  statute  is  “during  the  first  three 
weeks  after  the  injury.”  The  word  “injury”  in  its  ordinary  signification 
is  distinguished  from  the  word  “accident,”  and  differs  materially  from  it 
in  meaning.  The  word  “accident”  is  generally  used  to  designate  the 
cause,  and  the  word  “injury”  is  used  to  designate  the  effect.  The  effect 
of  the  accident,  (which  is  the  injury)  may  be  and  generally  is  immediate, 
but  in  a  considerable  number  of  cases  the  effect  of  the  accident  (which 
is  the  injury)  does  not  immediately  follow  in  point  of  time,  but  devel¬ 
ops  and  produces  disability  at  a  later  time,  in  some  instances  weeks  or 
months  after  the  accident.  It  is  apparent  that  if  we  give  the  word 
“injury,”  its  ordinary  significance  as  distinguished  from  accident,  the 
“first  three  weeks  after  the  injury”  would  commence  to  run  from  the 
time  the  accident  in  cases  like  this  produces  the  actual  disability  re¬ 
quiring  medical  or  hospital  service.  We  hold  in  this  case  that  such  service 
should  be  paid  for  by  the  employer. 


KEYES-DAVIS  COMPANY  vs.  LEE  E.  ALDERDYCE. 

LIABILITY  FOR  ACCIDENT  OCCURRING  OUTSIDE  OF  THE  STATE. 

Respondent  was  employed  as  a  traveling  salesman  by  applicant,  and  was  in¬ 
jured  in  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  while  in  the  active  discharge  of  his  duties. 

Held:  That  respondent  is  not  entitled  to  compensation,  on  the  ground  that 
the  provisions  of  the  compensation  law  do  not  cover  accidents  occuring  outside 
of  the  state  of  Michigan,  even  though  both  parties  are  residents  of  this  state. 

Application  of  Keyes-Davis  Company  for  ruling  on  question  of  injury  occurred 
in  another  state.  Both  parties  stipulated  the  facts  and  waived  arbitration  pro¬ 
ceedings  and  case  was  heard  by  full  board. 

•  The  applicant  and  respondent  are  both  residents  of  Battle  Creek, 
Michigan.  The  respondent  was  in  the  employ  of  the  applicant  as  a 
traveling  salesman,  and  was  injured  at  Buffalo,  New  York,  by  a  fall 
received  in  the  office  of  the  Larkin  Company,  where  he  was  on  the 
business  of  his  employer.  The  sole  question  involved  in  this  case  is 
whether  the  Michigan  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law  is  operative  be¬ 
yond  the  boundaries  of  the  State  of  Michigan.  The  applicant  contends 
that  it  is  not  and  that  there  is  no  liability  for  the  payment  of  compensa¬ 
tion  for  an  accident  occurring  outside  of  the  state. 

It  is  a  general  rule  of  law  that  every  statute  is  confined  in  its  opera- 


20 


tions,  to  persons,  property  and  rights  which  are  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  legislature  which  enacted  it;  and  if  a  citizen  of  the  state  leaves 
it  and  goes  into  another  state  he  is  left  to  the  protection  of  the  laws  of 
the  latter  state. 

Black  on  Interpretation  of  Laws,  Page  91; 

Lewis  Sutherland’s  Statutory  Construction,  Sections  IB  and  14. 

This,  however,  seems  to  be  based  upon  a  rule  of  statutory  construc¬ 
tion,  rather  than  upon  a  lack  of  legislative  power  to  make  such  a  law 
operative  outside  the  limits  of  the  state.  Under  this  rule  of  construc¬ 
tion  there  is  a  strong  presumption  in  case  of  every  statute  that  it  is 
intended  to  operate  and  be  effective  only  within  the  limits  of  the  state 
or  country  which  enacted  it,  and  in  the  absence  of  evidence  in  the  law 
itself  that  it  was  intended  to  have  an  extra-territorial  operation,  the 
presumption  seems  to  be  conclusive. 

From  our  examination  of  the  Michigan  Workmen’s  Compensation 
Law  we  find  no  internal  evidence  of  an  intent  that  the  law  should  be 
operative  outside  of  the  boundaries  of  Michigan.  The  language  used  in 
the  act  is  general  and  broad  enough  to  include  injuries  occurring  with¬ 
out  the  state,  but  under  the  above  rule  of  construction  such  general 
language  is  limited  and  held  to  be  intended  for  application  only  to 
persons,  property  and  rights  within  the  state.  There  is  another  feature 
of  the  act  which  reinforces  this  position  and  indicates  affirmatively  the 
intention  of  the  legislature  to  so  limit  the  operation  of  the  law,  and 
that  is  the  requirement  in  Section  8  of  Part  III  that  the  hearings  to 
adjudicate  disputed  claims  for  compensation  “shall  be  held  at  the  local¬ 
ity  where  the  injury  occurred.”  If  the  act  is  held  to  be  operative  out¬ 
side  of  the  state,  this  requirement  might  make  it  necessary  for  members 
of  the  Board  to  go  to  the  most  distant  portions  of  the  United  States, 
or  even  to  foreign  countries,  to  hear  and  adjudicate  disputed  claims  for 
compensation. 

The  fact  that  both  parties  are  residents  of  Michigan  and  the  contract 
of  employment  was  a  Michigan  contract  will  not,  we  think,  change  the 
rule.  The  obligation  to  pay  compensation  is  not  a  matter  of  contract, 
or  based  upon  contract,  but  is  a  statutory  duty,  created  by  statute  and 
existing  only  by  force  of  such  statute.  If  this  is  correct,  and  the 
statute  is  inoperative  at  the  place  where  the  accident  happens,  the 
happening  of  the  accident  creates  no  obligation  to  pay  compensation. 

B.  W.  C.  C.— Yol  2,  Page  1. 

It  is  therefore  held  by  the  Board  that  respondent  is  not  entitled  to 
compensation. 


21 


DETROIT  STEEL  PRODUCTS  CO.  vs.  HELEN  JENDRUS. 

REFUSAL  TO  SUBMIT  TO  OPERATION. 

Respondent’s  decedent  suffered  an  injury  while  in  the  employ  of  the  applicant, 
which  necessitated  an  operation.  Decedent  refused  to  allow  an  operation  until 
the  next  day,  although  he  was  told  that  it  was  necessary.  While  the  operation 
was  being  performed  decedent  vomited  and  some  of  the  vomit  was  drawn  into 
his  lungs,  causing  pneumonia  which  resulted  in  his  death. 

Held:  The  refusal  to  be  operated  on  when  first  requested  was  not  so  un¬ 
reasonable  as  to  defeat  the  claim  for  compensation,  as  decedent  finally  consented 
when  convinced  that  the  operation  was  absolutely  necessary. 

Appeal  df  Detroit  Steel  Products  Co.  from  a  decision  of  an  arbitration  commit¬ 
tee,  awarding  compensation  to  Helen  Jendrus  for  the  death  of  her  husband:  — 
Affirmed. 

In  this  case  the  deceased,  Joseph  Jendrus,  was  injured  by  a  severe 
blow  on  the  abdomen.  The  doctors  attending  the  injured  man  diag¬ 
nosed  the  injury  as  a  probable  rupture  of  the  intestine  and  advised  an 
operation.  The  accident  occurred  about  1  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  on 
February  14.  At  about  8  or  8 :30  in  the  evening  the  .doctors  sought  to 
operate  on  the  injured  man.  It  appears  that  he  could  not  talk  English 
and  communication  was  had  with  him  through  an  interpreter.  The  in¬ 
jured  man  shook  his  head,  indicating  a  refusal  to  be  operated  on.  The 
matter  of  an  operation  was  again  brought  up  by  the  doctors  on  the  fol¬ 
lowing  morning,  February  15.  Jendrus,  at  that  time,  refused  to  sub¬ 
mit  to  the  operation,  but  consented  at  about  11:30  a.  m.  The  operation 
was  performed  about  1:30  p.  m.  on  February  15.  It  seems  that  during 
the  operation  the  patient  vomited,  and  vomit  was  drawn  into  the  lungs, 
causing  pneumonia  and  resulting  in  his  death  a  few  days  later.  The 
operation  disclosed  a  rupture  of  the  intestine  which  was  not  sutured, 
and  the  post-mortem  examination  showed  the  same  to  be  in  process  of 
healing  at  the  time  of  death.  All  communication  with  the  deceased 
after  the  injury  was  through  an  interpreter. 

The  Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  refusal  to  be  operated  on  when 
first  requested,  and  the  further  action  of  deceased  in  delaying  consent 
to  the  operation  until  nearly  noon  on  the  day  following  the  accident 
was  not  so  unreasonable  and  persistent  as  to  defeat  the  claim  for  com¬ 
pensation  in  this  case.  He  did  submit  to  the  operation  after  being  con¬ 
vinced  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary.  It  seems  that  nearly  two 
hours  elapsed  from  the  time  he  gave  his  consent  till  the  operation  was 
performed.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  an  earlier  operation  would 
have  saved  his  life,  nor  is  it  certain  that  the  operation  actually  per¬ 
formed  would  not  have  resulted  in  his  recovery  were  it  not  for  the 
fact  that  he  vomited  while  under  the  anaesthetic  and  inhaled  some  of 
the  vomit,  causing  pneumonia.  It-  seems  clear  that  the  operation  was 
not  too  late  to  remedy  the  abdominal  injury  caused  by  the  accident. 
The  vomiting  and  resulting  pneumonia  came  as  an  incident  to  the 
operation.  The  fact  that  the  deceased  was  unable  to  speak  English 
and  was  unaccustomed  to  the  ways  of  this  country  should  be  given 
some  weight. 

The  judgment  and  decision  of  the  Arbitration  Committee  is  affirmed. 


22 


RAYNER  vs.  SLIGH  FURNITURE  CO. 

OBSERVANCE  OF  FACTORY  RULES— ACQUIESCENCE  BY  EMPLOYER  IN 

INFRACTION  OF  RULES. 

Applicant’s  decedent  was  employed  in  the  factory  of  appellant.  It  was  cus¬ 
tomary  for  the  appellant  to  announce  the  noon  hour  by  blowing  a  whistle.  The 
employes  were  required  to  proceed  to  the  end  of  the  room  in  which  they  worked 
and  punch  a  time  clock  before  leaving  for  dinner.  On  the  day  of  his  injury 
decedent  started  on  a  run  from  his  bench  toward  the  time  clock,  which  was 
located  about  150  feet  away,  and  collided  with  a  fellow  workman,  receiving  in¬ 
juries  which  resulted  in  his  death.  There  was  a  rule  forbidding  the  men  run¬ 
ning  to  punch  the  clock,  but  defendant’s  foreman  testified  that  it  was  hot  strictly 
enforced. 

Held:  1.  That  the  mere  fact  that  such  a  rule  was  made  is  not  controlling 
when  its  general  violation  is  acquiesced  in  by  the  employer. 

2.  The  infraction  of  this  rule  by  decedent  was  not  such  intentional  and  wilful 
misconduct  as  to  bar  recovery,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  was  the  general  custom 
of  decedent’s  fellow  employes  and  was  tacitly  permitted  by  respondent’s  foreman. 

Appeal  of  Sligh  Furniture  Company  from  the  decision  of  an  arbitration  com¬ 
mittee,  awarding  compensation  to  Lyda  Rayner  for  the  death  of  her  husband. 
Affirmed. 

On  November  5,  1912,  Adelbert  Rayner,  the  applicant’s  husband, 
was  injured  in  respondent’s  factory  in  the  city  of  Grand  Rapids.  Mr. 
Rayner  was  fifty-nine  years  of  age,  was  of  light  build,  somewhat  active, 
and  on  the  day  of  his  injury  was  working  in  the  cabinet  department  on 
the  third  floor  of  respondent’s  factory.  About  100  carvers  and  cabinet¬ 
makers  were  employed  in  that  room,  and  on  the  blowing  of  the  noon 
whistle  each  was  required  to  proceed  to  the  end  of  the  room  and  punch 
the  time  clock  before  leaving  for  dinner.  The  distance  from  the  bench 
where  Mr.  Rayner  was  working  to  the  time  clock  was  about  150  feet, 
and  when  the  noon  whistle  blew  on  the  day  of  the  injury,  he  started  on 
a  run  from  his  bench  towards  the  time  clock  to  punch  it.  After  pro¬ 
ceeding  about  30  feet  towards  the  clock  he  collided  with  one  Martin 
De  Vos,  a  fellow-employe,  fracturing  or  injuring  one  or  more  of  his 
ribs.  Rayner  continued  to  work  after  the  injury,  evidently  thinking 
that  it  was  not  serious  and  no  doctor  treated  him  for  four  or  five  days. 
No  notice  was  given  the  defendant  of  the  injury  until  after  Mr.  Rayner’s 
death,  which  occurred  on  December  26.  It  is  claimed  on  the  part  of 
the  applicant  that  the  injury  to  Mr.  Rayner’s  side  and  ribs  punctured 
or  affected  the  pleura  of  the  lungs  and  that  from  the  inflammation  or 
irritation  that  followed  the  lungs  became  affected,  resulting  in  Mr. 
Rayner’s  death,  and  that  the  original  injury  was  the  cause  of  such 
death.  The  respondent  contends  that  Mr.  Rayner’s  death  was  not  the 
result  of  the  accident,  that  it  did  not  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of 
his  employment,  and  that  he  was  guilty  of  intentional  and  wilful  mis¬ 
conduct. 

The  Board  has  carefully  examined  all  of  the  evidence  and  has  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  accident  above  referred  to  was  the  proximate 
cause  of  Mr.  Rayner’s  death.  It  is  a  regrettable  feature  of  the  case 
that  notice  of  the  injury  was  not  seasonably  given  the  respondent  by 


23 


Mr.  Rayner,  but  under  the  circumstances  shown  in  the  evidence  this 
failure  to  give  notice  would  not  be  a  bar  to  the  applicant’s  claim. 

It  is  clear  that  Mr.  Rayner  was  acting  in  the  course  of  his  employ¬ 
ment  at  the  time  he  received  the  injury.  In  fact  there  is  no  serious  dis¬ 
pute  on  this  point.  He  was  required  to  proceed  from  his  workbench 
to  the  time  clock,  and  to  punch  the  time  clock  before  leaving  the  room 
in  which  he  was  working.  This  was  a  duty  imposed  upon  him  by  the 
employer  and  he  was  in  the  act  of  performing  that  duty  at  the  time  he 
received  the  injury,  having  proceeded  part  way  from  his  bench  to 
the  clock.  We  are  also  of  the  opinion  that  the  injury  rose  out  of  his 
employment,  within  the  meaning  of  Act  No.  10,  Public  Acts  of  1912. 
The  evidence  fairly  shows  that  it  was  customary  for  the  men  to  run  for 
the  time  clock  when  the  whistle  blew  and  crowding  and  collisions  re¬ 
sulted  and  were  likely  to  result  in  going  to  and  punching  the  clock 
and  leaving  the  room  on  such  occasions.  The  evidence  on  this  point  is 
more  fully  referred  to  in  the  following  paragraph  of  this  opinion : 

Did  the  action  of  Mr.  Rayner  in  running  toward  the  time  clock 
amount  to  intentional  and  wilful  misconduct  within  the  meaning  of  the 
compensation  law?  The  evidence  shows  that  respondent  had  forbidden 
such  running  by  rule,  but  it  was  also  shown  that  such  rule  was  not  en¬ 
forced.  Frank  Lardie,  who  was  Mr.  Rayner’s  immediate  foreman,  testi¬ 
fied  that  he  had  notified  the  men  several  times  not  to  run  to  the  clock, 
and  that  only  a  part  of  the  men  did  the  running  when  the  whistle  blew 
(R.  35),  acknowledging  that  the  rule  against  running  is  not  enforced. 
Charles  Hicks,  foreman  of  the  carvers  in  the  room  in  which  Rayner 
worked,  testified  that  there  was  crowding  and  jamming  at  times  in  go¬ 
ing  to  the  clock;  that  the  rule  not  to  run  to  the  clock  was  made  about 
a  year  before  the  accident,  but  witness  would  not  say  that  the  rule  was 
so  enforced  as  to  stop  the  running  (R.  47).  Martin  De  Vos  testified 
that  people  used  to  run  to  the  clock  most  every  day  and  that  was  the 
case  right  up  to  the  time  Mr.  Rayner  was  hurt  (R.  47),  and  Mr.  Land- 
egand,  another  foreman  of*  respondent,  testified  that  the  biggest  share 
of  the  men  ran  to  the  clock  each  day,  notwithstanding  the  rule;  “they 
insist  on  running.  I  have  discharged  men  because  they  run,  but  it  did 
no  good,  the  rest  of  them  keep  it  up  just  the  same.  You  can’t  let  them 
all  go.  It  has  been  the  practice  there  to  run.” 

The  mere  fact  that  a  rule  was  made  forbidding  running  to  the  time 
clock  is  not  controlling  when  its  general  violation  is  acquiesced  in  by 
the  employer.  The  action  of  Mr.  Rayner  in  running  to  the  clock  did 
not  differ  materially  from  the  action  of  a  considerable  number  of  other 
employes,  and  such  conduct  was  acquiesced  in  and  tacitly  permitted 
by  respondent’s  foremen.  It  did  not  amount  to  intentional  and  wilful 
misconduct.  The  decision  of  the  committee  on  arbitration  is  affirmed. 


24 


PIETTERNELLA  VISSER  vs.  MICHIGAN  CABINET  CO. 

FRIGHT  OR  SHOCK-ABSENCE  OF  PHYSICAL  INJURY. 

Applicant’s  decedent  was  loading  some  stock  on  an  elevator  when  it  suddenly 
started  up.  The  elevator  was  stopped  and  the  stock  was  replaced  on  the  truck, 
and  after  wheeling  it  about  forty  feet  applicant  fell  to  the  floor  and  expired  a 
few  minutes  after  he  was  picked  up.  A  post  mortem  examination  disclosed 
that  he  was  suffering  from  organic  disease  of  the  heart  and  it  was  the  opinion 
of  the  medical  witnesses  that  while  deceased  received  no  physical  injury  the 
shock  and  excitement  resulting  from  the  sudden  starting  of  the  elevator  prob¬ 
ably  caused  his  death. 

Held:  Where  death  or  disability  results  from  fright,  unaccompanied  by  any 
immediate  physical  injury,  no  compensation  can  be  had. 

Appeal  of  Pietternella  Visser  from  decision  of  an  arbitration  committee 
refusing  to  make  an  award  for  the  death  of  her  husband. — Affirmed. 

Gerrit  Visser  was  working  in  the  employ  of  respondent  as  a  lugger  in 
its  factory  at  Grand  Rapids.  Part  of  his  duties  required  him  to  move 
the  unfinished  stock  from  various  floors  in  the  factory  to  the  lower 
floor  by  use  of  a  truck,  and  in  passing  from  one  floor  to  the  other  a 
large  elevator  was  used.  On  November  26,  Visser  was  moving  a  truck 
loaded  with  drawers  from  the  second  floor  to  the  first  floor  of  respond¬ 
ent’s  factory.  He  wheeled  the  truck  load  on  to  the  elevator  at  the 
second  floor,  then  descended  with  the  elevator  to  the  first  floor  and  pro¬ 
ceeded  to  wheel  the  truck  from  the  elevator.  The  elevator  started  up¬ 
ward  when  the  truck  was  partly  off,  causing  it  to  tip  so  that  some  of  the 
drawers  fell  off.  Other  employes  of  the  respondent  stopped  the  eleva¬ 
tor,  which  was  large  and  slow  moving,  when  it  was  about  two  and 
one-half  feet  above  the  floor.  The  truck  was  then  adjusted  and  the 
drawers  which  had  fallen  off  were  replaced  -by  Visser  and  another  em¬ 
ploye.  Visser  then  proceeded  to  wheel  the  truck  from  the  elevator  shaft 
to  another  portion  of  respondent’s  factory,  and  after  wheeling  it  about 
forty  feet  he  fell  to  the  ground.  He  was  picked  up  and  carried  into 
the  office  and  died  a  few  minutes  afterward.  A  post  mortem  examina¬ 
tion  was  held  which  showed  that  he  was  suffering  from  organic  disease 
of  the  heart.  While  he  received  no  physical  injury,  it  is  apparent  that 
the  nervous  shock  and  excitement  resulting  from  the  upward  movement 
of  the  elevator  affected  his  heart  in  its  diseased  condition,  and  in  the 
opinion  of  some  of  the  medical  witnesses  probably  caused  his  death. 

The  case  presents  squarely  the  question,  whether  compensation  can 
be  recovered  where  death  or  disability  results  from  fright  unaccom¬ 
panied  by  any  immediate  physical  injury.  Under  the  authority  of 

Nelson  vs.  Crawford,  122  Michigan,  486,  and 

Schroeder  vs.  Railway  Company,  20  D.  L.  N.,  251 

recovery  could  not  be  had  in  such  cases.  The  case  of  Yates  vs.  Colliers, 
Ltd.,  3  B.  W.  C.  C.,  419,  seems  to  establish  the  opposite  rule  under  the 
British  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law.  The  question  is  one  of  great 
importance.  If  the  Compensation  Law  is  held  to  cover  cases  of  fright 


25 


or  nervous  shock  unaccompanied  by  physical  injury,  it  will  bring  under 
the  Compensation  Law  a  large  class  of  cases  for  which  compensation 
by  way  of  damages  has  heretofore  been  denied  in  Michigan.  While  the 
question  is  not  free  from  doubt,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  our  statute 
was  not  intended  to  cover  the  class  of  cases  above  mentioned.  We  also 
think  that  it  is  desirable  to  have  this  question  finally  settled  by  an 
early  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court.  The  decision  of  the  committee 
on  arbitration  is  affirmed. 


AGLER  vs.  MICHIGAN  AGRICULTURAL  COLLEGE. 

CASUAL  EMPLOYMENT— CONSTITUTIONAL  BODIES. 

Applicant  was  employed  by  the  Michigan  Agricultural  College  to  make  some 
repairs  on  the  roofs  of  some  of  its  buildings.  He  was  not  a  regular  employe  of 
the  college,  but  was  merely  called  upon  as  his  services  were  needed.  While  en¬ 
gaged  in  one  of  these  jobs  he  fell  and  received  injuries  which  incapacitated  him 
for  a  long  period.  Compensation  was  refused  because  it  was  contended  that  under 
sub.  2  of  sec.  7,  part  1,  of  the  compensation  law  he  was  a  casual  employe.  Also  that 
the  Michigan  Agricultural  College  is  a  constitutional  body,  not  subject  to  legis¬ 
lative  control  and  therefore  not  liable  to  pay  compensation  in  any  case  of  injury. 

Held:  1.  That  the  proviso  of  sub.  2,  of  sec.  7,  excluding  those  “whose  em¬ 
ployment  is  but  casual,”  dees  not  apply  to  employes  of  the  state  or  of  munici¬ 
pal  corporations  within  the  state. 

2.  The  Michigan  Agricultural  College  is  subject  to  the  general  laws  of  the 
state  with  reference  to  its  liability  to  others. 

Appeal  of  Michigan  Agricultural  College  from  the  decision  of  an  arbitration 
committee  awarding  Willis  M.  Agler  compensation  at  the  rate  of  $10  per  week, 
not  to  exceed  500  weeks. — Affirmed. 

In  the  summer  of  1912,  the  applicant,  Willis  M.  Agler,  was  employed 
by  the  Michigan  Agricultural  College  to  repair  the  tin,  metal  and  slate 
portions  of  roofs  and  porticos  of  the  buildings  on  the  college  grounds 
for  a  period  of  nearly  three  months,  receiving  for  his  work  40  cents  per 
hour.  This  was  the  first  work  Agler  had  ever  done  for  the  college,  and 
at  its  conclusion  no  arrangement  was  made  with  him  for  any  further 
work.  In  the  spring  of  1913,  the  heavy  winds  injured  some  of  the  tin 
work  on  some  of  the  porticos  of  the  college  buildings  and  Agler  was  em¬ 
ployed  to  repair  the  same,  he  to  do  the  work  at  40  cents  per  hour,  the 
same  as  the  previous  summer.  Mr.  Agler  is  a  tinner  and  roofer  by  trade, 
but  does  not  maintain  a  regular  shop  or  place  of  business,  except  that  he 
has  a  room  in  his  basement  where  his  tools  and  stock  are  kept  and 
where  some  of  his  work  is  done.  He  was  accustomed  to  take  such  work 
and  jobs  in  his  line  as  he  could  procure,  working  generally  by  the  hour, 
and  when  he  undertook  to  make  the  repairs  on  the  porches  in  question 
he  knew  it  would  require  but  two  or  three  days’  work  for  himself  and 
a  helper.  He  knew  that  he  was  subject  to  the  direction  of  the  proper 
officials  of  the  college  and  could  be  discharged  by  them  at  any  time. 
The  college  furnished  the  material  for  making  the  repairs,  Mr.  Agler 
only  furnishing  part  of  his  tools.  Altogether  the  college  has  about  GO 
buildings  and  employs  on  an  average  125  employes  in  and  about  the 
grounds  and  buildings  in  addition  to  the  faculty  of  the  college.  It  does 
not  employ  regularly  tinners  or  roofers. 

4 


On  April  18,  1913,  while  Mr.  Agler  was  engaged  in  making  the  re¬ 
pairs  above  referred  to,  he  fell  from  a  ladder,  fracturing  his  left  leg. 
The  injury  will  probably  not  result  in  permanent  disability,  but  it  may 
be  a  considerable  time  before  the  injured  leg  will  be  as  well  as  prior  to 
the  injury.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  accident  Mr.  Agler  would  have 
finished  the  work  that  afternoon,  the  total  amount  of  time  required  in 
completing  the  work  being  41  hours  for  two  men  or  something  over 
20  hours  each.  The  respondent  contends  that  it  is  not  liable  to  pay 
compensation  because  the  work  in  which  Mr.  Agler  was  engaged  when 
injured  was  casual  employment. 

This  involves  the  construction  of  Section  7,  part  1  of  the  compensa¬ 
tion  law,  which  is  as  follows: 

‘The  term  ‘employe’  as  used  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  to  mean: 

1.  Every  person  in  the  service  of  the  state  or  of  any  county,  city,  township, 
incorporated  village  or  school  district  therein,  under  any  appointment,  or  con¬ 
tract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  written,  except  any  official  of  the 
state,  or  of  any  county,  city,  township,  incorporated  village  or  school  district 
therein. 

2.  Every  person  in  the  service  of  another  under  any  contract  of  hire,  express 
or  implied,  oral  or  written,  including  aliens,  and  also  including  minors  who  are 
legally  permitted  to  work  under  the  laws  of  the  state  who,  for  the  purposes  of 
this  act,  shall  be  considered  the  same  and  have  the  same  power  to  contract  as 
adult  employes,  but  not  including  any  person  whose  employment  is  but  casual 
or  is  not  in  the  usual  course  of  the  trade,  business,  profession  or  occupation 
of  his  employer.” 

The  next  section  of  the  act,  being  Section  8  of  Part  I,  provides  “any 
employe  as  defined  in  subdivision  one  of  the  preceding  section  shaft  be 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  act  and  of  any  act  amendatory  thereof.” 
The  remainder  of  Section  8  provides  in  detail  that  any  employe  men¬ 
tioned  in  subdivision  two  of  the  preceding  section  shall  become  subject 
to  the  provision  of  the  act  by  his  employer  accepting  the  same,  and  the 
failure  of  such  employe  to  make  his  election  not  to  be  subject  to  the  act. 
It  seems  clearly  apparent  from  these  provisions  that  two  distinct 
classes  of  employes  are  created,  one  of  the  said  classes  being  defined  by 
subdivision  one,  and  the  other  by  subdivision  two  of  said  Section  7. 
The  Agricultural  College  being  a  state  institution,  its  employes  are 
in  the  service  of  the  state  within  the  meaning  of  the  act  and  fall  within 
the  class  of  employes  defined  in  subdivision  one  above  quoted.  The  • 
proviso  which  excludes  from  the  benefit  of  the  compensation  law  those 
“whose  employment  is  but  casual”  is  found  only  in  subdivision  two  of 
said  section  and  applies  only  to  the  class  of  employes  defined  in  said 
subdivision  two.  It  does  not  apply  to  employes  of  the  state  or  of  muni¬ 
cipal  corporations  within  the  state. 

At  the  re-hearing  of  this  case  on  appeal  to  the  full  Board,  the  point 
was  raised  by  respondent  for  the  first  time  that  it  is  a  constitutional 
body  not  subject  to  legislative  control,  and  for  that  reason  is  not  liable 
to  pay  compensation  in  this  or  any  other  case.  In  support  of  this  con¬ 
tention  the  cases  of  Bauer  vs.  State  Board  of  Agriculture,  164  Michigan 
415,  and  Board  of  Regents  vs.  Auditor  General  167  Michigan  444  are 
cited.  We  have  examined  the  above  authorities  and  carefully  consid¬ 
ered  respondent’s  claim,  and  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  the 
position  taken  is  untenable.  The  authorities  referred  to  do  not  go  to  the 


27 


extent  of  holding  that  respondent  is  not  subject  to  the  general  laws  of 
the  state,  or  that  it  may  repudiate  its  obligations  because  it  is  a  consti¬ 
tutional  body.  The  substance  of  the  above  authorities  is  that,  being  a 
constitutional  body  with  certain  powers  and  functions  granted  and 
fixed  by  the  constitution,  it  may  determine  the  purpose  and  manner  of 
expending  its  funds,  and  that  the  legislature  may  not  interfere  with  or 
abridge  such  right.  The  precise  question  decided  in  the  Agricultural 
College  case  was  that  the  Board  might  use  its  funds  to  construct  a 
building  in  East  Lansing  to  be  leased  to  the  United  States  Government 
for  a  Post  Office,  and  that  such  action  by  the  State  Board  of  Agricul¬ 
ture  in  expending  its  funds  could  not  be  interfered  with  by  the  Auditor 
General  or  the  legislature.  This  is  a  very  different  question  from  the 
one  now  before  us  for  determination.  The  State  Board  of  Agriculture 
is  a  corporate  body,  an  artificial  person,  and  even  though  it  be  of  a  high 
class  because  created  by  the  constitution,  it  is  subject  to  the  general 
laws  of  the  state,  is  protected  by  such  general  laws  as  to  its  property, 
its  contracts,  and  the  liability  of  others  to  it;  and  it  is  subjec{  to  the 
general  laws  of  the  state  with  reference  to  its  liabilities  to  others.  It 
is  conducting  a  large  enterprise  having  some  60  buildings  125  employes 
besides  its  corps  of  professors,  teachers  and  instructors.  It  exists  by 
virtue  of  the  laws  of  Michigan,  is  protected  by  such  laws,  and  is  subject 
to  such  laws  in  all  general  matters.  The  award  of  the  committee  on 
arbitration  is  affirmed. 


JACOB  EIDER  vs.  THE  0.  H.  LITTLE  COMPANY. 

INJURED  TEAMSTER  NOT  REGULARLY  EMPLOYED— OWNER  OF  TEAM 

AND  WAGON. 

The  applicant  was  the  owner  of  a  team  and  wagon,  and  was  engaged  in  hauling 
dirt  for  appellant,  receiving  for  the  work  of  himself,  team  and  wagon  $6.00  per 
day.  While  so  engaged  he  received  injuries  to  two  fingers  by  which  he  was 
totally  disabled  for  two  and  one-half  months,  and  which  resulted  further  in 
causing  a  permanent  stiffness  by  reason  of  which  the  applicant  has  only  partial 
use  of  such  fingers.  An  arbitration  committee  awarded  the  applicant  compensa¬ 
tion  for  forty-three  weeks  at  50%  of  his  average  weekly  wage.  Appellant’s  con¬ 
tention  is  that  Rider  was  not  their  employe  within  the  meaning  of  the  act,  and 
that  the  award  of  compensation  was  excessive. 

Held:  1.  The  fact  that  the  applicant  worked  under  orders  of  defendant’s 
foreman,  and  was  required  to  conform  in  detail  to  the  regulations  and  system  of 
work  of  defendant  was  sufficient  to  make  him  an  employe  of  defendant  within 
the  meaning  of  the  compensation  law. 

2.  The  fact  that  applicant  was  totally  disabled  for  two  and  one-half  months, 
and  that  the  injury  resulted  in  a  partial  loss  of  the  use  of  his  fingers,  which 
condition  was  permanent,  is  such  as  to  make  the  compensation  award  a  reason¬ 
able  one. 

The  applicant,  Jacob  Eider,  was  the  owner  of  a  team  and  wagon,  and 
had  been  engaged  in  the  general  teaming  business  in  Detroit  for  a  num¬ 
ber  of  years  prior  to  his  injury.  He  had  worked  on  and  off  with  his 
team  for  respondent  during  a  period  of  about  six  years.  He  had  been 
working  steadily  for  respondent  for  about  seven  weeks  prior  to  his 
injury,  which  occurred  on  November  7th,  and  was  receiving  $6.00  per 


28 


day  for  himself,  his  team  and  wagon.  The  work  in  which  he  was  en¬ 
gaged  was  hauling  dirt  for  respondent.  There  were  from  twelve  to 
fifteen  teams  engaged  in  the  same  work,  and  the  wagons  were  loaded 
with  a  mechanical  device  called  a  “clam”  which  was  operated  in  prac¬ 
tically  the  same  way  as  a  steam  shovel.  The  clam  would  be  let  down 
and  filled  with  dirt  and  closed  by  the  machinery.  It  would  then  be 
raised  and  swung  around  over  the  wagon  which  was  to  be  loaded.  The 
teamster  would  steady  the  clam  so  as  to  be  over  the  portion  of  the 
wagon  that  needed  filling,  and  the  operator  of  the  machine  would 
then  cause  it  to  open  and  drop  the  dirt  in  the  wagon.  The  in¬ 
jury  in  this  case  was  caused  by  the  clam  closing  on  Mr.  Rider’s 
fingers  after  the  dirt  had  dropped  in  the  manner  above  indicated. 
The  first  and  second  fingers  were  badly  broken  and  lacerated. 
Defendant  was  totally  disabled  from  work  by  the  injury  for  two  and 
one-half  months,  and  the  injured  fingers  have  become  stiff  and  have 
lost  to  a  large  degree  their  power  of  closing  and  their  usefulness.  The 
committee  on  arbitration  awarded  the  applicant  compensation  for  forty- 
three  weeks  at  fifty  per  cent  of  his  average  weekly  wages.  This  de¬ 
cision  is  appealed  from  by  the  respondent  upon  the  following  grounds: 

1.  That  Rider  was  not  an  employe  of  respondent  within  the  mean¬ 
ing  of  the  compensation  law. 

2.  That  the  award  of  compensation  is  excessive.  It  appears  from 
the  evidence  that  Rider  was  licensed  as  a  teamster  in  the  city  of  De¬ 
troit,  and  that  he  engaged  in  doing  such  various  jobs  of  teaming  and 
transfer  work  as  he  could  get  to  do  from  time  to  time.  It  is  also 
shown  that  he  was  required  to  have  a  license  under  the  city  ordinance, 
and  that  such  licenses  are  required  of  teamsters  except  in  some  in¬ 
stances  where  firms  like  respondent  use  their  own  teams  and  teamsters 
in  their  business  and  have  their  names  printed  on  their  wagons.  It 
also  appears  that  Rider  worked  for  respondent  from  time  to  time  dur¬ 
ing  the  past  six  years,  and  that  he  worked  for  respondent  steadily  with 
his  team  and  wagon  from  about  the  14th  of  September  until  the  date  of 
the  injury,  doing  the  same  work  as  the  other  teamsters  of  respondent, 
and  doing  no  other  work  with  his  team  and  wagon  during  that  time. 
He  was  hired  for  $6.00  a  day.  It  is  undisputed  that  the  regular  wages 
of  a  teamster  for  that  class  of  work  is  $2.50  a  day  and  the  regular 
wage  for  a  team  and  wagon  $3.50  a  day,  and  Mr.  Rider  claims  that  he 
was  employed  at  $2.50  a  day  for  himself  and  $3.50  for  his  team  and 
wagon.  He  worked  under  the  orders  of  respondent’s  foreman,  who  di¬ 
rected  him  how  to  do  the  work,  where  to  go,  how  to  make  deliveries, 
and  required  Rider  to  conform  to  all  of  the  regulations  as  to  the  work 
done  and  the  manner  and  system  of  doing  it  that  was  required  of  the 
other  teamsters  of  respondent.  It  clearly  appears  that  respondent 
through  its  foreman  kept  a  close  supervision  over  the  work  and  move¬ 
ments  of  Mr.  Rider  and  directed  and  controlled  the  same  in  every  par¬ 
ticular.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Board,  Mr.  Rider  was  an  employe  of 
respondent  within  the  meaning  of  the  compensation  law  at  the  time  he 
was  injured,  and  the  fact  that  his  team  and  wagon  was  also  employed 
in  the  work  did  not  make  him  a  contractor  nor  in  any  way  change  his 
status  as  such  employe. 

The  fact  that  he  was  totally  disabled  for  two  and  one-half  months  is 


29 


undisputed,  and  the  fact  that  the  first  and  second  fingers  of  his  hand 
are  permanently  injured  is  also  undisputed  in  the  case.  In  the  opinion 
of  the  board  it  is  fairly  shown  that  the  injury  (which  is  permanent  in 
its  character)  to  applicant’s  first  and  second  fingers  has  caused  a  loss 
to  him  of  one-half  of  the  use  of  such  fingers.  The  board  has  held  in 
other  cases  that  where  the  use  of  a  finger  is  destroyed  by  an  injury, 
that  it  is  equivalent  to  the  loss  of  such  finger  whether  the  same  is 
amputated  or  not.  That  the  real  test  is  not  the  action  or  non-action 
of  the  surgeon  as  to  cutting  off  the  finger,  but  it  is  whether  the  injured 
person  has  been  deprived  permanently  of  the  use  of  such  finger  even 
though  it  was  not  amputated.  Upon  the  same  principal  an  injury 
which  destroys  one-half  of  the  beneficial  use  of  a  finger  should  be  rated 
as  the  loss  of  a  half  finger,  and  if  that  rule  is  applied  in  the  present 
case  the  award  of  forty-three  weeks’  compensation  will  be  correct. 
Substantially  the  same  result  would  be  reached,  we  think,  by  treating 
the  permanent  injury  to  the  fingers  as  a  permanent  partial  disability. 
The  award  of  the  committee  on  arbitration  is  affirmed. 


KONKEL  vs.  FORD  MOTOR  COMPANY. 

BURIAL  EXPENSES— CONTRACT  FUNERAL. 

An  employe  of  respondent  was  killed  while  at  work  and  left  no  dependents. 
In  accordance  with  Sec.  8,  Part  2,  of  the  compensation  law,  respondent  was 
liable  for  the  funeral  expenses  not  exceeding  $200.00.  Respondent  made  a  con¬ 
tract  with  an  undertaker,  the  applicant,  to  furnish  and  conduct  the  funeral  for 
$75,  and  further  agreed  to  pay  $15  for  the  cemetery  lot.  Applicant  presented  a 
bill  for  $104,  stating  that  the  extra  $14  was  for  three  carriages  furnished  for 
friends  of  the  deceased  who  attended  the  funeral.  Respondent  refused  to  pay  the 
extra  $14,  claiming  that  it  was  an  overcharge  and  that  the  agreement  practically 
excluded  carriages. 

Held:  1.  That  the  right  to  the  custody  and  burial  of  the  dead  belongs  to  the 
family,  next  of  kin,  near  relatives  and  friends  of  the  deceased,  and  that  the  com¬ 
pensation  law  does  not  assume  to  take  away  or  interfere  with  this  important 
right. 

2.  That  the  employer  has  no  authority  to  contract  for  funerals  with  an 
undertaker  in  such  a  way  as  to  arbitrarily  fix  the  number  of  carriages  or  to  de¬ 
cide  in  certain  cases  that  no  carriages  shall  be  provided.  These  are  matters  for 
the  family  or  next  of  kin  to  decide  and  arrange  for,  provided  the  expense  is 
reasonable  and  does  not  exceed  the  limit  fixed  by  law. 

Appeal  of  X.  B.  Konkel  to  compel  the  Ford  Motor  Co.  to  pay  his  claim  for 
funeral  expenses  incurred  in  the  burial  of  one  of  respondent’s  employes. 

This  case  involves  the  question  of  funeral  expenses,  the  deceased 
workman,  John  Ovczieneko,  having  left  no  dependents.  Section  8,  Part 
II,  of  the  act  provides  that  in  cases  where  the  employe  leaves  no  de¬ 
pendents,  the  employer  shall  pay  or  cause  to  be  paid  the  reasonable  ex¬ 
penses  of  his  last  sickness  and  burying,  which  shall  not  exceed  $200. 
It  is  claimed  by  respondent  that  it  entered  into  a  contract  with  the 
undertaker,  X.  B.  Konkel,  to  furnish  and  conduct  the  funeral  of  de¬ 
ceased  for  $75,  the  respondent  to  pay  in  addition  thereto  the  cost  of  the 
cemetery  lot,  which  was  $15.  After  the  funeral  was  had  the  claimant 
presented  a  bill  to  respondent  for  $104,  being  $15  for  the  cemetery  lot 


30 


and  $89  for  the  funeral.  The  precise  claim!  of  respondent  is  that  the 
claimant  had  made  an  overcharge  of  $14,  claiming  $89  for  the  funeral 
when  the  agreed  amount  was  $75.  The  claimant  admits  that  the  price 
agreed  upon  for  the  funeral  was  $75,  but  claims  that  the  relatives  and 
friends  of  the  deceased  when  the  funeral  came  on  required  him  to  fur¬ 
nish  three  additional  hacks,  and  that  the  $14  additional  charge  is  for 
those  hacks,  which  were  actually  furnished  and  used  at  the  funeral. 
The  only  relative  of  the  deceased  who  resided  here  and  attended  the 
funeral  was  a  brother,  but  many  friends  and  acquaintances  of  the  de¬ 
ceased  attended,  and  some  of  them  rode  in  the  three  hacks  to  the  ceme¬ 
tery.  The  agreement  between  the  claimant  and  respondent  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  funeral  practically  excluded  hacks,  the  precise  contention 
of  respondent  being  stated  as  follows:  “The  deceased  had  absolutely  no 
family  nor  friends  in  this  country,  outside  of  his  brother,  and  this  com¬ 
pany  will  not  pay  for  pleasure  carriages  for  funeral  purposes  and  if 
people  desire  to  go  for  a  ride  or  an  undertaker  desires  his  friends  to  go 
for  a  ride,  they  must  pay  for  their  carriages.  *  *  *  That  after  an 

absolute  contract  was  made  the  undertaker  should  not  go  ahead  and 
incur  additional  expenses.” 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  case  involves  the  fundamental  question,  has 
the  employer  the  right  to  order  and  contract  for  the  funeral  in  cases 
of  this  kind,  and  can  he  limit  the  item  of  expense  and  the  character  of 
the  funeral.  If  he  has  this  power  then  the  contract  entered  into  with 
claimant  would  be  controlling  and  the  additional  expense  incurred  for 
carriages  would  be  unauthorized.  The  Board,  however,  is  clearly  of 
the  opinion  that  the  employer  has  no  such  power.  The  right  to  the 
custody  and  burial  of  the  dead  belongs  to  the  family,  to  the  next  of  kin, 
to  the  near  relatives  and  friends.  This  right  is  inherent  and  univer¬ 
sally  recognized.  They  may  make  the  funeral  as  to  form,  rites,  pro¬ 
cession  and  burial  whatsoever  their  sentiment,  judgment  and  traditions 
dictate.  The  compensation  law  does  not  assume  to  take  away  or  in 
any  manner  interfere  with  this  important  right  of  the  family  and  rela¬ 
tives  of  the  workman  in  death  cases  like  this.  The  law  merely  provides 
that  the  employer  shall  pay  the  expense,  or  cause  it  to  be  paid,  and  that 
the  amount  of  his  liability  for  such  expense  shall  not  exceed  $200.  It 
does  not  give  him  the  right  to  contract  with  the  undertaker,  or  even 
to  select  the  undertaker.  Much  less  does  it  give  him  the  right  to  arbi¬ 
trarily  fix  the  number  of  carriages,  or  to  decide  that  in  certain  cases 
no  carriages  shall  be  provided.  These  are  matters  for  the  family  and 
next  of  kin  to  decide  and  provide  for,  and  if  the  expense  is  reasonable 
and  does  not  exceed  the  limit  fixed  by  law,  it  should  be  paid  by  the 
employer.  In  this  case  the  extra  hacks  were  ordered  by  the  next  of  kin 
and  friends  of  deceased,  and  were  used  to  convey  his  friends  to  the 
place  of  burial.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Board  they  were  reasonably  nec¬ 
essary,  and  the  bill  of  claimant  for  $104  is  allowed  and  ordered  paid. 


31 


KATHRYN  ADAMS  vs.  ACME  WHITE  LEAD  &  COLOR  WORKS. 

LEAD  POISONING— OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE. 

Applicant’s  decedent  was  employed  by  respondent  in  its  red  lead  plant.  He 
contracted  lead  poisoning  from  the  effects  of  which  he  died.  Compensation  was 
refused,  under  the  contention  that  his  death  was  not  the  result  of  an  accident, 
but  a  disease,  and  therefore  the  case  was  not  covered  by  the  act.  It  was  further 
contended  that  if  the  act  was  held  to  apply  to  industrial  diseases  it  would,  in 
that  respect,  be  unconstitutional. 

Held:  1.  That  the  lead  poisoning  suffered  by  decedent  in  this  case  constituted 
a  personal  injury  of  a  serious  and  deadly  character,  although  classified  under  the 
English  decisions  as  an  occupational  disease  and  not  an  accident. 

2.  That  part  of  Sec.  1,  Part  II,  which  covers  injuries,  received  otherwise  than 
by  accident,  is  not  such  a  variance  from  the  title  of  the  act  as  to  render  a 
portion  of  this  section  unconstitutional. 

Appeal  of  Acme  White  Lead  &  Color  Works  from  the  decision  of  an  arbitration 
committee  awarding  Sarah  E.  Adams  compensation  at  the  rate  of  $7.50  per 
week  for  300  weeks  for  the  death  of  her  husband. — Affirmed. 

Augustus  Adams,  the  husband  of  the  applicant,  was  an  employe  of 
the  respondent,  working  in  its  Red  Lead  plant,  so  called,  in  Detroit. 
On  May  29,  1913,  he  became  so  affected  from  lead  poisoning  that  he 
was  obliged  to  quit  his  work  and  on  June  27  he  died  from  the  effects 
of  such  lead  poisoning.  These  facts  are  undisputed  and  the  sole  ques¬ 
tion  in  the  case  is  whether  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  covers  a 
case  of  death  by  lead  poisoning  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment.  It  is  contended  on  behalf  of  respondent  as  follows: 

1.  That  lead  poisoning  is  not  an  accident. 

2.  That  Act  No.  10,  Public  Acts  of  1912,  was  not  intended  to  pro¬ 
vide  compensation  for  diseases,  but  only  accidents. 

3.  If  the  Act  does  apply  to  industrial  diseases,  it  is  so  far  uncon¬ 
stitutional. 

It  seems  to  be  established  under  the  English  cases  that  Lead  Poison¬ 
ing  is  not  an  accident,  but  is  an  occupational  disease.  It  seems  to 
follow  from  this  that  unless  the  Michigan  Workmen’s  Compensation 
Law  is  broad  enough  to  include  and  cover  occupational  diseases  the  ap¬ 
plicant’s  claim  in  this  case  must  be  denied.  The  controlling  provision 
of  the  act  on  this  point  is  found  in  Section  1  of  Part  II,  and  is  as  fol¬ 
lows:  “If  an  employe  *  *  *  receives  a  personal  injury  arising  out 

of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment,”  he  shall  be  entitled  to  com¬ 
pensation,  etc.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  above  language  does  not  limit 
the  right  of  compensation  to  such  persons  as  receive  personal  injuries 
“by  accident.”  The  language  in  this  respect  is  broader  than  the  Eng¬ 
lish  act  and  clearly  includes  all  personal  injuries  arising  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment,  whether  the  same  are  caused  “by 
accident”  or  otherwise.  It  is  equally  plain  that  Lead  Poisoning  in  this 
case  in  fact  constitutes  a  personal  injury,  and  that  such  personal  injury 
was  of  a  serious  and  deadly  character.  The  Board  is  therefore  of  the 
opinion  that  the  section  of  the  Michigan  Act  above  quoted  is  broad 
enough  to  cover  cases  of  Lead  Poisoning  such  as  the  one  in  question. 

It  is  claimed,  however,  on  behalf  of  the  respondent  that  the  title  of 


32 


the  act  is  such  as  to  exclude  all  personal  injuries  excepting  those  re¬ 
ceived  “by  accident”  and  that  in  so  far  as  the  body  of  the  act  is 
broader  than  the  title,  it  is  unconstitutional.  This  point  has  been  ably 
briefed  and  argued  on  the  part  of  the  respondent  and  we  are  asked  to 
hold  in  this  case  that  the  portion  of  the  provisions  of  Section  1  of  Part 
II  which  covers  injuries  received  otherwise  than  by  accident  is  invalid 
because  it  is  broader  than  the  title.  After  a  careful  consideration  of 
the  question,  the  Board  has  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  would  not 
be  justified  in  holding  such  portion  of  the  Compensation  Act  to  be  in¬ 
valid  on  the  constitutional  grounds  urged  by  the  respondent.  The 
award  of  the  committee  on  arbitration  is  therefore  affirmed. 


HILLS  vs.  PEBE  MARQUETTE  R.  R. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— NEGLIGENCE. 

Applicant’s  decedent,  an  employe  of  respondent,  was  struck  and  killed  by  one  of 
respondent’s  trains  while  on  his  way  home  to  dinner.  There  were  two  ways  of 
leaving  the  freight  yard,  one  by  way  of  a  public  highway,  known  as  Mill  street, 
and  the  other  through  respondent’s  yard.  The  highway  was  not  in  good  condi¬ 
tion  for  travel,  so  it  was  the  custom  of  the  men,  which  was  tacitly  acquiesced  in 
by  respondent,  to  leave  by  way  of  the  yard.  Decedent  left  by  the  last  way  when 
he  was  killed.  Respondent  contends  that  inasmuch  as  decedent  had  quit  work 
for  the  forenoon,  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of 
the  occurrence  of  the  accident,  and  further  that  decedent  should  have  left  by 
way  of  Mill  street. 

Held:  1.  That  an  employe  is  still  his  master’s  servant  while  leaving  his 
place  of  employment,  or  doing  such  acts  as  are  incident  to  or  connected  with 
such  leaving. 

2.  The  employment  covers  not  only  the  time  during  which  the  workman  is 
engaged  in  his  ordinary  labor  but  also  a  later  time  during  which  he  is  passing 
from  the  surroundings  of  his  employment  into  surroundings  unrelated  thereto. 

Appeal  of  Pere  Marquette  Railroad  Co.  from  the  decision  of  an  arbitration  com¬ 
mittee  awarding  Leone  H.  Hills  $4.95  per  week  for  300  weeks  as  compensation 
for  the  death  of  her  husband. — Affirmed. 

Irwin  E.  Hills,  the  husband  of  the  applicant,  was  killed  in  the  rail¬ 
road  yards  of  the  respondent  at  Williamston.  He  was  employed  by  re¬ 
spondent  as  a  section  hand,  had  worked  during  the  forenoon,  and  re¬ 
turned  with  the  gang  to  their  car  house  shortly  after  11  o’clock  stand¬ 
ard  time.  Thereupon  some  of  the  other  men  including  the  foreman, 
proceeded  to  eat  their  dinners  at  the  car  house,  and  Hills  started  to  go 
to  his  home,  which  was  located  half  a  block  from  the  depot,  for  dinner. 
The  railroad  tracks  of  respondent  run  in  an  easterly  and  westerly  di¬ 
rection  through  the  village  of  Williamston,  there  being  one  main  track 
and  two  side  tracks  substantially  parallel  with  it.  The  car  house  is 
situated  1,934  feet  east  of  the  depot  and  adjacent  to  respondent’s  south 
track.  The  course  taken  by  Mr.  Hills  in  going  from  the  car  house  to 
his  home  was  westward  through  respondent’s  yard  towards  the  depot. 
It  was  possible  for  him  to  leave  the  railroad  yards  by  going  north  on 
Mill  street  which  is  a  public  highway  crossing  defendant’s  track  at  a 
point  225  feet  west  of  the  car  house.  This  highway,  however,  was  not 


33 


in  good  condition  for  travel,  and  the  men  employed  in  the  yards  were 
accustomed  to  enter  and  leave  at  the  depot,  and  in  going  to  and  from 
the  car  house  the  regular  course  was  to  proceed  along  the  tracks  in  the 
yard  substantially  the  same  as  was  done  by  Mr.  Hills.  A  few  minutes 
after  Hills  left  the  car  house  a  freight  train  came  in  from  the  east  on 
respondent’s  main  track  and  passed  through  the  village  without  stop¬ 
ping.  The  train  was  accustomed  to  stop  at  Williamston  on  signal  and 
was  running  slow  as  it  approached  the  depot.  No  signal  to  stop  having 
been  given  and  in  passing  through  the  yards  between  the  car  house  and 
the  depot  the  train  was  running  from  15  to  18  miles  an  hour.  A  few 
minutes  after,  the  train  passed  the  body  of  Mr.  Hills  was  found  lying 
by  the  side  of  the  main  track  approximately  950  feet  west  of  the  car 
house  from  which  he  started.  The  place  where  the  body  was  found 
was  about  1,000  feet  east  of  the  depot.  There  was  no  eye  witness  to 
the  accident  and  all  of  the  evidence  tending  to  show  the  manner  in 
which  it  occurred  is  circumstantial.  It  is  undisputed  that  the  train 
referred  to  was  the  agency  which  caused  his  death.  It  is  claimed  on  the 
part  of  the  applicant  that  he  was  accidentally  struck  by  the  train  and 
thrown  against  the  switch  standard  which  was  located  near  the  track 
and  about  20  feet  east  of  the  point  where  his  body  was  found.  On 
the  part  of  the  respondent  it  is  claimed  that  he  boarded  the  train  which 
was  moving  slowly  near  the  car  house  intending  to  ride  to  the  depot  and 
dropped  off,  and  that  he  either  jumped  from  the  moving  train,  or  lost 
his  hold  and  was  killed  by  striking  the  switch  standard.  Respondents 
also  claim  that  the  injury  did  not  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of 
employment  for  the  reason  that  he  had  quit  work  for  the  forenoon, 
and  that  he  should  have  left  the  railroad  premises  by  the  Mill  Street 
road  instead  of  proceeding  to  the  depot  through  the  company’s  yards. 

After  a  careful  examination  of  the  evidence  the  board  has  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  deceased  was  accidentally  struck  by  the  train 
while  traveling  towards  the  depot,  and  was  thrown  against  the  switch 
standard.  A  severe  cut  was  found  in  the  back  of  his  head  and  his  coat 
and  clothing  were  torn  and  body  bruised  in  the  back,  indicating  that 
he  was  struck  from  behind.  There  was  a  deep  hole  in  his  chest  which 
appears  to  have  been  the  immediate  cause  of  his  death,  and  this  was 
apparently  caused  by  his  being  thrown  against  the  switch  standard 
which  was  freshly  bent  and  the  lamp  thereon  broken.  The  presumption 
of  right  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  deceased  and  the  circumstantial 
evidence  tending  to  show  that  he  was  accidentally  struck  by  the  train 
while  on  his  way  to  dinner  established  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  evi¬ 
dence  the  claim  of  the  applicant  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  acci¬ 
dent  occurred. 

The  only  remaining  question  is  whether  the  injury  arose  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment  of  the  deceased.  Respondents  contend 
that  deceased  having  quit  work  for  dinner  and  proceeded  towards  his 
home  a  distance  of  approximately  950  feet,  had  ceased  his  employment, 
and  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of 
the  accident.  In. this  connection  they  also  claim  that  he  should  have 
left  respondent’s  yards  at  the  Mill  Street  highway  and  if  he  had  done 
so  he  would  have  been  off  their  premises  before  the  time  when  the  acci¬ 
dent  occurred,  and  in  a  place  of  safety.  It  is  shown  that  the  usual 


34 


route  taken  by  the  men  living  in  the  vicinity  of  the  depot  and  going 
to  the  car  house,  was  to  enter  and  leave  defendant’s  yard  at  the  depot 
and  to  follow  the  course  which  deceased  was  traveling  when  he  was 
killed.  There  is  no  evidence  that  this  practice  was  forbidden  by  re¬ 
spondent,  and  we  think  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  deceased  was  at  fault 
in  doing  that  which  respondent  permitted  its  men  to  do,  and  which  was 
common  and  customary  practice.  We  also  think  that  deceased  was 
acting  in  the  course  of  his  employment  at  the  time  of  the  accident  and 
that  the  injury  arose  out  of  his  employment.  The  question  as  to  when 
the  employment  ceases  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact  depending 
upon  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case.  It  does  not  cease  at  the 
instant  his  working  time  is  over.  The  employment  includes  the  inci¬ 
dents  of  the  employment,  and  it  is  generally  held  that  the  workman  is 
still  his  master’s  servant  while  he  is  leaving  the  place  of  his  employ¬ 
ment,  or  doing  acts  that  are  incident  to  or  connected  with  such  leaving. 
The  employment  covers  not  only  the  time  during  which  the  workman  is 
engaged  in  his  ordinary  labor,  but  also  a  later  time,  during  which  he 
is  passing  from  the  surroundings  of  his  employment  into  surroundings 
unrelated  thereto.  Wilmarth  vs.  Cardoza,  176  Fed.  Eep.  3.  The  award 
of  the  arbitration  committee  is  affirmed. 


MICHIGAN  WORKMEN’S  COMPENSATION  MUTUAL  INSUR¬ 
ANCE  COMPANY  vs.  KATHRYN  REDFIELD. 

NEGLIGENCE— DEATH  CLAIMED  TO  BE  DUE  TO  OTHER  CAUSES. 

Respondent’s  decedent  received  injuries  by  his  hand  coming  in  contact  with  the 
gears  in  a  carding  machine  in  appellant’s  factory.  Gangrene  set  in  and  he  died 
on  May  4,  which  was  sixteen  days  after  the  injury.  Appellant  contends  that 
the  injury  was  the  result  of  the  wilful  and  intentional  misconduct  of  decedent, 
by  his  disregarding  the  signs  warning  employees  to  keep  their  hands  off  the 
machines  and  not  to  clean  machines  while  in  motion;  and  further,  that  he  was 
suffering  from  diabetes  when  injured  and  that  his  death  was  the  result  of  that 
disease. 

Held:  1.  That  the  act  which  decedent  was  performing  at  the  time  of  his 
injury,  was  picking  off  some  of  the  cotton  which  had  collected  on  the  carding 
cylinder,  and  that  such  action  was  necessary  and  ordinarily  performed  by  and 
required  of  the  operator  of  the  machine. 

2.  That  the  claim  that  death  was  due  to  diabetes  was  not  sustained  by  the 
proofs. 

Appeal  of  Michigan  Workmen’s  Mutual  Insurance  Co.  from  the  decision  of 
an  arbitration  committee,  awarding  Kathryn  Redfield  $5.25  per  week  for  300 
weeks,  for  the  death  of  her  husband. — Affirmed. 

On  April  18,  1913,  William  H.  Redfield,  the  husband  of  the  respond¬ 
ent,  was  injured  in  the  factory  of  the  Hr.  Denton  Sleeping  Garment 
Mills  at  Centerville,  Michigan.  He  was  employed  in  the  card  room  in 
the  factory,  where  for  many  years  he  had  worked  as  a  carder  in  opera¬ 
ting  the  carding  machines.  There  was  no  eye  witness  to  the  accident, 
but  it  appeared  from  the  blood  on  the  machinery  and  other  circum¬ 
stances  that  his  hand  was  caught  in  a  large  card  cylinder  and  the  gear 
connected  with  it.  The  hand  was  badly  lacerated,  necessitating  the 


35 


amputation  of  three  fingers.  The  other  injuries  to  the  hand  above  the 
fingers  were  dressed  and  treated,  an  effort  being  made  to  save  as  much 
of  the  hand  as  possible.  The  injured  man  was  taken  to  the  hospital  at 
Kalamazoo  for  treatment,  and  while  there  gangrene  set  in  and  he  died 
on  May  4th.  It  is  the  claim  of  the  applicant  that  compensation  should 
be  denied  for  two  reasons: 

1.  That  the  deceased  was  guilty  of  wilful  and  intentional  miscon¬ 
duct. 

2.  That  he  was  suffering  from  diabetes  when  injured,  and  that  his 
death  was  the  result  of  the  disease  rather  than  the  injury. 

The  claim  of  intentional,  wilful  misconduct  is  based  on  what  is 
claimed  to  be  a  violation  of  the  factory  rules  by  deceased.  It  was 
shown  that  on  each  of  the  carding  machines  was  one  or  more  signs 
“hands  off,”  and  also  that  there  were  signs  through  the  factory  and  in 
the  carding  room  to  the  effect  that  “cleaning  machinery  while  in  motion 
is  strictly  forbidden.”  It  is  claimed  that  deceased  was  in  the  act  of 
picking  off  some  of  the  cotton  which  had  collected  on  the  card  cylinder 
near  the  gear  when  he  received  his  injury,  and  that  such  act  consti¬ 
tuted  a  violation  of  the  above  rules.  This  claim,  however,  was  refuted 
by  the  testimony  of  the  general  manager  and  also  the  secretary  and 
treasurer  of  the  Dr.  Denton  Company.  It  was  shown  by  the  testimony 
of  these  witnesses  that  the  carding  machines  are  so  adjusted  that  the 
machinery  operates  through  a  system  of  weights  and  when  it  reaches  a 
certain  weight  then  it  dumps  down  upon  the  apron,  and  if  any  person 
puts  his  hands  on  the  machinery  and  disturbs  the  mechanism  it  would 
cause  the  machine  to  dump  and  seriously  interfere  with  its  operation. 
That  the  sign  “hands  off”  was  put  up  to  warn  people  not  to  put  their 
hands  on  the  machine  because  of  producing  the  above  results,  and  not 
because  the  machinery  was  dangerous.  These  signs  were  put  there  by 
the  manufacturers  of  the  machines.  It  was  further  shown  by  the  same 
witnesses  that  the  sign  relating  to  the  cleaning  of  the  machinery  while 
in  motion  did  not  refer  to  picking  off  accumulations  of  cotton  on  the 
cards  or  gears  but  referred  to  the  general  cleaning  of  the  machines. 
That  it  was  necessary  in  the  operation  of  the  card  machine  to  pick  off 
accumulations  of  cotton  while  the  machinery  was  in  motion,  and  that 
the  employes  were  expected  and  required  to  do  it.  That  every  time  a 
carding  machine  is  stopped  it  produces  an  unevenness  in  the  work,  in¬ 
volves  the  loss  of  time  and  impairs  the  quality  of  the  product.  If  the 
accumulations  were  not  picked  off  it  would  produce  thickening  in  parts 
of  the  product  and  make  it  unfit  for  use.  Picking  off  cotton  in  this 
way  while  the  machines  were  in  operation  was  in  fact  a  part  of  the 
duties  of  the  operator.  This  testimony  is  practically  undisputed,  and 
the  first  point  must  be  held  against  the  applicant. 

The  claim  that  the  gangrene  and  the  resulting  death  of  the  deceased 
was  caused  by  his  diabetes  and  not  by  the  injury  must  also  be  decided 
against  the  applicant.  The  testimony  produced  in  support  of  this 
claim,  particularly  the  medical  testimony,  fell  far  short  of  proving  the 
same,  and  apparently  was  disappointing  to  the  applicant. 

We  think  we  should  refer  in  this  opinion  to  the  request  made  by  coun¬ 
sel  for  the  applicant,  after  the  hearing  on  review  before  the  full  Board 
and  before  the  decision  of  the  case,  for  leave  to  take  the  depositions  of 


3G 


several  physicians  in  Detroit,  who  would  give  expert  evidence  tending 
to  show  that  Mr.  Redfield’s  death  was  caused  by  gangrene  produced  by 
diabetes.  The  Board  refused  to  grant  such  request.  The  Workmen’s 
Compensation  Law  provides  that  the  arbitration,  which  is  the  first  and 
fundamental  hearing  in  the  case,  shall  be  held  at  the  place  where  the 
accident  occurred,  in  order  to  make  such  hearing  reasonably  convenient 
and  inexpensive  to  the  injured  workman  or  his  dependents.  The  wit¬ 
nesses  in  such  case  on  behalf  of  the  workman  or  his  dependents  are 
usually  found  at  or  near  the  place  where  the  accident  occurred,  and  the 
same  is  true  of  the  witnesses  for  the  employer  in  a  vast  majority  of 
cases.  If  the  board  should  permit  a  reopening  of  the  case  to  take 
such  proposed  expert  testimony  in  a  distant  city,  necessitating  the  ex¬ 
pense  on  the  part  of  the  widow  to  be  present  at  the  taking  of  such  testi¬ 
mony  and  to  protect  her  interest  by  cross-examination  of  witnesses, 
such  action  would  defeat  one  of  the  most  important  provisions  of  the 
law  and  such  practice  would  place  it  in  the  power  of  the  employer  to 
make  the  recovery  of  compensation  in  some  cases  so  vexatious  and  ex¬ 
pensive  as  to  compel  the  abandonment  of  claims.  This  is  not  a  case  of 
newly  discovered  evidence,  but  is  a  request  for  permission  to  put  in 
expert  and  opinion  evidence  which  would  be  merely  cumulative.  The 
award  in  this  case  is  affirmed. 


ANDREWJESKI  vs.  WOLVERINE  COAL  CO. 

QUESTION  OF  CONSTRUCTION  OF  LAW  PROVIDING  THE  METHODS  OF 
COMPUTING  AVERAGE  WEEKLY  WAGE. 

Claimant’s  decedent  was  killed  while  employed  as  a  coal  miner  by  appellant. 

The  committee  on  arbitration  awarded  claimant  $10  a  week  for  300  weeks,  that 
being  the  maximum  rate  of  compensation  under  the  statute.  The  appellant  con¬ 
tends  that  the  coal  mining  industry  is  one  that  operates  only  for  a  portion  of  the 
year,  and  that  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  business  and  the  limited  time  of  opera¬ 
tion  yearly  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  determining  the  average  week¬ 
ly  wages  of  the  miner.  Respondent  further  claims  that  the  average  time  of 
operation  of  the  coal  miles  of  Michigan  is  211  days,  and  that  in  computing  the 
average  weekly  wages  in  this  industry,  the  average  daily  wage  should  be  multi¬ 
plied  by  211  and  divided  by  52,  instead  of  the  general  rule  of  multiplying  such 
daily  wage  by  300  and  dividing  by  52.  The  rule  contended  for  would  reduce  the 
rate  of  compensation  practically  one-third. 

Held:  That  the  exceptional  method  of  computing  the  rate  of  compensation, 
contended  for  by  appellant,  for  those  employed  in  the  coal  mining  industry 
is  not  authorized  by  the  law. 

Appeal  of  the  Wolverine  Coal  Company  from  the  decision  of  the  arbitration 
committee  on  claim  of  Anna  Andrewjeski. — Affirmed. 

This  is  a  claim  for  compensation  by  the  widow  of  Joseph  Andrewjeski, 
who  was  killed  by  falling  slate  in  respondent’s  mine  near  Bay  City. 
The  sole  question  is  the  amount  of  weekly  compensation  to  be  paid.  This 
involves  the  construction  of  section  11,  part  2  of  the  Compensation  Law 
providing  the  methods  of  computing  the  average  weekly  wage.  It  is 
contended  by  the  respondent  that  the  coal  mining  industry  is  one  that 
does  not  continue  throughout  the  year,  and  that  for  a  part  of  each 


37 


year  the  mines  are  closed  and  work  is  suspended.  For  this  reason  it  is 
claimed  that  the  computation  of  the  average  weekly  wage  of  deceased 
should  be  made  under  the  fourth  clause  of  section  11  part  2  of  the  Act, 
which  reads  as  follows: 

“In  cases  where  the  foregoing  methods  of  arriving  at  the  aver¬ 
age  annual  earnings  of  the  injured  employe,  cannot  reasonably 
and  fairly  be  applied,  such  annual  earnings  shall  be  taken  at  such 
sum  as,  having  regard  to  the  previous  earnings  of  the  injured  em¬ 
ploye,  and  of  other  employes  of  same  or  most  similar  class,  work¬ 
ing  in  the  same  or  most  similar  employment,  in  the  same  or  neigh¬ 
boring  locality,  shall  reasonably  represent  the  annual  earning 
capacity  of  the  injured  employe  at  the  time  of  the  accident  in 
the  employment  in  which  he  was  working  at  such  time.” 

It  is  contended  that  the  last  clause  of  the  above  quotation,  “in  the 
employment  in  which  he  was  working  at  the  time,”  is  a  limitation  placed 
upon  the  earning  capacity,  and  that  inasmuch  as  the  industry  is  one 
that  does  not  run  the  year  round,  the  employe  could  not  earn  in  that  in¬ 
dustry  wages  for  more  than  the  number  of  days  it  is  in  operation  each 
year,  and  that  the  daily  wage  of  the  injured  employe  should  be  multi¬ 
plied  by  the  average  number  of  days  that  the  industry  is  in  operation, 
instead  of  being  multiplied  by  300,  to  find  his  average  annual  earnings. 

In  this  case  the  mine  in  which  the  accident  occurred  was  actually 
operated  148  days  during  the  year,  and  coal  hoisted  from  the  mine  was 
credited  to  the  deceased  as  having  been  mined  by  him  on  131  days.  The 
only  record  that  the  company  has  or  that  could  be  produced  tending  to 
show  the  days  on  which  the  deceased  worked  in  the  mine  is  the  record 
of  the  coal  credited  as  above,  and  it  is  claimed  that  this  record  does 
not  accurately  show  the  number  of  days  deceased  worked  in  the  mine 
for  the  reason  that  coal  mined  by  him  may  be  hoisted  on  a  day  when 
he  is  not  working  and  it  is  also  possible  that  on  some  days  when  he 
works  no  coal  credited  to  him  is  hoisted.  The  respondent  makes  the 
further  claim  that  in  determining  the  average  daily  wages  of  deceased, 
the  aggregate  amount  of  money  earned  by  him  during  the  year  should 
be  divided  by  the  number  of  days  that  the  mine  was  in  operation,  and 
not  by  the  number  of  days  that  coal  was  credited  to  deceased.  The 
contention  is  that  the  aggregate  amount  of  money  which  deceased  actu¬ 
ally  earned,  $507.45  should  be  divided  by  148,  that  being  the  number  of 
days  that  the  mine  actually  ran,  instead  of  131,  which  is  the  number  of 
days  on  which  coal  was  credited  to  deceased  as  having  been  mined  by 
him.  If  148  is  taken  for  the  divisor,  the  average  daily  wage  will  be 
$3.43,  and  the  average  weekly  wage  $19.70.  If  131  is  taken  as  the  divisor, 
the  average  daily  wage  will  be  $3.87  and  the  average  weekly  wage  $22.33. 

It  is  shown  by  the  evidence  that  the  average  length  of  time  that  the 
coal  mines  of  Michigan  are  in  operation  yearly  is  211  days,  this  average 
being  found  by  taking  the  total  number  of  days  of  operation  of  all  the 
coal  mines  of  the  state  for  four  years  last  past,  and  striking  an  average 
for  all  of  such  mines.  It  is  further  shown  that  the  number  of  days  that 
Wolverine  Mine  No.  2,  in  which  deceased  was  killed,  was  operated  dur¬ 
ing  the  past  four  years,  are  as  follows :  In  1909,  248  days,  in  1910,  205 
days,  in  1911,  128  days,  and  in  1912,  148  days.  Some  of  the  other 


38 


mines  ran  as  high  as  281  days  in  a  year  and  some  as  low  as  75  days  in 
a  year.  It  is  contended  by  respondent  that  211  days  yearly, — that 
being  the  average  length  of  the  run  of  all  the  mines  in  the  state — ,  is  the 
period  of  operating  in  the  coal  industry,  and  that  such  period  of  opera¬ 
tion  places  a  limit  upon  the  possibility  of  earnings  of  any  miner  in 
that  occupation,  and  therefore  in  computing  the  average  annual  earnings 
of  a  coal  miner,  his  average  daily  wage  must  be  multiplied  by  211  in¬ 
stead  of  300.  Respondent  contends  for  the  general  average  for  the  en¬ 
tire  industry,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  time  of  operation  varies 
largely  in  different  mines,  some  being  as  high  as  281  days  and  some  as 
low  as  75  days  in  a  year.  It  also  appears  from  the  evidence  that  it  is 
possible  and  feasible  to  operate  the  coal  mines  continuously  throughout 
the  year,  but  the  Michigan  mines  usually  shut  down  in  the  summer  be¬ 
cause  the  market  for  coal  is  less  attractive.  It  also  appears  that  cer¬ 
tain  men  in  the  mines  are  employed  the  year  round,  such  as  firemen, 
pump-men,  etc.,  but  these  are  not  classed  as  miners. 

1.  The  computation  and  determination  of  the  “average  annual  earn¬ 
ings”  and  “average  weekly  wages”  have  given  rise  to  many  disputes, 
and  it  is  important  to  have  the  law  governing  such  computation  and 
determination  settled  at  as  early  a  date  as  possible. 

Section  11  of  part  2  of  the  Compensation  Law  was  evidently  framed 
with  the  purpose  of  avoiding  disputes  in  computation  by  making  such 
computations  so  simple  that  they  are  mere  sums  in  arithmetic.  It  is 
further  apparent  that  the  framers  of  section  11,  in  their  desire  to  make 
simple  and  clear  the  methods  for  making  computation,  sacrificed  accu¬ 
racy  in  detail  in  order  to  make  possible  speedy  adjustments  and  remove 
grounds  for  disagreements  and  contests.  For  instance,  the  section  pro¬ 
vides  in  many  instances  that  the  average  weekly  wage  shall  be  de¬ 
termined  by  taking  300  times  the  average  daily  wage  and  dividing  that 
sum  by  52.  This  is  upon  the  assumption  that  the  average  man  works 
approximately  300  days  in  a  year,  but  this  assumption  operates  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  man  who  works  more  than  300  days  yearly.  To 
illustrate:  A  man  works  steady  for  one  employer  seven  months,  work¬ 
ing  six  days  in  a  week  at  §2.00  per  day.  His  “average  weekly  wage”  is 
actually  §12.00,  but  having  worked  only  seven  months,  which  is  sub¬ 
stantially  less  than  a  full  year,  his  “average  weekly  wages”  must  be 
determined  under  this  section  by  multiplying  his  daily  wage  by  300  and 
dividing  by  52,  which  makes  his  average  weekly  wages  for  the  purposes 
of  compensation  under  the  law  §11.54  per  week,  instead  of  §12.00  per 
week  which  he  actually  earned.  It  is  further  apparent  from  section  11 
that  the  intent  of  the  statute  was  to  ascertain  approximately  the  “aver¬ 
age  annual  earnings”  of  the  employe,  using  the  methods  of  computation 
defined  in  such  section,  and  then  finding  the  average  weekly  wage  by 
dividing  such  sum  by  52.  The  essential  and  controlling  factor  in  mak¬ 
ing  the  computation  is  in  all  cases  the  average  annual  earnings,  and  the 
section  seems  to  recognize  the  right  to  include  in  such  “annual  earnings” 
not  only  the  money  earned  in  the  particular  employment,  but  also  in 
other  similar  employments.  It  is  apparent  that  death  or  total  disability 
involves  the  loss  of  all  the  earnings  of  the  employe,  whether  in  the  work 
in  which  he  was  engaged  when  injured  or  in  any  other  work. 

The  first  three  clauses  of  the  section,  distinctly  negative  the  conten- 


39 


tion  of  respondent.  The  first  clause  provides  for  cases  where  the  em¬ 
ploye  works  steady  the  year  round.  The  second  and  third  clauses  of 
section  11  distinctly  provide  that  the  average  daily  wage  of  the  employe 
shall  be  multiplied  by  300  to  obtain  the  “average  annual  earnings, ” 
thereby  distinctly  negative  respondent’s  contention  that  the  daily  wage 
should  be  multiplied  by  211.  In  the  second  and  third  clauses  of  section 
11  the  daily  wages  which  is  to  be  multiplied  by  300  is  defined  as  the 
“average  daily  wages  which  he  has  earned  in  such  employment  during 
the  days  when  so  employed.”  This  language  defines  with  certainty  that 
by  average  daily  wages  is  meant  the  wages  which  the  employe  receives 
" during  the  days  when  so  employed”  be  they  many  or  few,  and  then 
directs  that  such  average  daily  wage  shall  be  multiplied  by  300  and 
divided  by  52.  The  statute  makes  no  exception  in  favor  of  industries 
that  do  not  run  the  year  round. 

Does  the  fourth  clause  of  section  11,  above  quoted,  prescribe  a  differ¬ 
ent  rule  for  computing  compensation  in  cases  of  industries  not  opera¬ 
ting  throughout  the  year,  and  does  it  exclude  the  application  of  the  prior 
clauses  of  the  section?  The  fourth  clause  is  introduced  by  the  follow¬ 
ing  language;  “in  cases  where  the  foregoing  methods  (referring  to  the 
first  three  clauses)  of  arriving  at  the  average  annual  earnings  of  the  in¬ 
jured  employe  cannot  be  reasonably  and  fairly  applied,  such  annual 
earnings  shall  be  taken,  etc.”  It  will  be  noted  that  the  statutory  pro¬ 
vision  does  not  direct  the  application  of  clause  four  of  the  section  to  be 
made  to  any  particular  class  of  business  or  employes,  but  it  provides 
that  clause  4  shall  not  be  resorted  to  unless  it  is  first  determined  that 
none  of  the  first  three  clauses  of  the  section  can  be  reasonably  and  fairly 
applied  to  the  particular  case.  A  further  examination  of  clause  4  dis¬ 
closes  the  fact  that  it  contains  no  provision  for  arriving  at  the  annual 
earnings  of  the  employe  by  any  process  of  multiplication.  There  is 
also  an  absence  of  any  provision  by  which  the  actual  daily  earnings  of 
the  employe  shall  form  a  basis  of  the  computation,  and  it  seems  appar¬ 
ent  that  clause  4  was  intended  to  apply  in  exceptional  cases  where  no 
exact  or  substantial  basis  of  computation  existed,  and  it  was  necessary 
to  approximate  the  annual  earnings  of  the  employe  by  comparison  with 
other  similar  employes  engaged  in  the  same  or  similar  work.  An  ex¬ 
ample  of  this  is  found  in  the  case  of  a  young  man  who  was  employed  as 
a  lineman  by  an  Electric  Lighting  Company  without  any  wage  being 
fixed,  and  who  was  killed  by  coming  in  contact  with  a  live  wire  fifteen 
minutes  after  he  commenced  work.  In  such  case  it  would  be  necessary 
to  approximate  his  wages  by  comparison  with  what  others  received  for 
the  same  or  similar  lines  of  work.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  aver¬ 
age  weekly  wage  of  deceased  should  be  computed  under  clause  2  of  sec¬ 
tion  11  and  that  Respondent’s  contention  on  this  point  is  not  sustained. 

The  remaining  contention  of  Respondent,  that  the  average  daily  wage 
of  deceased  should  be  determined  by  dividing  the  amount  of  money  that 
he  actually  earned  by  the  total  number  of  days  that  the  mine  was  oper¬ 
ated,  cannot  be  sustained.  The  rate  of  compensation  was  fixed  by  the 
Arbitration  Committee  in  this  case  at  $10.00  per  week,  which  is  the 
maximum  amount.  If  Respondent’s  contention  on  this  point  is  sus¬ 
tained,  it  would  reduce  the  weekly  compensation  to  $9.89  a  week,  a 
difference  of  11c  weekly  for  the  period  of  300  weeks.  Respondent  has 
no  record  of  the  days  nor  times  that  defendant  worked  in  the  mine  ex- 


40 


cept  that  its  books  show  he  was  credited  with  having  mined  coal  on  131 
days  during  the  year.  The  claim  that  he  is  presumed  to  have  been  work¬ 
ing  every  day  that  the  mine  was  operated  will  scarcely  take  the  place 
of  proof,  as  the  general  rule  is  that  all  presumptions  are  in  favor  of  the 
deceased.  The  real  question  to  be  determined  is  how  many  days  the 
deceased  in  fact  worked  in  the  mine,  irrespective  of  the  number  of  days 
that  the  mine  was  operated,  and  when  the  actual  number  of  days  that 
he  worked  is  determined,  such  number  must  be  used  as  the  divisor  in 
ascertaining  his  daily  wage.  We  think  it  is  satisfactorily  shown  from 
the  evidence  that  when  the  mine  shut  down  in  April  on  the  expiration  of 
the  scale  deceased  found  other  employment,  and  that  he  either  did  not 
return  to  work  in  the  mine  until  several  days  after  it  commenced  opera¬ 
tions  in  September,  or  if  he  did  return  when  it  commenced  operations, 
his  wages  were  paid  in  the  name  of  another  man,  and  the  money  that  he 
earned  for  these  days  would  have  to  be  added  to  the  aggregate  amount 
of  earnings  credited  to  him.  This  would  bring  his  average  wages  above 
$20.00  per  week.  The  decision  of  the  Arbitration  Committee  is  affirmed. 


CLEM  vs.  CHALMERS  MOTOR  CAR  CO. 

INTENTIONAL  AND  WILFUL  MISCONDUCT— CARPENTER  INJURED  WHILE 
DESCENDING  FROM  A  BUILDING  BY  A  ROPE  INSTEAD 
OF  A  LADDER. 

Claimant’s  decedent  was  employed  as  a  carpenter  by  defendant  and  on  the 
day  of  his  injury  was  working  on  the  flat  roof  of  a  large  building  which  was 
being  constructed,  the  roof  being  about  20  feet  from  the  ground.  The  weather 
was  very  cold  and  decedent  and  the  other  men  were  called  down  from  the 
roof  by  the  foreman  at  about  9  o’clock  in  the  forenoon  for  a  hot  coffee  lunch, 
which  it  was  usual  to  serve  to  the  men  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  the  cold.  The 
means  generally  used  for  descending  from  the  roof  was  an  extension  ladder, 
but  decedent  chose  to  descend  by  means  of  a  rope,  and  in  some  manner  lost  his 
hold  of  the  rope  and  was  killed.  Payment  of  compensation  was  refused  on  the 
ground:  (1.)  That  the  injury  is  not  one  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment,  and  (2)  that  it  was  the  result  of  decedent’s  intentional  and  wilful 
misconduct. 

Held:  1.  That  the  act  of  coming  down  from  the  roof  for  coffee  lunch  at 

the  foreman’s  call  was  in  the  course  of  deceased’s  employment. 

2.  That  the  dangers  ordinarily  incident  to  descending  from  such  roof  arise 
out  of  the  employment,  and  this  fact  is  not  fundamentally  changed  by  varying 
the  manner  and  means  of  descending  as  in  this  case. 

3.  There  being  no  proof  that  any  order  or  rule  forbidding  the  use  of  a  rope  in 
descending  was  communicated  or  made  known  to  decedent,  and  it  appearing 
that  other  employes  used  the  rope  method  in  descending,  and  that  deceased  used 
much  care  in  letting  himself  down  over  the  edge  of  the  roof  with  such  rope, 
his  act  did  not  constitute  intentional  and  wilful  misconduct  within  the  meaning 
of  the  law. 

On  December  12,  1912,  Charles  S.  Clem  was  in  the  employ  of  Chalmers 
Motor  Company  in  Detroit  and  was  receiving  an  average  weekly  wage 
of  $20.65.  He  was  a  carpenter  by  trade  and  was  working  on  the  roof  of 
the  new  storage  building  which  was  being  erected  by  the  company.  This 


41 


building  was  approximately  160  feet  long,  150  feet  wide  and  19  or  20  feet 
high,  the  roof  in  course  of  construction  being  what  is  commonly  called 
a  flat  roof.  The  day  was  cold  and  the  men  employed  on  this  roof,  25  or 
30  in  number,  were  obliged  to  wrear  gloves  or  mittens  in  their  work. 
During  the  few  days  of  very  cold  weather  at  this  time,  the  foreman  pro¬ 
vided  hot  coffee  for  the  men,  and  at  about  9  o’clock  in  the  forenoon  of 
each  day  would  call  them  down  from  the  roof  for  a  hot  coffee  lunch. 
The  ordinary  means  used  by  the  men  for  ascending  to  and  descending 
from  the  roof  of  the  building  was  an  extension  ladder  such  as  painters 
use,  20  feet  in  length,  resting  against  the  south  side  of  the  building  and 
tied  to  it  by  ropes.  This  was  the  only  ladder  provided.  The  heavier 
material  used  by  the  men  in  their  work  was  lifted  to  the  roof  by  block 
and  tackle  with  rope  falls,  and  in  addition  to  this  there  were  about  a 
dozen  ropes  from  20  to  30  feet  in  length  which  were  used  to  pull  up 
lighter  material  over  the  cornice  of  the  building  when  needed  by  the 
men  working  on  the  roof.  These  ropes  were  located  around  in  different 
places  so  that  when  material  was  needed  at  any  particular  place  there 
would  be  a  rope  near  at  hand  with  which  to  haul  it  up.  The  ropes  were 
lying  on  the  roof  and  at  places  where  the  men  happened  to  leave  them. 

At  about  9  o’clock  in  the  forenoon  of  December  12,  1912,  the  foreman 
called  the  men  working  on  the  roof  to  come  down  for  hot  coffee,  and  it 
appears  that  they  proceeded  to  go  down  by  way  of  the  ladder,  one  fol¬ 
lowing  another.  While  others  were  going  down  in  this  way,  Mr.  Clem 
said  to  a  fellow  workman  named  Sekos,  “Hold  this  rope  and  I  will  slip 
down.”  From  this  point  Sekos  tells  the  story  as  follows:  “I  was  in  a 
hurry  to  get  down.  I  wanted  to  get  down,  but  I  just  held  it  (the  rope). 
Another  man  was  behind  me  on  the  roof,  but  did  not  have  hold  of  the 
rope.  *  *  *  I  held  the  rope  all  right;  it  didn’t  let  loose  at  all;  it 

didn’t  break,  and  if  he  had  hung  on  the  rope  all  right  he  would  have 
got  down  safely.  I  guess  he  lost  the  rope ;  I  guess  his  hands  were  cold ; 
he  had  mitts  on  his  hands  and  so  did  I.  *  *  *  It  was  pretty  cold;  we 
were  so  cold  we  were  going  down  to  get  some  coffee.” 

The  only  other  eye  witness  was  Albert  E.  Glaser,  the  man  who  stood 
behind  Sekos  when  Clem  started  down  the  rope.  Glaser  testified  in  sub¬ 
stance  that  Clem  asked  Sekos  to  hold  the  rope  for  him;  that  Sekos  held 
one  end  of  the  rope ;  that  Clem  took  the  other  end  of  it,  went  over  to  the 
edge  of  the  roof  and  got  down,  feet  first  on  his  knees,  and  went  down 
backwards,  with  his  legs  down  first  holding  onto  the  rope  with  his  hands. 
That  he  was  careful  about  it,  and  that  would  be  the  most  careful  way  to 
do  it;  Clem  had  gloves  on  his  hands;  it  was  so  cold  that  we  could  not 
work  without  gloves;  we  were  all  cold  at  that  time  and  fingers  a  little 
stiff  with  the  cold;  a  man  with  fingers  stiffened  with  the  cold  would  not 
be  able  to  hold  onto  a  rope  as  he  otherwise  could. 

Angus  E.  McDonald  was  subforeman,  having  charge  of  part  of  the  men 
working  on  the  roof.  McDonald  had  been  a  sailor  and  used  a  rope 
instead  of  the  ladder  on  going  up  to  and  down  from  the  roof  of  this 
building  probably  four  or  five  times;  and  on  one  occasion  when  he  so 
used  a  rope,  the  general  foreman  cautioned  him  and  the  men  then  pres¬ 
ent  not  to  use  ropes  for  going  up  and  down,  but  to  use  the  ladder.  There 
was  no  evidence  that  Clem  was  present  at  this  time,  or  that  the  fore¬ 
man’s  order  not  to  use  the  rope  ever  reached  him.  It  is  conceded  that 
6 


42 


no  question  as  to  the  effect  of  violation  of  shop  rules  or  orders  is  in¬ 
volved  in  this  case.  It  is  also  conceded  the  “Coming  down  off  the  roof 
for  coffee  lunch”  at  the  foreman’s  call  was  “in  the  course  of  Clem’s  em¬ 
ployment.”  The  issue  is  narrowed  down  to  “the  manner  of  coming 
down”  from  the  roof,  and  the  means  used  by  Clem  for  that  purpose.  It 
is  contended  on  behalf  of  the  company  that  compensation  should  be 
denied  because  (1)  the  injury  is  not  one  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course 
of  the  employment  of  deceased,  and  (2)  that  it  was  the  result  of  his  in¬ 
tentional  and  wilful  misconduct. 

The  first  objection,  we  think,  cannot  be  sustained.  It  is  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge  that  carpenters’  employes  in  the  erection  of  a  build¬ 
ing  must  ascend  and  descend  and  change  their  positions  on  the  building 
as  the  work  requires  and  that  they  are  often  required  to  choose  the 
means  and  manner  of  so  doing.  This  is  also  shown  by  the 
proofs,  attention  being  called  to  the  testimony  of  McDonald,  the 
sub-foreman,  that  it  is  not  uncommon  for  men  to  go  down  a  rope 
if  there  is  one  there,  and  that  he  would  sooner  go  down  a  rope 
than  not.  We  think  the  means  and  manner  chosen  by  deceased  to  de¬ 
scend  from  the  roof,  did  not  place  his  act  of  descending  outside  of  the 
course  of  his  employment.  Did  his  choice  of  the  means  and  manner  of 
descent  constitute  “intentional  and  wilful  misconduct”  within  the  mean¬ 
ing  of  the  Compensation  Law?  Mere  negligence  on  the  part  of  de¬ 
ceased  will  not  defeat  the  claim  of  his  widow  for  compensation.  A  mis¬ 
taken  estimate  of  the  risk  in  descending  by  means  of  a  rope,  or  the  mere 
choosing  of  means  and  manner  of  descending  which  were  less  safe  than 
the  ladder,  would  at  most  be  only  negligence  on  the  part  of  deceased. 
There  is  no  evidence  of  wilfulness  except  what  might  be  inferred  from 
the  naked  fact  of  choosing  the  rope  method  of  descending.  The  evidence 
shows  that  deceased  exercised  much  care  in  letting  himself  down  over  the 
edge  of  the  roof  with  the  rope.  There  is  an  entire  absence  of  any  show¬ 
ing  of  wilfulness  by  any  act  or  word  of  deceased  except  as  above,  and  we 
think  it  may  be  fairly  said  that  deceased  acted  in  the  belief  that  he 
could  safely  descend  by  the  rope.  He  fell  because  of  losing  his  hold  on 
the  rope.  Whether  this  resulted  from  his  fingers  being  stiffened  ^vith 
cold,  or  from  his  gloves,  or  for  some  other  cause  does  not  appear.  It  was 
not  impossible  that  by  reason  of  frosted  fingers  or  some  other  cause  he 
might  have  lost  his  hold  on  the  ladder,  had  he  chosen  that  way  of  de¬ 
scending.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  act  complained  of  did  not 
constitute  “intentional  and  wilful  misconduct”  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute,  and  the  decision  of  the  arbitration  committee  in  favor  of  the 
widow  is  affirmed. 


43 


PHILLIP  LIMRON  vs.  PERE  MARQUETTE  R.  R.  CO. 

LOSS  OF  FOOT,  AND  OTHER  INJURIES  WHICH  CAUSE  DISABILITY,  RE¬ 
SULTING  FROM  SAME  ACCIDENT. 

Applicant  suffered  an  accident  which  resulted  in  the  loss  of  one  foot,  also 
serious  injury  to  the  other  foot  and  to  his  left  shoulder,  the  latter  injuries  produc¬ 
ing  disability  of  uncertain  duration.  It  is  contended  by  respondent  that  appli¬ 
cant  is  only  entitled  to  award  of  125  weeks,  being  the  amount  for  the  loss  of  the 
foot,  and  that  compensation  cease  at  the  end  of  that  period  unless  the  disa¬ 
bility  resulting  from  the  other  injuries  continues  beyond  that  time. 

Held:  That  applicant  is  entitled  to  receive  half  wages  during  the  continuance 
of  total  disability  resulting  from  the  injuries  other  than  the  loss  of  his  foot, 
to  which  shall  be  added  compensation  for  the  specific  period  of  125  weeks,  pro¬ 
vided  in  the  law  for  the  loss  of  a  foot. 

The  applicant,  Phillip  Limron,  while  in  the  employ  of  respondent, 
met  with  an  accident  causing  the  loss  of  his  right  foot,  the  dislocation 
of  his  left  shoulder,  a  severe  gash  in  his  left  leg  and  breaking  some  of 
the  bones  in  his  left  foot,  particularly  the  great  toe  and  the  one  next 
to  it.  Aside  from  the  loss  of  the  right  foot,  the  other  injuries  sus¬ 
tained  by  the  applicant  have  caused  total  disability,  the  same  being 
mainly  caused  by  the  injury  to  the  shoulder.  For  the  loss  of  the  right 
foot  the  applicant  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  125  weeks  under  the 
specific  provisions  of  the  law  for  such  injury,  without  reference  to  the 
length  of  time  that  he  is  actually  disabled  from  work.  For  the  other 
injuries  which  he  received  resulting  in  total  disability  as  above,  he 
would  be  entitled  to  receive  half  his  weekly  wages  during  the  con¬ 
tinuance  of  such  total  disability  even  if  he  had  not  suffered  the  loss  of 
the  right  foot.  If  he  had  suffered  either  of  the  injuries  alone,  he  would 
be  entitled  to  receive  for  those  causing  total  disability  half  wages 
during  its  continuance,  on  the  one  hand,  and  for  the  loss  of  the  foot 
half  wages  for  125  weeks.  Having  in  fact  suffered  all  of  the  above  in¬ 
juries  from  one  accident,  is  he  entitled  to  specific  compensation  for  the 
loss  of  the  foot  and  also  compensation  for  the  total  disability  resulting 
from  his  other  injuries?  It  is  claimed  by  the  respondent  that  the  award 
should  be  half  wages  for  125  weeks,  and  if  at  the  end  of  that  time  the 
applicant  is  still  incapacitated  by  reason  of  his  other  injuries,  he  may 
apply  to  the  Board  for  further  compensation. 

If  the  contention  of  respondent  is  upheld,  and  the  “other  injuries” 
of  the  applicant  caused  total  disability  terminating  at  the  end  of  125 
weeks,  then  the  applicant  would  receive  merely  half  wages  for  125 
weeks  which  would  be  compensation  for  the  total  disability,  but  would 
receive  no  compensation  for  the  loss  of  his  right  foot.  It  is  apparent 
that  such  a  construction  would  result  in  a  gross  injustice  to  the  appli¬ 
cant.  It  is  conceded  that  the  mere  loss  of  the  right  foot  would  entitle 
him  to  compensation  for  125  weeks.  It  is  also  conceded  that  his  other 
injuries  would  entitle  him  to  compensation  for  125  weeks  if  his  present 
total  disability  continued  for  that  period.  If  in  addition  to  the  loss 
of  his  right  foot  the  other  injuries  resulted  in  the  loss  of  an  arm,  the 
period  of  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  foot  would  be  added  to  the 


44 


period  of  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  arm,  and  the  total  compensa¬ 
tion  period  would  be  their  sum,  and  more,  because  the  law  provides 
that  the  loss  of  the  arm  and  foot  together  shall  constitute  permanent 
total  disability  which  would  entitle  the  injured  workman  to  500  weeks’ 
compensation.  It  is  the  opinion  of  the  Board  that  in  cases  where  a 
workman  receives  injuries  causing  total  disability,  and  in  addition 
thereto  suffers  the  loss  of  a  member  as  in  this  case,  the  award  of  com¬ 
pensation  should  be  so  made  as  to  fairly  cover  both.  This  would  re¬ 
quire  the  payment  of  half  wages  during  the  continuance  of  total  dis¬ 
ability,  and  in  addition  the  payment  of  half  wages  for  125  weeks  for 
the  loss  of  the  foot,  the  latter  to  commence  when  the  period  of  pay¬ 
ments  for  total  disability  ended.  Allowance  should  be  made  for  the 
disability  incident  to  the  amputation  of  the  member,  which  in  this  case 
is  to  be  fixed  at  six  weeks  and  is  to  be  deducted  from  the  125  weeks’ 
period  above  mentioned.  The  compensation  for  the  loss  of  a  foot  or 
other  member  is  required  to  be  paid  at  all  events,  without  reference  to 
whether  such  loss  destroys  or  lessens  the  earning  capacity  of  the  in¬ 
jured.  For  example  a  man  loses  a  finger  and  returns  to  work  at  the 
end  of  ten  days  at  the  same  wages.  He  is  entitled  to  the  specific 
amount  fixed  in  the  law  for  the  loss  of  such  finger  for  the  reason  that 
such  loss  deprives  him  of  the  use  of  that  finger  for  the  remainder  of 
his  life.  The  handicap  resulting  from  such  loss  might  be  difficult  to 
estimate  in  many  cases,  and  it  seems  for  this  reason  the  law  has  laid 
down  a  specific  schedule  fixing  definite  amounts.  The  award  of  the 
committee  on  arbitration  will  be  set  aside  and  an  order  entered  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  this  opinion. 


SPOONER  vs.  DETROIT  SATURDAY  NIGHT. 

EMPLOYER  AND  EMPLOYE:  QUESTION  OF  BY  WHOM  WAS  DECEASED 

EMPLOYED. 

Decedent  was  employed  by  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Printing  Co.  as  engineer. 
The  plant  of  the  Detroit  Saturday  Night,  haying  been  injured  by  fire,  temporary 
arrangements  were  made  with  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Co.  for  the  use  of  their 
plant  to  get  out  the  paper.  Decedent  was  killed  while  running  an  elevator  dur¬ 
ing  the  night  on  which  respondent  was  using  the  plant.  Respondent  contends 
that  decedent  was  not  in  its  employ  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  and  that  run¬ 
ning  the  elevator  was  out  of  the  course  of  his  regular  employment.  It  was  shown 
that  respondents  entered  into  a  contract,  part  of  which  stipulated  that  they  were 
to  furnish  a  competent  engineer  to  attend  to  the  engine  while  they  had  the  use  of 
the  plant.  They  did  in  fact  hire  a  man,  but  decedent  insisted  that  he  do  the  work 
himself. 

Held:  1.  That  as  Spooner’s  work  for  Winn  &  Hammond  ceased  at  5  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon  and  his  pay  for  the  night  work  was  made  by  respondent,  this 
was  sufficient  to  make  him  an  employe  of  respondent. 

2.  That,  inasmuch  as  he  met  his  death  while  running  the  elevator  at  the 
request  of  respondent’s  foreman,  this  was  sufficient  to  bring  his  act  within  the 
course  of  his  employment. 

Appeal  of  the  Detroit  Saturday  Night  from  the  decision  of  an  arbitration  com¬ 
mittee  awarding  compensation  to  Mary  Spooner  for  the  death  of  her  husband. — 
Affirmed. 

On  February  3,  1913,  respondent  entered  into  a  contract  for  the  use 


45 


of  a  portion  of  the  plant  and  machinery  of  Winn  &  Hammond  Com¬ 
pany,  a  publishing  concern  of  the  City  of  Detroit,  respondent’s  plant 
and  place  of  business  having  been  rendered  untenatable  by  fire.  The 
contract  is  in  writing  and  was  made  between  the  Saturday  Night  Com¬ 
pany  and  T.  H.  Collins,  receiver  for  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Company, 
and  provides  the  terms  and  compensation  for  the  use  of  machinery, 
power  and  appliances  in  the  plant  and  also  contains  the  following  pro¬ 
viso: 

“It  is  further  agreed  that  should  the  Detroit  Saturday  Night  Com¬ 
pany  wish  to  operate  the  machinery  in  this  plant  at  any  time  other 
than  the  stated  working  hours  of  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Company 
which  are  7  a.  m.  to  11:30  a.  m.  and  12:15  p.  m.  to  5:00  p.  m.,  that 
the  charge  for  power  service  shall  be  $1  per  hour  in  addition  to  the 
prices  above  quoted  and  that  the  Detroit  Saturday  Night  Company 
agree  to  furnish  a  competent  engineer  to  tend  boiler  and  perform  such 
other  duties  as  usually  fall  to  a  man  in  that  capacity.” 

The  Saturday  Night  Company  desired  to  operate  the  plant  on  the 
night  of  February  5th  to  get  out  its  paper  for  that  week,  and  some 
negotiations  were  had  between  the  representatives  of  the  Saturday 
Night  Company  and  Receiver  Collins  and  Mr.  Spooner,  who  was  the 
regular  engineer  of  the  Winn  &  Hammond  plant,  for  the  services  of  Mr. 
Spooner  as  engineer  that  night.  Objection  was  made  by  some  of  the 
Winn  &  Hammond  people  to  the  proposal  because  the  work  would  be 
too  much  for  Mr.  Spooner,  and  that  he  would  be  worn  out  and  unable 
to  do  his  work  properly  for  the  Winn  &  Hammond  people  the  next  day. 
Mr.  Williamson,  superintendent  for  the  Saturday  Night  Company,  em¬ 
ployed  a  man  by  the  name  of  Leonard  J.  McCabe  as  engineer  for  that 
night.  Time  and  a  half  was  allowed  for  night  work  and  Spooner  it 
seems  desired  the  job  on  that  account,  and  it  is  claimed  that  he  was 
opposed  to  having  any  other  engineer  run  the  engine  lest  it  might  not 
be  handled  properly.  McCabe  came  to  the  plant  that  afternoon  talked 
with  Spooner  in  the  matter  and  left  because  the  latter  told  him  that  he, 
Spooner,  was  going  to  run  the  engine  that  night.  It  is  claimed  on  the 
part  of  the  applicant  that  Spooner’s  work  for  Winn  &  Hammond  Com¬ 
pany  ceased  at  5  o’clock  on  February  5th,  and  from  that  time  he  was 
in  the  employ  of  the  Saturday  Night  Company  until  he  met  his  death 
at  about  2  o’clock  in  the  morning  following.  It  is  further  claimed  on 
the  part  of  the  applicant  that  Mr.  Spooner  was  hired  by  the  Saturday 
Night  Company  as  engineer  and  that  the  accident  which  resulted  in  his 
death  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment. 

It  is  claimed  by  respondent  that  Spooner  was  not  in  the  employ  of 
the  Saturday  Night  Company,  but  was  there  substantially  as  a  volun¬ 
teer  because  he  was  unwilling  to  have  anyone  else  handle  his  engine, 
and  that  Spooner  was  in  fact  at  the  time  of  the  accident  in  the  employ 
of  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Company.  Respondent  further  claims  that 
the  work  of  running  the  elevator,  at  which  Spooner  was  fatally  injured, 
was  entirely  outside  of  his  duties  as  engineer,  and  that  his  injury  did 
not  arise  out  of  or  in  the  course  of  his  employment.  There  is  no  dis¬ 
pute  as  to  any  of  the  material  facts  in  the  case  except  the  question  of 
employment  of  Mr.  Spooner  as  engineer  that  night.  The  place  and 
manner  of  the  accident  are  undisputed.  The  sole  question  of  fact  in 


46 


dispute  is  whether  or  not  Spooner  that  night  was  working  as  an  em¬ 
ploye  of  the  Detroit  Saturday  Night  Company. 

Death  having  sealed  Spooner’s  lips,  the  disputed  fact  must  be  deter¬ 
mined  from  the  testimony  of  others  and  from  inferences  that  may  be 
drawn  from  established  facts  and  conditions. 

It  is  undisputed  that  Winn  &  Hammond  Company  ceased  work  in 
the  plant  at  5  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  of  February  5th;  that  the  plant 
was  operated  that  night  by  the  respondent  in  getting  out  its  paper;  that 
Mr.  Spooner  was  working  that  night  running  the  engine  which  fur¬ 
nished  power  and  light  for  the  respondent;  that  the  plant  could  not 
run  and  respondent’s  work  could  not  be  done  without  an  engineer  and 
the  operation  of  the  engine;  and  that  Spooner  was  engaged  in  running 
the  engine  with  the  knowledge  and  approval  of  and  pursuant  to  some 
arrangement  with  respondent.  The  duty  of  respondent  to  furnish  an 
engineer  is  fixed  by  the  written  contract  above  referred  to,  and  it  is 
conceded  that  respondent  expected  to  pay  for  Spooner’s  services  as 
engineer  that  night,  the  claim  of  respondent  being  that  Spooner  was  to 
act  as  engineer  that  night  through  an  arrangement  made  with  Receiver 
Collins  of  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Company,  who  was  Spooner’s  regular 
employer.  The  precise  claim  as  made  by  respondent  is  that  it  was 
understood  that  Spooner  was  to  work  as  engineer  that  night,  that  Re¬ 
ceiver  Collins  would  “bill  respondent  for  him,”  and  that  respondent 
would  pay  the  bill  for  the  services  of  Spooner  as  such  engineer,  such 
payment  to  be  made  to  Receiver  Collins  of  the  Winn  &  Hammond  Com¬ 
pany.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  claimed  by  the  applicant  that  Spooner 
was  employed  as  such  engineer  for  the  night  in  question  directly  by 
respondent  and  was  to  be  paid  time  and  a  half  for  his  work,  which 
would  amount  to  approximately  $5.20.  It  is  not  disputed  by  respondent 
that  this  amount  was  to  be  paid  for  the  services  of  Spooner  that  night, 
respondent’s  claim  being  that  such  payment  should  be  made  to  Col¬ 
lins  as  receiver,  and  that  by  reason  of  such  arrangement  Spooner  was 
in  fact  in  the  employ  of  Winn  &  Hammond  Company  at  the  time  he 
met  his  death.  There  is  a  sharp  conflict  of  evidence  in  relation  to  the 
hiring  of  Spooner  for  the  night  in  question  between  the  witnesses  of  the 
applicant  and  the  respondent,  but  from  a  careful  examination  of  all 
the  proofs  the  Board  has  reached  the  conclusion  and  finds  as  a  matter 
of  fact  that  Spooner,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  was  working  as  an  em¬ 
ploye  of  respondent. 

The  engine  which  Mr.  Spooner  was  engaged  in  operating  was  located 
in  the  basement  of  the  building,  and  the  place  where  he  met  his  death 
was  in  the  elevator  between  the  third  and  fourth  floors  of  the  building. 
It  appears  that  it  was  not  necessary  for  Spooner  to  remain  in  the  base¬ 
ment  with  the  engine  all  of  the  time,  and  he  came  to  the  floor  above 
where  respondent’s  employes  were  folding  papers  and  putting  in  the 
inserts.  Mr.  Loeffelbein,  foreman  of  the  press  room,  was  the  man 
charged  with  getting  out  the  work,  and  was  in  charge  of  the  work  at 
that  time,  respondent’s  superintendent  being  away.  Loeffelbein  and 
others  desired  to  get  some  stools  that  were  located  on  the  fourth  floor 
of  the  building  to  use  in  their  work  of  folding.  There  were  no  lights 
on  the  stairways  or  on  the  fourth  floor,  and  Spooner  proposed  to  run 
the  men  up  to  the  fourth  floor  in  the  elevator,  which  he  had  been 


47 


accustomed  to  run  at  times  in  connection  with  his  work  as  engineer. 
Loeffelbein  and  two  other  foremen  of  respondent  thereupon  got  into  the 
elevator  with  Spooner.  Spooner  started  the  elevator  and  while  ascend¬ 
ing  to  the  fourth  floor  was  caught  in  the  gate  or  some  other  way  and 
crushed  to  death.  There  was  no  light  in  the  elevator  and  those  with 
him  could  not  tell  just  how  the  accident  happened.  Respondent  con¬ 
tends  that  running  the  elevator  in  question  was  outside  of  the  course 
of  Spooner’s  employment,  and  that  the  accident  which  caused  his  death 
did  not  arise  out  of  his  employment. 

The  employes  of  the  Saturday  Night  Company  were  not  familiar  with 
the  building,  having  moved  into  it  in  an  emergency  caused  by  fire; 
while  on  the  other  hand,  Spooner  was  familiar  with  the  plant  and  had 
been  accustomed  to  run  the  elevator  frequently  during  his  long  em¬ 
ployment  with  Winn  &  Hammond  Company.  It  was  but  natural  under 
those  circumstances  that  Spooner  should  volunteer  to  run  the  elevator 
up  to  the  fourth  floor  with  Loeffelbein  and  Hussey  and  Wheeler,  two 
other  foremen  of  respondent,  to  get  the  stools  that  were  wanted.  The 
stools  were  to  be  used  in  doing  the  work  of  folding  and  putting  in 
inserts,  and  the  proposal  of  Spooner  to  run  the  elevator  to  the  upper 
floor  seems  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  suggestion  from  him,  which  re¬ 
spondent’s  foreman  might  either  have  accepted  or  declined.  Loeffelbein 
was  foreman  of  the  pressroom  and  had  charge  of  getting  out  the  work 
that  night,  and  in  the  absence  of  respondent’s  superintendent,  Loeffel¬ 
bein  was  Spooner’s  immediate  superior.  Also,  Spooner  might  naturally 
be  expected  to  be  governed  by  the  orders  and  wishes  of  the  other  two 
foremen  of  respondent  who  went  with  him  and  Loeffelbein  on  the  fatal 
elevator  trip.  The  acquiesence  of  Loeffelbein  and  the  other  two  fore¬ 
men  in  Spooner’s  proposal  to  run  the  elevator  for  them  and  their  ap¬ 
proval  of  his  action  in  so  doing  had  the  effect  of  placing  Spooner  in 
the  same  position  as  if  he  had  been  ordered  by  his  foreman  to  run  the 
elevator  on  this  trip.  He  was  merely  doing  what  any  helpful  man  ac¬ 
customed  to  run  the  elevator  would  have  done  under  the  the  circum¬ 
stances,  and  was  trying  to  further  the  business  and  work  of  his  em¬ 
ployer.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Board  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  his  employment  and  the  award  of  the  arbitration  committee 
is  affirmed. 


48 


ADMINISTRATION  AND  PRACTICE. 

The  Industrial  Accident  Board  on  October  9,  1912,  adopted  certain 
rules  relating  to  the  reporting  of  accidents,  settlement  of  claims,  re¬ 
ceipts  for  compensation  and  procedure  to  be  followed  in  cases  settled 
and  disposed  of  without  contest.  These  are  known  as  “Rules  of  Pro¬ 
cedure”  and  are  numbered  from  one  to  nine  inclusive.  Said  rules  and 
the  procedure  marked  out  by  them  cover  the  uncontested  cases,  and 
also  the  reporting  of  accidents  and  other  preliminary  proceedings  in 
cases  that  later  become  contested  and  eventually  proceed  to  arbitration. 

In  the  administration  of  the  law  the  Board  has  from  time  to  time 
adopted  rules  relating  to  practice  and  procedure  in  connection  with 
contested  cases  and  claims,  as  experience  seemed  to  require,  and  the 
same  are  here  set  forth,  under  the  head  of  “Administration  and  Prac¬ 
tice,”  as  follows: 


RULES. 

I. 

SELECTION  OF  ARBITRATORS. 

It  is  a  maxim  of  the  law  that  no  man  can  act  as  judge  in  his  own 
case,  and  this  principle  extends  to  and  excludes  all  persons  financially 
interested  in  the  outcome  of  the  case,  together  with  their  agents,  offi¬ 
cers,  and  attorneys.  Persons  so  nearly  related  to  any  of  the  parties 
in  an  arbitration  case  that  they  may  be  fairly  deemed  to  be  financially 
interested  in  the  decision  are  also  excluded  under  this  principle.  The 
rule  is  therefore  established  by  the  Board  that  all  persons  who  fall 
within  any  of  the  above  named  classes  are  disqualified  from  acting  as 
arbitrators  in  cases  to  be  heard  before  committee  on  arbitration  under 
the  Workmen’s  Compensation  law. 


II. 

POSTPONEMENT  OF  CASES. 

The  compensation  law  provides  that  arbitration  be  had  in  the  locality 
where  the  accident  occurred.  This  is  for  the  accommodation  of  parties 
interested  and  to  save  expenses  for  travel  and  mileage  for  themselves 
and  witnesses.  In  all  arbitration  cases  one  member  of  the  Board  goes 
to  place  of  accident,  frequently  traveling  hundreds  of  miles  to  hear  the 
case.  It  is  apparent  under  these  conditions  that  a  postponement  of 
such  hearings  cannot  be  had,  and  it  is  necessary  for  the  parties  to  be 
prepared  for  arbitration  and  to  proceed  with  the  same  at  the  time 
and  place  set.  Any  other  rule  would  make  the  administration  of  the 
compensation  law  expensive  and  ineffectual.  The  parties  must  also  have 


49 


their  witnesses  ready  at  the  time  and  place  set  for  arbitration  so  as  to 
make  their  proofs  complete. 


III. 

INSURER  DEEMED  PARTY. 

When  arbitration  is  ordered  in  the  case  of  any  employer  who  is  in¬ 
sured,  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  such  arbitration  shall  be  given 
both  to  the  employer  and  the  company  or  organization  carrying  the 
risk;  and  a  copy  of  the  award  or  judgment  on  such  arbitration  shall  be 
sent  by  mail  from  the  offices  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  to  such 
employer  and  also  to  the  carrier  of  the  risk.  In  all  such  cases  if  an 
award  of  compensation  is  made  it  shall  be  against  the  employer  and 
also  against  the  carrier  of  the  risk,  both  of  whom  shall  be  deemed 
parties  to  such  proceeding. 


IV. 

AGREEMENTS  AND  AWARDS. 

In  all  cases  where  an  award  has  been  made,  or  agreement  in  regard 
to  compensation  entered  into  by  the  parties  and  approved  by  the  Board, 
such  award  or  agreement,  as  the  case  may  be,  shall  continue  in  force 
until  modified  by  the  order  of  the  Board,  or  by  written  agreement  of 
the  parties  approved  by  the  Board,  or  by  a  written  agreement  of  the 
parties  approved  by  the  Board.  The  employer  may  not  stop  or  in  any 
way  change  the  rate  of  compensation  provided  for  in  such  award  or 
agreement  except  as  herein  provided.  In  cases  where  the  employe  re¬ 
turns  to  work  at  the  termination  of  his  disability  the  filing  of  the  final 
receipt  for  compensation  will  be  deemed  an  agreement  terminating  the 
period  of  disability. 

V. 


GROUNDS  FOR  DENYING  LIABILITY  TO  BE  STATED. 

If  the  employer  denies  liability  in  case  where  a  claim  for  compensa¬ 
tion  is  filed  by  an  injured  employe  or  his  dependents,  such  denial  shall 
be  filed  with  the  Board  in  writing  by  such  employer  and  shall  set  forth 
with  reasonable  detail  and  certainty  the  facts  and  circumstances  upon 
which  he  relies  as  a  defense  to  such  claim.  Upon  the  filing  of  such 
denial  in  the  office  of  the  Board,  a  copy  of  same  shall  be  furnished  to 
the  claimant,  so  that  he  will  have  such  seasonable  information  as  to 
the  nature  and  particulars  of  the  employer’s  defense  as  may  be  reason¬ 
ably  necessary  to  enable  him  to  procure  witnesses  and  prepare  for  the 
hearing  on  arbitration. 


VI. 

WITNESSES  AND  PROOFS. 

The  arbitration  is  the  first  and  fundamental  hearing  in  contested 
cases,  and  is  held  at  the  place  where  the  accident  occurred  in  order 


50 


to  make  such  hearing  reasonably  convenient  and  inexpensive  to  the 
parties.  The  proofs  should  be  fully  taken  at  such  arbitration,  and 
such  proofs  in  general  form  the  record  and  basis  for  the  hearing  on 
review  before  the  full  Board.  Where  cases  are  taken  before  the  full 
Board  for  review,  additional  testimony  may  be  taken  when  necessary 
by  deposition  under  the  provisions  of  the  general  statutes  of  the  state. 
The  party  appealing  should  furnish  the  Board  with  a  copy  or  transcript 
of  the  proofs.  Witnesses  will  not  be  heard  orally  before  the  full  Board 
except  on  extraordinary  occasions,  and  then  only  in  cases  where  per¬ 
mission  to  produce  and  examine  such  witnesses  has  been  granted  by 
the  Board  on  application  prior  to  the  date  of  the  hearing. 


VII. 

HEARINGS  ON  REVIEW. 

Hearings  on  review  before  the  full  Board  shall  be  held  at  the  office 
of  the  Board  in  the  city  of  Lansing.  This  general  rule,  however,  may 
be  modified  by  the  order  of  the  Board  in  exceptional  cases,  when 
deemed  necessary.  On  such  hearings  the  time  allowed  to  each  side  for 
argument  or  oral  presentation  of  the  case  shall  not  exceed  one  hour. 
Briefs  or  written  arguments  may  be  filed  with  the  Board  at  or  before 
the  time  of  such  hearing.  If  conditions  seem  to  require  it,  the  Board 
may  permit  the  filing  of  briefs  or  written  arguments  within  a  limited 
time  after  the  hearing  on  review.  Either  or  both  of  the  parties,  as  they 
choose,  may  present  their  case  on  such  hearing  by  briefs  or  written 
arguments  without  being  present  at  the  hearing. 


VIII. 

CONTESTED  MEDICAL  AND  HOSPITAL  BILLS. 

The  provision  of  law  authorizing  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  to 
pass  upon  bills  for  medical  and  hospital  services  applies  only  in  cases 
where  there  is  a  real,  bona  fide  dispute.  Before  such  matter  can  be 
brought  to  the  Board  for  adjustment,  the  parties  are  required  to  make 
an  earnest  effort  to  reach  a  settlement  of  the  matter  between  them¬ 
selves,  and  may  appeal  to  the  Board  only  after  they  have  exhausted  the 
ordinary  means  of  bringing  about  such  settlement.  In  all  matters  of 
this  kind  which  are  brought  before  the  Board,  the  person,  firm,  or 
corporation  applying  must  show  by  satisfactory  proof  that  they  have 
made  an  earnest  and  adequate  effort  to  reach  a  settlement,  and  that 
the  settlement  failed  through  no  fault  of  theirs.  Where  bills  of  the 
above  class  are  brought  before  the  Board  for  adjustment  by  persons 
objecting  to  same,  their  objections  will  be  considered  only  in  cases 
where  they  have  exhausted  the  ordinary  means  of  reaching  a  settlement 
before  making  application;  and  in  all  cases  where  such  bills  are  pre¬ 
sented  by  claimants  without  having  first  exhausted  the  ordinary  means 
of  reaching  a  settlement,  the  same  will  be  dismissed  without  prejudice 
and  without  investigation  of  their  merits. 


51 


IX. 


POSTPONEMENT  OF  REVIEW  HEARINGS. 

At  all  hearings  on  Review  the  full  Board  is  present,  and  the  docket 
for  such  hearings  is  so  arranged  that  the  cases  will  follow  each  other 
in  regnla  •  succession.  The  arbitration  cases  require  a  large  portion  of 
Ihe  time  of  the  members  of  the  Board  away  from  Lansing,  and  when 
( ases  are  set  for  hearing  on  Review  such  hearing  must  proceed  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  the  docket  and  be  disposed  of.  Parties  may  not  stipulate 
to  postpone  such  cases  after  the  same  are  set  for  hearing,  and  post¬ 
ponement  will  be  granted  by  the  Board  only  in  exceptional  instances. 
In  case  any  of  the  parties  or  their  attorneys  cannot  be  present  or  repre¬ 
sented  at  such  hearing,  a  reasonable  time  will  be  given  to  file  a  brief 
or  written  argument  in  the  case. 


X. 


LUMP  SUM  PAYMENTS. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  clear  purpose  of  the  legislature  was  to  pro¬ 
vide  that  the  compensation  receivable  under  this  law  should  go  to  the 
persons  or  families  entitled  to  the  same  in  weekly  payments,  it  being 
the  judgment  of  the  legislature  that  when  so  paid  it  would  more  effectu¬ 
ally  meet  and  relieve  the  wants  of  the  injured  employes  and  their  fami¬ 
lies,  than  if  paid  in  a  lump  sum.  This  view  has  the  full  endorsement 
and  concurrence  of  the  Board.  Therefore,  lump  sum  payments  will 
only  be  authorized  in  exceptional  cases  where  circumstances  create  a 
necessity  for  such  action.  Application  for  lump  sum  payments  can 
only  be  made  after  an  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation”  has 
been  filed  with  and  approved  by  the  Board,  or  an  award  of  compensa¬ 
tion  made;  and  such  application  is  required  to  be  in  the  form  of  a 
sworn  petition  setting  forth  in  detail  the  facts  and  circumstances  on 
which  application  is  based.  Desire  of  the  applicant  to  go  to  another 
state  or  country,  or  to  buy  property,  or  to  invest  in  business,  etc.,  do 
not  constitute  reasons  for  lump  sum  payment.  In  general,  conditions 
created  by  the  acts  of  the  injured  employe  or  his  dependents  after  the 
accident,  do  not  constitute  ground  for  such  payment.  As  a  general 
rule,  the  circumstances  and  conditions  that  will  justify  such  payment 
are  those  existing  prior  to  the  accident  or  created  by  it,  such  as  mort¬ 
gage  indebtedness  on  the  home  of  the  employe.  In  such  case  both  the 
indebtedness  and  attendant  conditions  must  be  set  forth  in  detail,  and 
if  secured  by  mortgage,  the  location  and  description  of  the  property 
must  be  given,  the  name  and  address  of  the  mortgagee,  and  the  office  or 
place  where  the  mortgage  is  filed  or  recorded. 


XI. 

APPEALS  TO  SUPREME  COURT. 

In  case  an  appeal  is  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court  by  certiorari,  it  is 
incumbent  upon  the  appellant  to  prepare  the  return  to  such  writ  in 


52 


much  the  same  way  that  a  bill  of  exceptions  is  prepared  in  cases  ap¬ 
pealed  by  writ  of  error.  Such  proposed  return  should  be  submitted  to 
and  served  upon  the  opposite  party,  or  his  attorney,  so  as  to  give  op¬ 
portunity  to  prepare  and  submit  amendments  in  substantially  the  same 
way  as  in  settling  bills  of  exceptions.  The  appellant  at  the  time  of 
serving  the  proposed  return  on  the  opposite  party  should  serve  such 
opposite  party  with  notice  of  the  time  when  the  proposed  return  will 
be  presented  to  the  Board  for  settlement.  This  practice  will  give  both 
parties  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  and  to  have  all  matters  which  they 
deem  important  included  in  such  return.  In  cases  where  the  proposed 
return  is  agreed  upon  between  the  parties,  such  agreement  may  be  sig¬ 
nified  by  a  stipulation  in  writing  attached  to  the  proposed  return. 


XII. 

FINDINGS  OF  FACT  AND  LAW. 

If  either  party  in  a  case  desires  to  have  findings  of  fact  and  law 
made  by  the  Board  for  the  purpose  of  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court, 
such  party  shall  prepare  and  submit  to  the  Board  proposed  findings  of 
law  and  fact  in  substantially  the  manner  required  by  rule  in  non- jury 
cases.  Such  proposed  findings  shall  be  served  upon  the  opposite  party 
together  with  notice  of  the  time  when  the  same  will  be  presented  for 
settlement  before  the  Board.  Such  opposite  party  may  draft  and  sub¬ 
mit  amendments  to  such  proposed  findings  of  fact  and  law,  and  also 
additional  proposed  findings,  if  deemed  necessary.  In  case  of  disagree¬ 
ment  on  such  proposed  findings,  the  same  will  be  settled  by  the  Board 
in  substantially  the  same  manner  that  is  provided  for  settlement  of  the 
return  to  a  writ  of  certiorari.  Parties  will  aid  the  Board  in  this  work 
by  agreeing  upon  the  facts  to  be  found  whenever  possible,  and  in  cases 
where  they  are  unable  to  agree,  they  will  aid  the  Board  by  reducing 
the  matters  in  difference  to  the  smallest  possible  compass. 


RULES  OF  PROCEDURE  ADOPTED  BY  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT 

BOARD. 

Rules  and  system  of  reporting  accidents  and  the  making  and  keeping 
record  of  adjustment  and  payment  of  compensation  adopted  hy  the  In¬ 
dustrial  Accident  Board. 

WHAT  ACCIDENTS  TO  BE  REPORTED. 

Rule  1.  All  accidents  which  result  in  disability  continuing  for  more 
than  one  full  working  day  shall  be  reported  to  the  Board;  all  accidents 
involving  the  loss  of  a  member  shall  be  so  reported  irrespective  of  the 
question  of  disability  resulting;  all  accidents  causing  death  shall  be 
reported  to  the  Board. 


53 


WHEN  TO  BE  REPORTED. 

Rule  2.  All  employers  subject  to  the  Compensation  Law  shall  make 
reports  to  the  Board  weekly  of  all  accidents  to  their  employes  which 
come  within  the  classes  of  accidents  designated  in  Rule  1.  Such  reports 
shall  be  on  and  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  weekly  re¬ 
port  blank,  “Form  No.  5-a,”  of  said  Board. 

FIFTEENTH-DAY  REPORT. 

Rule  3.  In  all  cases  where  the  disability  resulting  to  the  injured  em¬ 
ploye  continues  for  more  than  fourteen  days,  a  further  report,  on  and  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  report  blank,  “Form  No.  6,”  shall 
be  made  to  the  Board  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  such  disability :  Provided, 
That  in  all  cases  where  the  accident  causes  the  loss  of  a  member  or  death, 
such  report  on  Form  No.  6  shall  be  made  to  the  Board  within  ten  days 
after  such  accident  or  such  death,  as  the  case  may  be. 

IMMEDIATE  REPORT  REQUIRED. 

Rule  4-  In  all  cases  where  a  claim  for  compensation  is  filed  with  the 
Board  by  an  injured  employe,  if  it  appears  that  the  report  required  by 
Rule  3  has  not  been  made  and  filed  by  the  employer  on  account  of  dis¬ 
agreement  as  to  the  continuance  of  the  disability  or  for  any  other  rea¬ 
son,  the  Board  shall  thereupon  require  such  employe  to  forthwith  file  a 
report  of  the  accident  on  and  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
blank  Form  No.  6  of  said  Board. 

MEMORANDUM  AGREEMENT. 

Rule  5.  When  an  agreement  in  regard  to  compensation  is  made  be¬ 
tween  the  employer  and  the  injured  employe,  the  same  shall  be  in  writ¬ 
ing  on  and  in  accordance  with  Form  No.  10. 

SUPPLEMENTAL  REPORT. 

Rule  6.  In  cases  where  death  occurs,  a  supplemental  report  will  be 
filed  on  Form  No.  7,  giving  information  as  to  dependents  of  deceased. 

RECEIPTS  FOR  COMPENSATION. 

Rule  7.  After  an  agreement  relating  to  compensation  is  made  be¬ 
tween  the  employer  and  the  injured  employe,  and  approved  by  the 
Board;  and  also  in  cases  where  an  application  for  arbitration  has  been 
filed  and  an  award  of  compensation  made  by  the  Board,  receipts  for 
weekly  payments  of  compensation  made  upon  Form  No.  11,  signed  by 
such  employe  or  his  dependents,  shall  be  filed  in  the  office  of  the  Board 
monthly. 

FINAL  REPORT. 

Rule  8.  When  the  disability  of  the  injured  employe  terminates;  and 
also  when  the  payment  of  the  compensation  for  the  loss  of  a  member, 


54 


or  in  case  of  death,  has  been  fully  made,  final  report  thereof  shall'  be 
filed  with  the  Board,  on  and  in  accordance  with  Form  No.  7-a,  together 
with  settlement  receipt  on  and  in  accordance  with  Form  No.  12,  signed 
by  the  employe  or  his  dependents,  as  the  case  may  be. 

Rule  9.  Wherever  the  word  “employer”  is  used  in  the  foregoing  rules, 
numbered  from  1  to  8  inclusive,  it  shall  be  construed  to  cover  either 
the  employer,  or  the  insurance  company  carrying  the  risk,  or  the  Com¬ 
missioner  of  Insurance,  as  the  case  may  be. 


HOW  TO  REPORT  ACCIDENTS. 

On  the  following  pages  will  be  found  a  concrete  case,  displaying  the 
correct  method  of  reporting  an  accident,  and  also  the  procedure  to  be 
followed  when  payment  of  compensation  is  made.  It  will  be  observed 
that  ALL  accidents  resulting  in  disability  of  one  full  working  day  or 
more  are  recorded  on  the  weekly  report  form  (No.  5- A).  If  incapacity 
exceeds  fourteen  days,  a  detailed  report  on  form  No.  6  will  be  filed  on 
the  fifteenth  day,  and  the  latter  will  be  followed  at  an  interval  of  , not 
to  exceed  fifteen  days  by  an  agreement  in  regard  to  compensation,  exe¬ 
cuted  on  form  No.  10.  When  an  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation” 
is  reached,  payments  are  to  be  made  weekly,  and  receipts  taken  for  the 
same  upon  form  No.  11,  entitled  “Receipt  on  Account  of  Compensation,” 
which  in  cases  of  extended  disability  are  to  be  filed  monthly  with  the 
Industrial  Accident  Board.  When  the  final  payment  is  made,  a  “Settle¬ 
ment  Receipt”  is  taken  upon  form  No.  12,  and  this  is  submitted  together 
with  form  No.  7-A,  “Final  Report  of  Accident,”  showing  that  the  case 
is  closed  and  completing  the  files  of  the  Board.  Form  No.  7  will  be 
filed  if  death  results  so  that  information  may  be  had  as  to  dependents. 


THINGS  TO  REMEMBER. 

Employers,  and  agents  who  are  handling  the  reporting  and  adjusting 
of  accidents,  will  facilitate  the  work  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board 
by  paying  careful  attention  to  the  “Rules  of  Procedure”  and  guiding 
themselves  accordingly. 

The  personal  signature  of  the  injured  employe,  or  the  dependent  or 
dependents  to  whom  compensation  is  to  be  paid,  is  required  and  must 
always  appear  on  the  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation,”  “Re¬ 
ceipts  on  Account  of  Compensation”  and  “Settlement  Receipts.”  Type¬ 
written  signatures  will  not  be  accepted,  and  all  papers  so  signed  will 


55 


be  returned  for  correction.  The  mark  of  an  employe  who  cannot  write 
will,  when  properly  witnessed,  be  accepted.  “An  Agreement  in  Regard 
to  Compensation”  must  bear  the  signature  of  the  injured  man  or  his 
dependents.  It  must  also  bear  the  signature  of  the  employer,  and  when 
such  signature  is  made  by  an  officer  or  agent  of  the  employer,  the  sig¬ 
nature  of  such  officer  or  agent  must  be  accompanied  by  an  appropriate 
designation  of  his  official  position  or  agency.  The  execution  of  the 
agreement  must  be  attested  by  two  witnesses,  as  indicated  in  the  form. 

Incomplete  or  improperly  executed  reports  will  be  returned  for  cor¬ 
rection. 

Illegible  signatures  should  be  written  in  duplicate  on  receipts  and 
agreements  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the  filing  department,  so  that 
confusion  in  the  indexing  of  cases  and  reference  thereto  can  be  avoided. 
This  will  be  helpful  to  employers  as  well  as  to  the  Board,  as  it  will 
insure  such  classification  and  indexing  that  prompt  and  full  informa¬ 
tion  may  be  furnished  on  any  case  at  any  time. 

It  is  particularly  important  that  the  “First  Report  of  Accidents” 
submitted  on  form  No.  6  should  give  the  correct  name,  address,  (street 
and  number)  and  age  of  the  injured  employe,  as  well  as  a  concise  de¬ 
scription  of  the  accident  and  the  nature  of  the  injury.  Reports  not 
containing  this  information  will  be  returned  for  correction. 

REPORT  ACCIDENTS  PROMPTLY. 

IF  IN  DOUBT  DO  NOT  HESITATE  TO  CALL  UPON  THE  INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT  BOARD  FOR  ADVICE. 

WHEN  COMPENSATION  IS  DUE  SEE  THAT  THE  INJURED  EMPLOYE  OR 
HIS  DEPENDENTS  RECEIVE  SAME  WITHOUT  DELAY. 

SEE  THAT  INJURED  EMPLOYE  RECEIVES  IMMEDIATELY  THE  MEDICAL 
AND  HOSPITAL  SERVICES  TO  WHICH  HE  IS  ENTITLED  UNDER  THE 
ACT. 

Following  are  given  a  sample  report,  “Weekly  Report  Form,”  “Re¬ 
port  of  Accident,”  “Supplementary  Report  of  Accident,”  “Final  Report 
of  Accident,”  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation,”  “Receipt  on 
Account  of  Compensation,”  and  the  “Settlement  Receipt,”  properly 
filled  in  on  blanks  of  the  Board,  the  matter  constituting  the  blank  being 
printed  in  Roman  type,  and  the  matter  written  into  such  blanks  in 
making  such  report  and  preparing  the  same  for  execution  is  printed  in 
Italics. 


FORMS  FOR  REPORTING  ACCIDENTS. 

Every  accident  involving  the  loss  of  one  full  working  day  or  more 
should  be  reported  upon  form  No.  5-A,  which  is  to  be  filed  weekly  and 
which  is  to  carry  from  week  to  week  the  name  of  every  injured  employe, 
together  with  the  full  amount  of  time  lost  to  date,  until  disability  has 
terminated.  Also  give  medical  expense  when  possible. 


50 


Form  No.  5A  WEEKLY  REPORT  FORM  * 

Date  received .  For  week  ending  January  11, 1913 

(Do  not  fill  in.) 

Name  of  Employer . Sherwood  Motor  Company, . 

Address  (Street  and  Town) . 767-73  Water  Street,  Franklin,  Michigan . 

Nature  of  Business . Motor  Manufacturing . 

Signature  of  person  making  report . F.  M.  CR AN DELL . Position . Accident  Clerk . 


Date  of 
Injury. 

Name. 

Nature  of  Injury. 

Occupation. 

Age. 

Time 

Lost 

Days. 

Medical 

Expense. 

10/14 

*John  K.  Ledyard 

Contused  right  foot 

Grinder 

29 

71 

$45 

10/26 

*  Samuel  Reed 

Broken  Arm 

Tester 

35 

59 

65 

1/8 

Alex  Sherbrook 

Broken  Ribs 

Trucker 

40 

4 

35 

1/7 

John  Flanagan 

Strain  of  Left  Wrist 

Bench  Hand 

20 

1 

00 

9/15 

*  Edward  Murray 

Broken  Leg 

Trucker 

19 

88 

48 

1/6 

E.  H.  Cladstone 

Cut  on  4th  finger 

Drill  press  man 

IS 

2 

1 

1/7 

R.  M.  Huff 

Lacerated  scalp 

Foreman 

45 

5 

4 

FORWARD  WEEKLY  TO  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD,  LANSING,  MICH. 

♦Record  on  this  form  ALL  accidents  where  injury  incapacitates  for  full  working  day  or  longer.  If 
employe  is  carried  forward  from  previous  report  specify  by  asterisk  in  each  case. 


REPORT  OF  ACCIDENT  WHERE  COMPENSATION  INVOLVED. 

Form  No.  6  is  to  be  filed  only  in  compensation  cases,  i.  e.  when  tem¬ 
porary  disability  has  exceeded  fourteen  days,  or  when  an  accident  re¬ 
sults  in  the  loss  of  a  member,  or  in  death,  or  permanent  disability. 
When  No.  6  is  filed,  it  should  be  submitted  promptly  on  the  fifteenth 
day  following  the  injury,  and  it  should  be  followed  at  an  interval  of  not 
to  exceed  fifteen  days  by  an  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation” 
on  form  No.  10. 

When  form  No.  6  is  filed  it  is  regarded  as  a  notice  that  compensation 
is  involved  and  request  for  an  agreement  in  regard  to  the  same  will 
be  made  after  the  lapse  of  fiften  days  if  form  No.  10  is  not  then  on  file 
in  the  office  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board. 


57 


Form  No.  6.  (Sec.  17,  part  3.) 

Date  received . . 

(Do  not  fill  in.) 

MICHIGAN  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD. 

Report  of  Accident. 

(To  be  made  only  in  cases  involving  loss  of  a  member,  or  death,  or  disability  continuing  more  than 

fourteen  days.) 

1.  Name  of  employer . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

2.  Address  of  employer . 767-73  Water  St.,  Franklin,.  Mich . 

3.  Nature  of  business . Motor  Manufacturing . 

4.  Name  of  person  injured . John  K.  Ledyard . 

5.  Address  of  injured . 303  Main  St.,  Franklin,  Mich . 

6.  Occupation  of  injured . Grinder . 

7.  Sex.. male _  8.  'Age.. 29  yrs -  9.  Date  of  accident . November  14,  1912 . 

10.  State  amount  of  weekly  wage*.  .Average  $18.  .  11.  Nationality . English . 

12.  Place  of  accident,  in  detail . Department  No.  8,  Sherwood  Motor  Company  Shops . 

13.  Cause  and  manner  of  accident ....... .Lar{fe  piece  of  steel  fell  on  his  foot,  crushing  same . 

14.  Nature  and  extent  of  injury . Severe  contusion  of  right  foot,  hones  of  second  and  third  toes 

broken . . 


15.  Did  you  supply  medical  attention . yes . 

16.  Name  and  address  of  physician . E.  J.  Parker,  121  Atwater  St.,  Franklin . 

17.  Was  injured  taken  home  or  to  hospital . City  Hospital,  Saginaw  St . 

18.  Signature  of  person  making  out  report . F.  M.  CRANDELL . ‘ . 

(Do  not  type  name.  Report  will  be  returned  if  signature  is  not  written.) 

19.  Position . Accident  Clerk .  20.  Date  of  report . November  28,  1912. 

*If  piece  work,  give  average  earnings;  if  hourly  rate  is  given,  state  number  of  hours  per  day. 

INSTRUCTIONS. 

The  time  for  making  this  report  in  cases  where  the  accident  involves  the  loss  of  a  member,  or  death, 
is  within  ten  days  after  the  accident.  Where  the  accident  results  in  disability  only,  this  report  is  to 
be  made  on  the  fifteenth  day  after  the  accident. 

In  case  the  accident  causes  the  loss  of  a  member,  state  exactly  what,  and  the  precise  point  of 
amputation:  For  example,  the  index  finger  of  the  right  hand  at  the  second  joint,  or  the  left  arm  at 
the  elbow;  the  right  eye,  etc. 

ANSWER  THE  QUESTIONS  ON  THIS  BLANK  FULLY.  INCOMPLETE  OR  INDEFINITE 
REPORTS  WILL  BE  RETURNED  FOR  CORRECTION. 


SUPPLEMENTAL  REPORT  IN  DEATH  CASES. 

The  following  form,  No.  7,  “Supplemental  Report  of  Accident/’  is  to 
be  submitted  in  addition  to  form  No.  6  if  death  results  so  that  knowl¬ 
edge  as  to  names  of  all  known  dependents  and  such  other  information 
as  desired  may  be  on  record  in  the  offices  of  the  Industrial  Accident 
Board. 


Form  No.  7. 

Date  received . 

(Do  not  fill  in.) 

MICHIGAN  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 
Supplemental  Report  of  Accident 

1 .  Name  of  employer . 

2.  Address  of  employer . 

3.  Name  of  injured  person . 

4.  State  how  long  after  injury  death  resulted . 


8 


58 


5.  If  at  hospital  give  name  and  location . 

6.  Did  you  furnish  all  medical  aid  required  during  first  three  weeks? . 

7.  Amount  of  compensation  paid  to  date . 

8.  No.  ot  weeks . 

9.  Date  of  accident . 

10.  Date  of  death . 

11.  Give  names,  ages,  relationship  and  address  of  ALL  dependents: 

Name.  Age.  Relationship.  Address. 


12.  Signature  of  person  making  report . 

13.  Position .  Date  of  report . 

INSTRUCTIONS. 

ANSWER  THE  QUESTIONS  ON  THIS  BLANK  FULLY.  INCOMPLETE  OR  INDEFINITE 
REPORTS  WILL  BE  RETURNED  FOR  CORRECTION. 


REPORT  AT  CLOSE  OF  CASE. 

“Final  Report  of  Accident”  is  to  be  sent  in  after  the  last  payment  of 
compensation  is  made  and  is  to  accompany  the  “Settlement  Receipt.” 
In  addition  to  giving  the  date  of  accident  and  date  of  return  to  work 
it  will  also  contain  information  as  to  the  total  amount  of  compensa¬ 
tion  paid  and  the  total  medical  and  hospital  cost.  The  latter  is  no 
inconsiderable  item  in  the  cost  of  administering  a  compensation  law 
and  for  statistical  purposes  in  displaying  total  costs  is  invaluable  and 
should  therefore  never  be  omitted  when  possible  to  include. 

Form  No.  7  A 

Date  received .  File  No.  of  Accident . 

(Do  not  fill  in  )  (Do  not  fill  in.) 

MICHIGAN  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 
Final  Report  of  Accident. 

1.  Name  of  employer . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

2.  Address . 767-73  Water  St.,  Franklin,  Mich . 

3.  Name  of  person  injured . John  K.  Ledyard . 

4.  Occupation . Grinder . 

5.  Wages . $18.00  per  week . 

6.  Total  amount  of  compensation  paid . $ 81.00 . 

7 .  N umb  er  of  weeks . N ine . 

8.  Total  medical  and  hospital  cost . $ 45.00 . 

(Exclusive  of  services  of  company  surgeon.) 

9.  Date  payment  completed . January  16,  1913 . 

10.  Date  of  accident.  .November  14,  1912. .  11.  Date  of  return  to  work.  .January  16,  1913 . 

12.  Signature  of  person  making  report . F.  M.  CR AN DELL . 

13.  Position . Accident  Clerk . 

14.  Date  of  report . January  16,  1913 . 


59 


FORMS  USED  IN  MAKING  PAYMENTS. 

The  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation”  is  to  be  executed  in 
all  cases  involving  compensation.  If  payment  is  to  be  made  for  specific 
indemnity,  such  as  the  loss  of  a  finger,  etc.,  so  specify,  giving  thereon 
the  number  of  weeks  involved.  If  injuries  additional  to  specific  loss 
have  been  sustained  specify  that  payment  of  compensation  will  be  made 
during  period  of  disability,  at  the  conclusion  of  which  payment  will  be 
made  for  any  specific  loss  that  may  be  sustained.  Specific  loss  is  not 
limited  to  amputation.  There  may  be  permanent  loss  of  function  re¬ 
sulting  from  the  injury,  and  agreement  should  cover  such  permanent 
loss,  the  specific  number  of  weeks  to  be  determined  at  the  expiration 
of  the  period  of  disability. 

Form  No.  10.  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law. 

(Act  No.  10  of  Public  Acts  Extra  Session  1912.) 

Industrial  Accident  Board. 

Lansing,  Mich. 

AGREEMENT  IN  REGARD  TO  COMPENSATION.* 

We, . John  K.  Ledyard . . 

(Name  of  injured  employe.) 

residing  at  city  or  town  of . Franklin ,  Mich . 

and . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

(Name  of  employer,  insurance  company  or  commissioner  of  insurance.) 
have  reached  an  agreement  in  regard  to  compensation  for  the  injury  sustained  by  said  employe  while 

in  the  employ  of . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

. Franklin,  Michigan . 

(Name  and  address  of  employer.) 

The  time,  including  hour  and  date  of  accident,  the  place  where  it  occurred,  the  nature  and  cause 
of  injury  and  other  cause  or  ground  of  claim,  are  as  follows: 

The  accident  occurred  November  lJj,  1912,  10:80  A.  M.  Department  No.  8,  Sherwood  Motor  Com¬ 
pany  Shops.  A  large  bar  of  steel  fell  on  the  foot  of  the  injured  causing  a  severe  contusion.  The  bones  of 
the  second  and  third  being  broken . 


The  terms  of  the  agreement  follow: 

Here  state  the  sum  per  week  agreed  upon,  subject  to  the  terms  of  the" Act ;  also  wages  earned  by  in¬ 
jured  at  time  of  accident. 

. Average  weekly  wage — 1 18.00 . 

. Compensation  agreed  upon,  $9.00  per  week  during  the  period  of  disability . 

. If  permanent  loss  of  function  results  it  is  agreed  to  make  weekly  payment  for  same  at  conclusion 

of  incapacity . . 


Witness: 

. M.R.  REMINGTON . 

. 120  John  St.,  Franklin,  Mich .  . JOHN  K.  LEDYARD . 

(Name  of  injured  employe.) 

. A.  R.  BLAKSLEY .  . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

. 917  Genesee  St.,  Franklin.  Mich  .  .  .  (Name  of  employer,  insurance  company,  or 

insurance  commissioner.) 

By. . . . J.  C.  SHERWOOD,  Secy . 

Dated  at . Franklin . this.  .28th.  .day  of _ November . 1912. 

*Note — If  the  employer,  or  the  insurance  company  carrying  such  risk,  or  commissioner  of  insur¬ 
ance,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  the  injured  employe  reach  an  agreement  in  regard  to  compensation  under 
this  act,  a  memorandum  of  such  agreement  shall  be  filed  with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  and,  if 
approved  by  it  shall  be  deemed  final  and  binding  upon  the  parties  thereto.  Such  agreement  shall  be 
approved  by  said  board  only  when  the  terms  conform  to  the  provisions  of  this  act — Section  5,  part  III. 


60 


COMPENSATION  RECEIPTS. 

“Receipts  on  Account  of  Compensation”  are  to  be  taken  when  pay¬ 
ments  are  made  and  may  be  submitted  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board 
monthly  when  disability  is  prolonged  beyond  that  period. 

Form  No.  11.  *  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law. 

(Act  No.  10  of  Public  Acts  Extra  Session  1912.) 
Industrial  Accident  Board. 

Lansing,  Mich. 

RECEIPT  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  COMPENSATION. 

RECEIVED  OF . Sherwood  Motor  Company . the  sum  of 

(Name  of  employer,  insurance  company  or  commissioner  of  insurance.) 

. Nine . dollars  and . No . cents 

being  the  proportion  of  my  weekly  wages  from  the . twenty -eighth . day  of . November .... 

1912 ,  to  the . -fifth . day  of . December . 1912,  under  the  Michigan 

Workmen’s  Compensation  Law,  subject  to  review  by  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  said  accident 

occurring  on  the . 14th . day  of . November . 1912,  while  in  the  employ  of . 

. Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

S . 9.00 .  . JOHN  K.  LEDYARD . 

(Name  of  employe.) 

. 303  Main  St . 

(Street  and  number.) 

Date . November  6,  1912 . 

. Franklin.  Mich . 

(City  or  town.) 

If  the  employer,  or  the  insurance  company  carrying  such  risk,  or  commissioner  of  insurance,  as  the 
case  may  be,  and  the  injured  employe  reach  an  agreement  in  regard  to  compensation  under  this  act,  a 
memorandum  of  such  agreement  shall  be  filed  with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  and,  if  approved  by 
it,  shall  be  deemed  final  and  binding  upon  the  parties  thereto.  Such  agreement  shall  be  approved  by 
said  board  only  when  the  terms  conform  to  the  provisions  of  this  act — Section  5,  part  III. 


RECEIPT  WHEN  LAST  PAYMENT  IS  MADE. 

The  “Settlement  Receipt”  is  evidence,  when  signed  by  the  recipient 
of  compensation  and  a  witness,  that  all  payments  have  been  made  in 
accordance  with  the  “Agreement  in  Regard  to  Compensation,”  and 
should  contain  not  only  the  amount  for  the  current  week,  but  also  the 
entire  amount  paid  by  the  employer  as  relating  to  the  particular  acci¬ 
dent.  This  receipt  should  be  accompanied  when  sent  to  the  Board  by 
a  “Final  Report  of  Accident,”  form  Jfo-.  7-A. 

Form  No.  12.  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law. 

(Act  No.  10  of  Public  Acts  Extra  Session  1912.) 

Industrial  Accident  Board. 

Lansing,  Mich. 


SETTLEMENT  RECEIPT. 

RECEIVED  OF . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

(Name  of  employer,  insurance  company  or  commissioner  of  insurance.) 

the  sum  of . Nine . dollars  and . No . . 

cents,  making  in  all,  with  weekly  payments  already  received  by  me,  the  total  sum  of . 

Eighty-one . dollars  and . No . cents, 

in  settlement  of  compensation  under  the  Michigan  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law,  for  all  injuries 

received  by  me  on  or  about  the . fourteenth . day  of . November . 

1912,  while  in  the  employ  of . Sherwood  Motor  Company . 

(Name  of  employer,  city  or  town,  street  and  number.) 
subject  to  review  and  approval  by  the  Industrial  Accident  Board. 


G1 


Witness  my  hand  this . sixteenth . day  of . January..,  1913 

Witness . J.M.  NORTHWA  Y .  . JOHN  K.  LED  YARD . 

(Name  of  employe.) 

Address . 717  Baker  Court .  . SOS  Main  St . 

(Street  and  number.) 

. Franklin,  Mich .  . Franklin,  Mich . 

(City  or  town.) 

If  the  employer  or  the  insurance  company  carrying  such  risk,  or  commissioner  of  insurance,  as  the 
case  may  be,  and  the  injured  employe  reach  an  agreement  in  regard  to  compensation  under  this  act, 
a  memorandum  of  such  agreement  shall  be  filed  with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  and,  if  approved 
by  it,  shall  be  deemed  final  and  binding  upon  the  parties  thereto.  Such  agreement  shall  be  approved 
by  said  board  only  when  the  terms  conform  to  the  provisions  of  this  act. — Section  5,  part  III. 


THINGS  TO  BE  OBSERVED  BY  EMPLOYERS  IN  FILING  NOTICE 
OF  ACCEPTANCE  OF  ACT. 

An  employer  electing  to  accept  the  provisions  of  Act  No.  10,  Public 
Acts,  1912,  may  expedite  action  upon  his  acceptance  by  observing  the 
following : 

Secure  the  blank  prepared  for  this  purpose  by  the  Industrial  Accident 
Board. 

Answer  each  question  fully,  specifying  average  number  of  employes; 
nature  of  business,  location  of  plant  and  home  office,  if  the  two  vary. 
Give  name  under  which  business  is  conducted  in  order  that  acceptance 
may  be  filed  properly.  Such  acceptance  must  be  signed  by  the  em¬ 
ployer,  and  in  case  where  the  employer  is  a  corporation,  the  original 
signature  of  the  officer  executing  the  acceptance  is  required,  together 
with  appropriate  designation  of  his  official  position  with  the  company. 

Specify  distinctly  the  method  adopted  of  providing  compensation  for 
injured  employes,  stating  whether  the  employer  desires  to  carry  his  own 
risk ;  to  insure  through  a  company  authorized  to  transact  a  liability  busi¬ 
ness  in  Michigan;  to  join  with  other  employers  in  a  mutual  insurance 
company  organized  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  act,  or  to 
operate  through  the  state  insurance  department. 

Carry  own  risk:  If  the  employer  desires  to  carry  his  own  risk,  a 
sworn,  detailed  financial  statement,  setting  forth  fully  all  assets  and 
liabilities  and  properly  certified,  must  accompany  the  written  accept¬ 
ance. 

Insuring  in  Stock  or  Mutual  Companies  :  If  the  employer  elects  to 
protect  his  employes  through  a  stock  or  an  authorized  mutual  in¬ 
surance  company,  the  name  of  the  company  should  be  designated,  and  a 
certificate  showing  that  the  risk  is  fully  covered  should  be  filed  by  the 
insurance  company  carrying  the  business. 

Insuring  in  State  Insurance  Department:  If  the  employer  elects  to 
carry  his  risk  through  the  State  Insurance  Department,  he  must  make 
application  to  that  department  and  meet  its  requirements.  He  must  also 
file  his  acceptance  with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  designating  this 
method  of  carrying  his  risk. 

Change  of  Method  for  Carrying  Risk  :  The  employer  may  change 
from  one  approved  method  to  another  at  any  time  after  the  approval 


62 


of  his  written  acceptance  upon  notifying  the  Industrial  Accident  Board 
and  receiving  its  authority.  It  is  the  intent  of  Act  10,  Public  Acts, 
1912,  that  employes  covered  by  its  provisions  be  fully  protected  at  all 
times,  and  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  insists  that  this  protection 
be  continuous  and  that  there  be  no  interval  when  the  employe  is  not 
covered.  In  case  of  change  in  the  manner  of  carrying  the  risk  or  the 
company  carrying  the  same. 

Changes  in  the  firm,  corporation  or  co-partnership  name  should  be 
reported  immediately  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  in  order  that 
its  files  may  be  corrected  to  correspond  with  such  change. 

Acceptances  specifying  insurance  companies  not  authorized  to  do 
business  in  Michigan  cannot  be  approved  by  the  Industrial  Accident 
Board. 

Elections  upon  the  part  of  employers  desiring  to  carry  their  own 
risk  will  be  approved  only  when  a  satisfactory  financial  showing  is 
made.  Certainty  of  payment  of  all  compensation  due  to  the  injured 
workman  or  his  dependents,  is  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
law.  The  compensation  is  required  to  be  paid  in  weekly  installments 
by  the  employer,  and  in  extreme  cases  such  payments  may  extend  over 
a  period  of  500  weeks,  or  approximately  ten  years.  It  is  therefore  evi¬ 
dent  that  the  question  to  be  determined  by  the  Board  in  passing  upon 
the  application  of  an  employer  to  carry  his  own  risk,  is  not  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  his  present  solvency,  nor  the  question  that  is  usually  presented 
in  commercial  transactions  where  credits  for  short  periods  are  obtained, 
but  is  the  question  whether  the  employer  will  continue  in  business  and 
be  solvent  and  responsible  for  the  payment  of  compensation  in  case  of 
injury  to  his  employes,  for  a  period  that  may  extend  ten  years  from 
date.  The  duty  is  imposed  upon  the  Board  to  so  administer  the  law 
that  every  working  man  entitled  to  compensation  will  receive  all  of 
his  money  no  matter  how  long  the  period  through  which  the  payments 
are  to  be  distributed.  In  view  of  this  duty  imposed  upon  the  Board, 
and  the  inherent  difficulties  in  the  question  to  be  passed  upon  (due 
mainly  to  the  long  period  of  time  covered  by  the  payments),  it  will  be 
apparent  that  only  those  of  more  than  ordinary  financial  strength  can 
be  authorized  to  carry  their  own  risk.  The  refusal  of  the  Board  to  ap¬ 
prove  an  application  of  this  class  is  not  to  be  considered  as  a  reflection 
on  the  present  financial  condition  of  the  applicant,  but  should  be  con¬ 
sidered  in  the  light  of  the  above  facts  and  conditions,  and  particularly 
the  purpose  of  the  law  to  provide  certainty  of  payment  to  the  end  of 
the  period  of  compensation. 

Following  will  be  found  a  properly  executed  form  of  acceptance. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. — Form  No.  1  (Sec.  6,  Part  1). 

EMPLOYER’S  WRITTEN  ACCEPTANCE 
Act  No.  10  of  Public  Acts,  Extra  Session  1912. 

Industrial  Accident  Board, 

Lansing,  Mich. 

Take  notice  that  the  undersigned  employer  of  labor  in  Michigan  accepts  the  provisions  of  Act  No. 
10  of  Public  Acts,  Extra  Session,  1912. 

Number  of  employes . 276 . 


63 


Location  of  place  of  employment . Bush  and  Pine  Streets,  Caledonia,  Mich . 

(If  more  than  one  plant,  place  of  business  or  work  place,  state  each  fully.) 

. 12th  and  7th  Streets,  Newport,  Mich . 

. Congress  Street,  Detroit,  Michigan . 

Nature  of  employment . Manufacture  of  Auto  Parts . 

(If  more  than  one  kind,  state  each  fully,  with  location.) 

. Painting,  Trimming  and  Decorating  Bodies . 

. Brass  foundry  and  machine  shop . 

Method  of  providing  for  compensation  adopted  by  the  undersigned . Liability  insurance . 

(State  whether  Mutual  Insurance  [give  name],  In- 


. with  Southampton  &  Globe  Casualty  Co . 

surance  Company  [give  name],  State  Insurance  Commissioner  or  carry  own  risk.) 

Dated  at . * . .  Detroit,  Mich., . ,  this . .  24th . .  day  of ... .  March . 1 91 3 

( Home  office.) 

. Michigan  Motor  Manufacturing  Co . 

By . John  Quincy  Adams,  Secretary . 

. Congress  Street,  Detroit,  Mich . 

(P.  O.  Address.) 


Note. — If  emplover  wishes  to  accept  the  provisions  of  the  above  law,  this  notice  must  be  signed 
by  the  employer  and  filed  with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board.  When  so  filed  it  becomes  immediately 
binding  on  the  employer.  If  employer  is  a  corporation,  the  notice  should  have  the  corporate  name  ana 
seal  affixed  and  be  signed  by  an  officer  having  authority  to  do  so. 


FILING  OF  CERTIFICATES  BY  INSURANCE  COMPANIES. 

The  following  form  of  certificate  is  required  by  the  Industrial  Acci¬ 
dent  Board  from  insurance  companies  showing  that  the  insurance  speci¬ 
fied  by  the  employer  in  his  written  acceptance  of  Act  No.  10  is  actually 
in  force. 

CERTIFICATE. 

To  Industrial  Accident  Board, 

Lansing,  Mich. 

Gentlemen: 

This  certifies  that . 

(Name  of  firm.) 

of . is  insured  by . 


covering  the  obligations  imposed  upon  said  insured  by  Act  No.  10  of  Public  Acts  of  1912,  Extra  Session, 
commonly  known  as  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Law;  that  said  insurance  is  written  upon  and  in 

accordance  with  our  Policy  form  No.  or  letter . being  the  same  in  every  respect  as 

the  Policy  contract  form  filed  by  the  undersigned  company  with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  (on 


and  in  accordance  with  our  blank  form  of  Policy  No.  or  letter . and  our  endorsement 

written  upon  and  in  accordance  with  our  blank  endorsement  form  No . filed  by  the  under¬ 


signed  company  with  your  Board.)1  All  changes  that  may  hereafter  be  made  by  the  company  in  such 
contract  of  insurance  will  be  immediately  reported  to  your  Board. 

The  location2  and  character  of  the  business  operations  covered  by  said  insurance  are  as  follows: 


This  certificate  is  furnished  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board. 

Dated  at . Michigan  this . day 

of . 191 _ 


(Name  of  Company.) 


By . . . 

(Name  and  official  title  of  officer  or  agent  executing  certificate  on  behalf  of  Co. 


1*  If  the  Policy  form  covers  without  any  attached  rider,  erase  matter  in  parenthesis  above;  but 
if  the  rider  and  policy  are  both  used,  let  matter  in  parenthesis  stand  and  erase  corresponding  matter 
so  as  to  express  the  fact. 

2.  If  more  than  one  location,  so  state;  and  if  business  of  more  than  one  character,  state  facts  with 
substantial  accuracy. 


64 


NOTICES  TO  BE  POSTED  BY  EMPLOYERS. 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Sec.  6,  part  I.,  the  Industrial 
Accident  Board  prepared  the  following,  printed  on  cardboard,  12x20 
inches.  The  section  of  the  Act  relating  to  same  provides:  “That  such 
employer  so  electing  to  become  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  act 
shall  within  ten  days  after  the  approval  by  said  board  of  his  election 
filed  as  aforesaid,  post  in  a  conspicuous  place  in  his  plant,  shop,  mine  or 
place  of  work,  or  if  such  employer  be  a  transportation  company,  at  its 
several  stations  and  docks,  notice  in  the  form  as  prescribed  and  fur¬ 
nished  by  the  industrial  accident  board  to  the  effect  that  he  accepts 
and  will  be  bound  by  the  provisions  of  this  act.” 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich.,  Form  No.  9  (Sec.  6,  Part  1.) 

NOTICE  TO  EMPLOYES. 

All  workmen  or  operatives  employed  by  the  undersigned  in  or  about  this  establishment  are  hereby 
notified  that  the  employer  or  employers  owning  or  operating  the  same  have  filed  with  the  Industrial 
Accident  Board,  at  Lansing,  notice  of  election  to  become  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Act  No.  10  of 
Public  Acts,  Extra  Sessions  1912. 

(This  Act  is  commonly  known  as  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law.) 

You  are  further  notified  that  unless  you  serve  written  notice  on  your  employer  of  your  election  not 
to  come  under  the  law,  the  act  will  immediately  apply  to  you. 

If  you  do  notify  your  employer  that  you  elect  not  to  come  under  said  act,  you  may  afterwards  waive 
such  claim  by  a  notice  in  writing,  which  shall  take  effect  five  days  after  it  is  delivered  to  the  employer, 
at  the  expiration  of  which  period  the  law  will  apply  to  you. 

INJURY  NOT  RESULTING  IN  DEATH - NOTICE  OP 

An  employe  who  has  been  injured  in  the  course  of  his  employment  and  whose  incapacity  extends 
over  a  period  of  two  weeks  (Sec.  3,  part  2)  shall  serve  written  notice  of  such  injury  on  his  employer 
(from  whom  blank  forms  may  be  obtained),  which  notice  shall  be  signed  by  the  person  injured  and  shall 
state  in  ordinary  language  the  time,  place  and  cause  of  the  injury  (Sec.  16,  part  2). 

INJURY  RESULTING  IN  DEATH - NOTICE  OF 

When  death  results  from  an  injury  received  by  an  employe  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  notice 
shall  be  served  by  his  dependents,  or  by  a  person  in  their  behalf  (Sec.  16,  part  2). 

LIMIT  OF  PERIOD  OF  NOTIFICATION. 

Notice  of  the  injury  shall  be  given  to  the  employer  within  three  months  after  the  happening  thereof, 
and  claim  for  compensation  shall  be  made  within  six  months,  or  in  case  of  death  or  in  the  event  of 
physical  or  mental  incapacity,  notice  shall  be  given  within  six  months  after  the  death  or  removal  of 
such  mental  or  physical  incapacity.  No  proceeding  for  compensation  under  this  Act  shall  be  main¬ 
tained  unless  these  rules  are  observed  (Sec.  15,  part  2). 

Date . 4 . 

. Employer. 

The  Industrial  Accident  Board  has  prepared  the  following  certificate, 
to  be  executed  by  the  employer  and  filed  with  the  Board,  showing  that 
such  notices  were  actually  posted  as  required  by  the  section  of  the  law 
above  quoted.  This  certificate  should  be  promptly  filed  with  the  Board, 
and  the  signature  to  the  same  is  required  to  be  that  of  the  employer 
himself  or  if  made  by  an  officer  or  agent  of  a  corporation,  the  appropri¬ 
ate  designation  of  the  official  character  of  the  person  signing  must 
accompany  signature. 


65 


CERTIFICATE. 

INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD, 

Lansing,  Mich.: 

We  do  hereby  certify  that  on  the . day  of . 

we  posted  in  the  most  prominent  places  in  and  around  our  place  of  business,  viz.: . 

(Insert  workrooms,  mines,  stations,  etc.) 

. printed  notices  of  our  acceptance  of  the  provisions  of  Act  No.  10  of  Public 

(Give  number.) 

Acts  Extra  Session  1912,  the  same  being  notices  furnished  by  the  Industrial  Accident  Board;  and  we 
further  certify  that  said  notices  were  conspicuously  posted  and  securely  fastened. 

Dated  at 
day  of 


19 


66 


PROCEDURE  IN  DISPUTED  CASES. 


In  cases  where  the  parties  are  unable  to  reach  an  agreement  in  regard 
to  compensation,  it  then  becomes  necessary  to  take  proceedings  for  the 
arbitration  and  adjudication  of  the  claim.  All  of  the  ordinary  means 
of  reaching  a  settlement  should  be  exhausted  by  the  parties  before  mak¬ 
ing  application  for  arbitration.  However,  in  case  where  arbitration 
becomes  necessary,  application  by  mail  should  be  made  to  the  Industrial 
Accident  Board  for  the  necessary  blank  form  (known  as  “Application 
for  Adjustment  of  Claim”),  being  form  No.  13  (reproduced  on  page 
67  of  this  bulletin).  The  blank  will  then  be  mailed  to  the  person 
applying  for  the  same,  and  when  it  is  properly  filled  out,  signed  and 
returned,  it  will  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Board,  and  if  it 
appears  that  all  means  for  reaching  a  settlement  between  the  parties 
have  been  exhausted,  the  Board  will  by  an  appropriate  order  fix  the 
time  and  place  for  arbitration.  The  usual  order  in  such  case  will  be 
found  on  page  67  in  this  bulletin.  Notice  and  letter  of  instruction 
is  then  sent  to  all  of  the  parties  to  such  arbitration  in  the  form  shown 
on  page  68.  Other  forms  in  use  in  arbitration  proceedings  are  repro¬ 
duced  on  the  pages  following  and  the  reader  may  familiarize  himself 
with  the  details  of  this  procedure  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board 
from  the  receipt  of  the  “Application  for  Adjustment  of  Claim”  to  the 
finding  of  the  committee  on  arbitration,  which  is  set  forth  in  each  case 
on  form  No.  17,  “Award  on  Arbitration.”  This  finding  of  the  committee 
is  final  unless  an  appeal  is  taken  by  either  party  in  accordance  with 
Sec.  8  of  part  3.  The  Board  has  prepared  a  form  for  use  of  parties 
desiring  to  appeal  to  the  full  Board  from  the  findings  of  the  Committee 
on  Arbitration,  a  copy  of  which  form  will  be  found  on  page  72. 

WAIVER  OF  ARBITRATION. 

If  both  parties  can  agree  on  the  facts  in  a  case  and  the  only  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  parties  is  the  construction  and  application  of  the  law 
to  said  facts,  and  the  parties  being  desirous  of  obtaining  a  decision  by 
the  full  Board  without  resorting  to  arbitration,  Form  No.  18  (page 
70)  may  be  executed  and  submitted  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board 
and  a  decision  will  be  rendered  in  accordance  with  the  law  from  the 
facts  displayed  therein. 


67 


Form  No.  13. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. 


NOTICE  AND  APPLICATION  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIM. 


State  of  Michigan, 
County  of . 


Applicant. 


Respondent  (s). 

. \ . .  the  above  named  applicant,  hereby 

gives  notice  to  said  Industrial  Accident  Board  that  the  above  named  parties  have  failed  to  reach  an 
agreement  in  regard  to  compensation  under  Act  No.  10  of  the  Public  Acts  of  1912,  extra  session;  and 
hereby  makes  application  to  said  Industrial  Accident  Board  for  the  adjustment  of  such  compensation 
between  said  parties,  and  the  adjudication  and  determination  of  the  same. 

Said  applicant  further  shows  that  the  accident  upon  which  claim  for  compensation  is  based  in  this 

matter  occurred  on  the . . day  of . 191 . . 

at  the  town  of . .  county  of . . 

and  State  of  Michigan,  and  resulted  in; 


(State  fully  result  of  injury.) 


The  postoffice  address  of  the  above  named  applicant  is . 

and  the  postoffice  address  of  the  respondent (s)  is  as  follows; 


The  above  named  applicant  prays  for  the  following  relief  in  the  premises,  viz: 


(State  amount  of  claim  as  near  as  may  be.) 

Wherefore  the  applicant  prays  that  a  time  and  place  be  fixed  by  said  Board  for  the  arbitration  and 
adjudication  of  said  matter,  and  that  due  notice  thereof  be  given  to  all  of  the  parties  hereto,  and 
that  an  order  or  award  be  made  by  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  granting  such  relief  as  the  applicant 
may  be  entitled  to  in  the  premises. 


Dated  at 


(Signed) 
. . . ,  this 


(Applicant.) 
day  of . 


191. . 


Note. — Either  party  to  the  dispute  may  apply  to  the  Board  for  the  adjustment  of  the  matter  in 
difference.  The  original  notice  ana  application  shall  be  sent  by  mail  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board, 
Lansing,  Michigan.  If  the  accident  did  not  result  fatally,  describe  particularly  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  injury.  If  death  resulted  to  the  employe  from  the  accident,  so  state,  giving  the  full  name  of 
such  deceased  employe. 


vs. 


ORDER  FOR  ARBITRATION. 


Applicant. 


Respondent  (s). 

The  notice  and  application  of . 

the  above  named  applicant,  for  an  adjustment  of  claim  in  the  above  named  matter  having  been  pre, 
sented  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  and  due  consideration  thereof  having  been  had,  and  it  ap¬ 
pearing  to  the  Board  that  the  arbitration  prayed  for  by  said  applicant  should  be  had;  it  is  ordered  that 
the  matters  in  difference  between  said  applicant  and  said  respondent  mentioned  in  the  notice  and  ap¬ 
plication  filed  herein  be  adjusted  and  determined  by  arbitration  under  the  provisions  of  Act  No.  10 

of  Public  Acts,  Extra  Session,  1912,  and  that  said  arbitration  be  held  at . 

in  the  town  of . .  County  of . . 

State  of  Michigan,  on  the . day  of . 


,  19.. 


68 


commencing  at . o’clock  in  the . noon, 

and  that . of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board 

be  and  he  is  hereby  appointed  and  designated  as  chairman  of  the  committee  to  be  formed  for  such 
arbitration.  It  is  further  ordered  that  due  notice  be  given  to  said  applicant  of  the  time  and  place  of 
such  arbitration,  together  with  request  and  notice  for  said  applicant  to  select  one  member  of  said 
arbitration  committee;  and  that  like  notice  be  given  to  said  respondent  together  with  like  notice  and 
request  that  said  respondent  choose  one  member  of  said  arbitration  committee. 


(Seal.) 

Dated  and  entered  this 


day  of 


Chairman. 

,  A. .  D.  .  19...  . 


State  of  Michigan 
INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 

OAKLAND  BUILDING 

Lansing 

I  herewith  enclose  you  copy  of  the  application  for  adjustment  of  claim  and  notice  of  arbitration  of 
the  same;  also  a  blank  form  on  which  you  are  to  designate  your  member  of  the  arbitration  committee 
which  is  to  hear  and  decide  the  matter.  Please  select  one  man  as  your  member  of  the  committee  of 
arbitration,  write  his  name  in  the  blank  at  the  place  indicated,  date  and  sign  the  same  and  return  to 
the  Industrial  Accident  Board  in  the  enclosed  stamped  envelope. 

You  are  required  under  the  law  to  make  selection  of  your  member  of  the  committee  of  arbitration 
and  to  notify  the  Board  of  your  selection  in  the  manner  set  forth  in  said  form  within  seven  days.  In 
case  of  your  failure  so  to  do  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  to  make  the  selection 
of  such  member.  It  will  be  necessary  for  both  parties  to  be  present  at  the  time  and  place  fixed  for  this 
arbitration,  and  that  they  be  prepared  to  proceed  with  the  matter. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Secretary. 


Form  No.  14. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. 

NOTICE  OF  HEARING 

OF  APPLICATION  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIM 


Applicant. 


Respondent  (s). 

To  the  above  named  parties  and  each  of  them: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  on  the . day  of . 191. ., 

notice  and  application  for  adjustment  of  claim  for  compensation  in  the  above  entitled  matter  was  filed 
with  the  Industrial  Accident  Board  at  its  office  in  Lansing,  Michigan,  and  that  a  true  copy  of  said 
notice  and  application  is  hereto  attached. 

You  will  further  take  notice  that  the  arbitration  of  said  claim  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  o^ 

Act  No.  10  of  the  Public  Acts  of  1912,  extra  session,  will  be  held  on . day  of 

. at . 


in  the  town  of . .  county  of . . . , 

State  of  Michigan,  commencing  at . o’clock  in  the . ....noon 

of  said  day;  and  that  said  applicant (s)  and  said  respondent (s)  are  each  required  to  name  one  member 
of  the  committee  of  arbitration  provided  for  in  said  act  within  seven  days  after  receiving  this  notice, 
and  to  give  notice  of  such  selection  to  the  said  BoaTd  at  its  office  in  the  city  of  Lansing. 

You  are  further  notified  to  be  present  at  the  time  and  place  fixed  for  said  hearing  and  arbitration, 
and  to  be  prepared  to  proceed  with  the  same. 


Dated  at  Lansing,  Michigan,  this 


INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD, 

By . 

Secretary. 

day  of . .  191 .... 


69 


Form  No.  15. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. 

NOTICE  OF  APPOINTMENT 

OF  MEMBER  OF  COMMITTEE  OF  ARBITRATION 


VS. 


Applicant. 


Respondent  (s). 

To  the  Industrial  Accident  Board, 

Lansing,  Michigan. 

Gentlemen: 

You  are  hereby  notified  that . 

whose  postoffice  address  is . 

has  been  chosen  as  a  member  of  the  committee  of  arbitration  in  the  above  entitled  matter  by  the  un¬ 
dersigned. 

[Applicant]  [Respondent  (s)] 

Dated  at . this . day  of . .  191 . . 

Note. — If  this  blank  is  filled  out  by  the  applicant,  the  word  “  respondent  (s)”  should  be  crossed  out 
under  the  signature.  If  filled  out  by  the  respondent (s),  the  word  “applicant"  should  be  crossed  out 
in  the  manner  above  indicated.  Please  fill  out  the  above  blank  and  forward  to  the  Industrial  Accident 
Board,  Lansing,  Michigan,  in  the  enclosed  envelope  within  seven  days  after  it  is  received  by  you. 
Write  the  full  name  of  the  member  of  the  committee  of  arbitration  chosen  by  you  as  plainly  as  possible. 


Iii  a  large  majority  of  cases  the  parties  can  and  do  procure  the  at¬ 
tendance  of  their  witnesses  without  the  use  of  the  subpoena.  However, 
in  some  cases  a  means  for  compelling  attendance  of  witnesses  is  neces¬ 
sary,  and  on  application  the  Board  will  issue  witness  subpoenas  in  the 
following  form,  viz. : 


State  of  Michigan 
INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 

OAKLAND  BUILDING 

Lansing 


Form  No.  16. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. 

WITNESS  SUBPOENA. 

STATE  OF  MICHIGAN, 

County  of . 

To . 

. . . .  GREETING. 

In  the  name  of  the  people  of  the  State  of  Michigan: 

You  are  hereby  required  and  commanded  to  be  and  appear  before . 

. . of  the 

Industrial  Accident  Board  of  Michigan,  at  the . 

in  the  city  of . .  county  of . .  State  of 

Michigan,  on  the . day  of . A.  D.  191. . , 

at . . o’clock  in  the . noon,  then  and  there  to  give  evidence  in  a  certain 

matter  pending  before  said . . . 

. wherein 

. is  applicant 


and . . . is 

respondent  or  respondents,  as  the  case  may  be.  Hereof  fail  at  your  peril. 

Given  under  the  hand  and  seal  of  said  Board  this . day  of 

. A.  D.  191. 


INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD  OF  MICHIGAN. 

By . 


Member  of  Board. 


70 


Form  No.  17. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. 

AWARD  OF  ARBITRATION. 


Applicant, 


Respondent  (s). 

Notice  and  application  for  adjustment  of  claim  for  compensation  having  been  filed  with  said  Board 
in  the  above  entitled  matter,  and  thereafter  said  Board  having  requested  both  of  the  parties  to  appoint 
their  respective  representatives  on  the  committee  of  arbitration,  and  said  committee  of  arbitration 

having  been  duly  formed,  consisting  of . 

representing  said  applicant,  and . 

representing  said  respondent  (s),  and . 

member  of  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  as  chairman  thereof;  and  said  matter  having  come  on  to  be 

heard  before  the  aforesaid  arbitration  committee  at . 

in  the  city  of . .  county  of . 

and  State  of  Michigan,  on  the . day  of . 19. . . .,  at . 

o’clock  in  the . noon,  and  after  hearing  the  proofs  and  allegations  of  the  said  applicant (s) 

and  said  respondent  (s),  and  said  committee  having  made  careful  inquiry  and  investigation  of  said 
matter  and  being  fully  advised  in  the  premises,  doth  find,  determine  and  adjudge  that  the  said  ap¬ 
plicant,  . . 

is . entitled  to  receive  and  recover  from  said  respondent  (s) . .’ . 

the  sum  of . dollars  per  week  for  a  period  of . 


weeks,  from  the . day  of . .  191 . . ,  and  that  said  applicant . . 

is  entitled  to  receive  and  recover  from  said  respondent  (s)  on  this  date . 

dollars,  being  the  amount  of  such  compensation  that  has  already  become  due  under  the  provisions  of 

law,  the  remainder  of  said  award  to  be  paid  to  said . 

applicant,  by  said  respondent (s)  in  weekly  payments,  commencing  one  week  from  the  date  of  the  award. 


Committee  of  Arbitration. 
By . 


Chairman. 


Dated  and  entered  this . day  of . A.  D.  19 - 

In  a  considerable  number  of  cases,  the  facts  surrounding  the  injury 
are  not  in  dispute,  the  only  matter  of  uncertainty  being  the  application 
of  the  law  to  such  facts  and  conditions.  Frequently  in  such  cases  the 
parties  desire  to  submit  to  the  Board  directly  the  legal  questions  in 
dispute,  waiving  arbitration  and  obtaining  a  speedy  decision  of  the  full 
Board  thereon.  For  the  purpose  of  facilitating  this  practice  the  Board 
has  prepared  the  following  form  for  stipulating  the  facts  and  submitting 
the  matter  directly  to  the  full  Board,  viz. : 

Form  No.  18. 

Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Michigan. 

STIPULATION,  AND  WAIVER  OF  ARBITRATION. 


Applicant, 

vs. 


Respondent  (s). 

The  facts  in  this  case  being  undisputed  and  the  only  matter  in  difference  between  the  parties  hereto 


71 


being  the  construction  and  application  to  said  facts  of  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Law,  being  Act 
No.  10,  Public  Acts  1912,  extra  session,  and  the  parties  hereto  desiring  to  obtain  a  decision  of  said  matter 
by  the  full  board  without  resorting  to  arbitration,  do  hereby  stipulate  and  agree  as  follows: 

1.  That  the  accident  to  the  employe,  upon  which  the  claim  for  compensation  in  this  cause  is  based, 

occurred  on  the . day  of . 19. . 

in  the  town  of . county  of . 

State  of  Michigan,  and  that  the  same  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment.  That  the 

character  and  nature  of  the  injury  and  the  result  thereof  is  as  follows:  . 

»  (State  in  detail  the  nature  of 


the  injury,  disability  or  death  resulting,  etc.) 


2.  That  the  facts  relating  to  the  wages  of 
said  employe  are  as  follows: . 


If  average  weekly  wage  is  undisputed,  so  state;  if  disputed,  state  all  material  facts  relating  to  same. . .  . 


3.  The  other  material  facts  in  said  cause  not  included  in  paragraphs  1  and  2  are  as  follows: 


4.  That  the  arbitration  of  the  matters  in  difference  between  the  parties  hereto,  provided  for  in  said 
Workmen’s  Compensation  law,  be  and  the  same  is  hereby  waived,  and  the  decision  of  said  matters  is 
hereby  submitted  to  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  sitting  as  a  full  board,  the  same  as  if  this  cause 
had  proceeded  to  arbitration  under  said  law,  and  the  decision  on  arbitration  therein  had  been  appealed 
from  and  said  cause  thereby  brought  before  the  full  board  on  appeal  from  such  decision.  It  is  further 
stipulated  and  agreed  that  the  decision  of  said  board  in  this  cause  pursuant  to  this  stipulation,  and  based 
upon  the  facts  set  forth  herein  shall  be  valid  and  binding,  and  shall  have  the  same  validity,  force  and 
effect  as  if  said  cause  had  proceeded  to  arbitration  in  due  course,  and  was  brought  before  the  full  board 
on  appeal  duly  taken  from  the  decision  of  an  arbitration  committee  therein. 

In  witness  whereof  the  parties  hereto  have  signed  this  stipulation  at . ^ ...  in 


the  county  of . State  of  Michigan,  this 

day  of . 191 . . 


(Applicant.) 

Signed  in  presence  of 

(Respondents.) 


STATE  OF  MICHIGAN, 
County  of . 


On  this . day  of . 19.. 

before  me . .  a  notary 

public  in  and  for  said  county  personally  appeared . •• 

known  to  me  to  be  the  persons  described  in  and  who  signed  the  foregoing  stipulation,  and  acknowledged 
that  they  signed  the  same  as  their  free  act  and  deed.  And  I  further  certify  that  I  read  over  all  of  said 
stipulation  to  said  persons,  and  fully  acquainted  them  with  the  contents  thereof  before  the  same  was 
acknowledged  and  signed  by  him  (them). 


Myjcpmmissioa  expires^the 


day  of 


Notary  Public. 
. 19 _ 


72 


STATE  OF  MICHIGAN,  j 

County  of . J 

On  this . day  of . 19 _ 

before  me . .  a  notary 

public  in  and  for  said  county  personally  appeared . . 

known  to  me  to  be  the  person  who  signed  the  foregoing  stipulation  on  behalf  of . 

. the  employer  therein  mentioned,  and 

acknowledged  that  he  executed  the  same  on  behalf  of  said . 

being  duly  authorized  so  to  do,  and  that  the  same  is  his  free  act  and  deed  as . 

(State  position  or  office.) 

for  said  employer. 

Notary  Public. 

My  commission  expires  on  the . day  of . 19 _ 


APPEAL  FROM  DECISION  OF  ARBITRATION  COMMITTEE. 

The  decision  of  an  arbitration  committee  will  stand  as  the  decision  of 
the  Industrial  Accident  Board  unless  a  claim  for  review  is  filed  by 
either  party  to  the  cause  within  seven  days.  The  act,  however,  gives 
the  Board  power  to  grant  further  time  in  which  to  claim  such  review 
if  sufficient  cause  be  shown.  The  Board  has  prepared  the  following 
form  for  making  application  for  review: 

Form  No.  19.  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act. 

STATE  OF  MICHIGAN 

INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  BOARD 

Lansing 

APPLICATION  FOR  REVIEW  OF  CLAIM  BEFORE  FULL  BOARD. 


To  the  Industrial  Accident  Board,  Lansing,  Mich. 

Gentlemen: — The  undersigned,  as  provided  in  Part  3,  Sec.  8,  of  Act  No.  10,  Public  Acts  1912,  makes 

application  for  a  review  of  the  findings  of  the  Committee  on  Arbitration  in  the  claim  of . 

. vs. 


This  claim  for  review  is  based  on  the  following  grounds: 


Dated  at . this . day  of . . 19 ... . 

Section  11.  Part  3.  If  a  claim  for  review  is  filed,  as  provided  in  part  three,  section  eight,  the  in¬ 
dustrial  accident  board  shall  promptly  review  the  decision  of  the  committee  of  arbitration  and  such 
records  as  may  have  been  kept  of  its  hearings,  and  shall  also  if  desired  hear  the  parties,  together  with 
such  additional  evidence  as  they  may  wish  to  submit,  and  file  its  decision  therein  with  the  records 
of  such  proceedings.  Such  review  and  hearing  may  be  held  in  its  office  at  Lansing  or  elsewhere  as 
the  board  shall  deem  advisable. 

Section  12.  The  findings  of  fact  made  by  said  industrial  accident  board  acting  within  its  powers, 
shall,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  be  conclusive,  but  the  supreme  court  shall  have  power  to  review  ques¬ 
tions  of  law  involved  in  any  final  decision  or  determination  of  said  industrial  accident  board:  Pro¬ 
vided,  That  application  is  made  by  the  aggrieved  party  within  thirty  days  after  such  determination 
by  certiorari,  mandamus  or  by  any  other  method  permissible  under  the  rules  and  practice  of  said 
court  or  the  law  of  this  State,  and  to  make  such  further  orders  in  respect  thereto  as  justice  may  re¬ 
quire. 


INDEX. 


10 


OPINIONS  IN  LEADING  CASES  HEARD  ON  REVIEW. 


INDEX  TO  CASES. 

Page 

Acme  White  Lead  &  Color  Works,  Kathryn  Adams  vs . .  31 

Chalmers  Motor  Car  Co.,  Jessie  B.  Clem  vs .  40 

C.  H.  Little  Co.,  Jacob  Rider  vs .  27 

Detroit  Saturday  Night,  Maud  Spooner  vs .  44 

Detroit  Steel  Products  Co.  vs.  Helen  Jendrus .  21 

Ford  Motor  Co.,  X.  B.  Konkel  vs .  29 

Harry  Hart .  18 

Helen  Jendrus,  Detroit  Steel  Products  Co.  vs .  21 

Jacob  Rider  vs.  C.  H.  Little  Co . . .  27 

Jessie  B.  Clem  vs.  Chalmers  Motor  Car  Co .  40 

Joe  Andrewjeski  vs.  Wolverine  Coal  Co .  36 

Kathryn  Redfield,  Michigan  Workmen’s  Compensation  Mutual  Insurance  Co.  vs .  34 

Kathryn  Adams  vs.  Acme  White  Lead  &  Color  Works . ' .  31 

Keyes-Davis  Co.  vs.  Lee  E.  Alderdyce .  19 

Lee  E.  Alderdyce,  Keyes-Davis  Co.  vs .  19 

Leone  Hills  vs.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co .  32 

Lida  Rayner  vs.  Sligh  Furniture  Co .  22 

Maud  Spooner  vs.  Detroit  Saturday  Night . . .  44 

Michigan  Agricultural  College,  Willis  M.  Agler  vs .  25 

Michigan  Cabinet  Co.,  Pietternella  Yisser  vs .  24 

Michigan  Workmen’s  Compensation  Mutual  Insurance  Co.  vs.  Kathryn  Redfield .  34 

Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,  Leone  Hills  vs .  32 

Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,  Philip  Limron  vs .  43 

Philip  Limron  vs.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co .  43 

Pietternella  Yisser  vs.  Michigan  Cabinet  Co . .  24 

Sligh  Furniture  Co.,  Lida  Rayner  vs .  22 

Willis  M.  Agler  vs.  Michigan  Agricultural  College .  25 

Wolverine  Coal  Co.,  Joe  Andrewjeski  vs .  36 

X.  B.  Konkel  vs.  Ford  Motor  Co .  29 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


A. 

Page 

Absence  of  physical  injury .  24 

Acceptance  of  Act;  things  to  be  observed .  61 

employer’s  written .  62 

Accident  outside  of  state;  liability  for .  19 

Accidents;  forms  for  reporting .  .-55 

what  to  be  reported .  52 

when  to  be  reported .  53 

fifteenth-day  report .  54 

how  to  report . 53 

immediate  report  required .  53 

supplemental  report .  53 

Administrator;  compensation  not  payable  to .  8 

Administration  and  practice: 

1.  Selection  of  arbitrators .  48 

2.  Postponement  of  cases . 48 

3.  Insurer  deemed  party .  49 

4.  Agreements  and  awards . 49 

5.  Grounds  for  denying  liability  to  be  stated .  49 

6  Witnesses  and  proofs .  49 

7.  Hearings  on  review .  50 

8.  Contested  medical  and  hospital  bills .  50 

9.  Postponement  of  review  hearings .  51 

10.  Lump  sum  payments .  51 

11.  Appeals  to  Supreme  Court .  51 

12.  Findings  of  fact  and  law .  52 

After  first  three  weeks;  payment  of  hospital  expense .  12 

Agreement;  memorandum .  53 

Agreements  and  awards .  49 

Appeal  from  decision  of  arbitration  committee .  72 

Appeal  to  Supreme  Court .  51 

Application  for  adjustment  of  claim .  67 

Appointment;  notice  of .  69 

Arbitration;  order  for .  67 

Arbitrators;  selection  of .  48 

Average  weekly  wage;  method  of  computing .  36 

Award  of  arbitration .  70 

Awards  and  agreements .  49 

B. 

Boat  owners,  liability  of .  8 

Burial  expenses .  29 

C. 

Cases;  postponement  of .  48 

Casual  employment .  25 

Certificates  filed  by  insurance  companies .  63 

by  employers .  65 

Commission  salesmen .  6 

Compensation;  receipts  for .  53 


77 


Page 

Compensation  where  loss  of  foot  and  additional  injuries .  43 

not  payable  to  administrator . ; .  8 

for  loss  of  member  does  not  depend  on  loss  of  time .  14 

for  loss  of  more  than  one  finger;  method  of  paying .  9 

Contested  medical  and  hospital  bills .  50 

Constitutional  bodies .  25 

Contract  funeral;  burial  expenses . 29 

Construction  of  law  average  weekly  wage . .  30 


D. 


Death  claimed  to  be  due  to  other  causes . * .  34 

Denying  liability:  grounds  for  to  be  stated .  49 

Disability;  presuming  duration  of .  6 

Disease;  injury  aggravated  by .  7 

Disease;  occupational . 31 

Duty  to  seek  employment;  partial  disability .  10 


E. 

Early  rulings  of  Board .  3-17 

Election;  when  employe  is  subject .  16 

Employed;  injured  teamster  not  regularly .  27 

Employer;  posting  of  notices  by .  6 

acquiescence  of  in  infraction  of  rules .  22 

insurance  company  reporting  for .  7 

Employers:  notices  to  be  posted  by .  64 

certificates  to  be  filed  by .  65 

Employer  and  employe;  question  of  by  whom  was  deceased  employed  .  . .  44 

Employment;  casual .  25 

duty  to  seek  when  partially  disabled .  10 


F. 

Fact  and  law;  findings  of .  52 

Factory  rules;  observance  of . 22 

acquiescence  of  employer  in  infraction  of .  22 

Final  report .  53 

Findings  of  fact  and  law .  52 

Finger;  method  of  paying  compensation  for  when  loss  of  more  than  one .  9 

Forms  for  reporting  accidents — 

Weekly  report  form . 56 

Where  compensation  involved .  57 

Supplemental  report .  57 

Final  report . 58 

Forms  used  in  making  payments — 

Agreement  in  regard  to  compensation .  ,  59 

Compensation  receipts .  60 

Settlement  receipt .  60 

Fright  or  shock;  absence  of  physical  injury .  24 

Funeral  contract;  burial  expense .  29 


G. 

Grounds  for  denying  liability  to  be  stated . 


49 


H. 


Hearing;  notice  of .  68 

Hearings  on  review .  50 

postponement  of .  54 

Hospital  bills;  contested  medical  and .  60 

tickets,  medical  and .  12 

expenses;  payment  of  after  first  three  weeks .  12 

How  to  report  accidents .  54 


78 


I.  Page 

Incapacity;  partial  after  fourteen  days .  7 

Injured  teamster  not  regularly  employed .  27 

owner  of  team  and  wagon .  27 

Injury  aggravated  by  disease .  7 

neglect  to  properly  care  for .  8 

absence  of  physical .  24 

Insurance  company  reporting  for  employers .  7 

companies;  certificates  to  be  filed  by .  63 

Insurers  deemed  party .  49 

Intentional  and  wilful  misconduct .  40 

L. 

Law ;  provisions  and  progress .  3 

findings  of  fact  and .  52 

Lead  poisoning;  occupational  disease . 31 

Liability  of  boat  owners .  8 

for  accident  occurring  outside  of  state .  19 

grounds  for  denying  to  be  stated .  49 

Loss  of  usefulness  of  member .  13 

of  more  than  one  finger;  method  of  paying  compensation  for .  9 

of  member;  compensation  for  does  not  depend  on  loss  of  time .  14 

of  foot  and  other  injuries  from  same  accident ;  compensation  for .  43 

Lump  settlement  during  disability .  10 

sum  payments . 51 

M. 

Master  and  servant;  negligence .  32 

Medical  and  hospital  bills;  contested .  50 

and  hospital  tickets .  11 

services  rendered  more  than  three  weeks  after  accident .  18 

Member;  loss  of  usefulness .  13 

compensation  for  loss  of  does  not  depend  on  loss  of  time .  14 

Memorandum  agreement .  53 

Method  of  paying  compensation  for  loss  of  more  than  one  finger .  9 

Miners  receiving  part  pay  in  supplies .  11 

Minors;  payment  of  compensation  to .  15 

Misconduct;  intentional  and  wilful .  40 

Municipalities;  posting  of  notices  by .  7 

N. 

Neglect  to  properly  care  for  injury .  8 

Negligence,  wilful;  what  constitutes .  12 

master  and  servant .  32 

death  claimed  to  be  due  to  other  causes . .  34 

Notice  of  hearing .  68 

of  appointment .  69 

and  application  for  adjustment  of  claim .  67 

Notices;  posting  by  employers .  6 

posting  of  by  municipalities . . .  .  .  7 

to  be  posted  by  employers .  64 

O. 

Observance  of  factory  rules .  22 

Occupational  disease;  lead  poisoning . 31 

Operation;  refusal  to  submit .  21 

Opinions  of  Board  in  leading  cases  heard  on  review .  18-47 

Order  for  arbitration .  67 


79 


P.  Page 

Part  pay  in  supplies;  miners  receiving .  11 

Partial  incapacity  after  fourteen  days .  7 

disability;  duty  to  seek  employment .  10 

Party;  insurer  deemed .  49 

Payment  of  compensation  to  minors .  15 

of  hospital  expense  after  first  three  weeks .  12 

Payments;  lump  sum .  51 

to  be  made  weekly .  9 

Physical  injury;  absence  of .  24 

Plan  of  making  payment .  14 

Poisoning,  lead;  occupational  disease . 31 

Posting  of  notices  by  employer .  6 

of  notices  by  municipalities .  7 

Postponement  of  cases .  48 

of  review  hearings .  51 

Presuming  duration  of  disability .  6 

Procedure  in  disputed  cases — 

Notice  and  application  for  adjustment  of  claim .  67 

Order  for  arbitration .  67 

Notice  to  parties .  68' 

Notice  of  hearing .  68 

Notice  of  appointment .  69 

Witness  subpoena .  69 

Award  of  arbitration .  70 

Stipulation  and  waiver  of  arbitration .  70 

Appeal  from  decision  of  arbitration  committee .  72 

Proofs;  witnesses  and .  49 

Progress  of  the  law .  3 

Provisions  of  the  law .  3 

Q. 

Question  of  by  whom  was  deceased  employed .  44 

R. 

Receipts  for  compensation .  53 

Re-employment  no  part  of  settlement .  10 

Refusal  to  submit  to  operation .  21 

Report ;  final .  58 

of  accident  where  compensation  involved .  56 

Reporting;  insurance  companies  for  employer .  7 

Review;  hearings  on .  50 

hearing;  postponement  of .  51 

Rules;  violation  of  shop .  6 

factory ;  observance  of .  22 

acquiescence  by  employer  in  infraction  of .  22 

Rules  of  procedure  adopted  by  Board : 

1.  What  accidents  to  be  reported .  52 

2.  When  to  be  reported .  53 

3.  Fifteenth-day  report .  53 

4.  Immediate  report  required .  53 

5.  Memorandum  agreement .  53 

6.  Supplemental  report .  53 

7.  Receipts  for  compensation .  53 

8.  Final  report .  53 

Rulings  of  Board;  early .  3-17 

S. 

Salesman;  commission .  6 

Selection  of  arbitrators .  48 


80 


Page 

Settlement;  lump  sum  during  disability .  10 

re-employment  no  part  of .  10 

Shop  rules;  violation  of .  6 

Stipulation  and  waiver  of  arbitration .  70 

Supplemental  report .  57 

Supreme  Court;  appeals  to .  51 

T. 

Team  and  wagon;  owner  of  injured .  27 

Teamster  injured;  not  regularly  employed .  27 

Things  to  remember. . .  54 

V. 

Violation  of  shop  rules .  6 

W. 

Waiver  of  arbitration . 70 

Weekly  payments .  9 

wage,  average;  method  of  computing .  36 

report  form .  56 

What  accidents  to  be  reported .  52 

Wilful  negligence;  what  constitutes .  12 

Witness  subpoena .  69 

Witnesses  and  proofs .  49 


